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ABSTRACT OF THESIS
Soviet-Japanese relations were re-established in October 1956, 
After the end of the Pacific war, the Soviet Union and Japan did 
not restore diplomatic relations because of Soviet refusal to 
participate in the San Francisco Peace Treaty. In the middle of 
the 1950s, both countries began to search for a way to
normalization. In the summer of 1955, the negotiations for
normalization of Soviet-Japanese relations started in London. The 
most intractable problem was the territorial question over the 
disposition of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. The negotiations 
were prolonged because the two governments could not reach a 
definite agreement on this issue. On 19 October 1956, as a 
result of the negotiations which had lasted for more than a year, 
both the two countries finally reached an agreement to re-establish 
diplomatic relations by shelving the territorial issue.
This thesis mainly deals with process of the Soviet-Japanese 
normalization talks. The following points were mainly focused in 
this thesis. Firstly, the negotiations on the territorial issue
are examined and described in detail. Chapter 1 deals with 
Anglo-American treatment of the issue during the period from the
Yalta Secret Agreement to the San Francisco Peace Treaty and
discribes how the territorial issue came into existence. Chapters 
3 to 8 describe the development of the negotiations on this issue 
in 1955-6. Secondly, this thesis examines British and American
attitudes towards the normalization talks. Previously, American 
attitudes have been touched on by the preceeding works. But the 
attitudes of Britain, which was one of the most important signatory 
to the San Francisco Peace Treaty and one of the most significant 
western allies for the Japanese, have been ignored. This thesis 
attempts to cast some analytical light on the British attitudes by 
relying on the documents of Public Record Office. The American 
attitudes are also examined, based on the State Department 
documents. Finally, domestic influence in Japan on the 
negotiations is analized. Though there are many domestic factors 
which should be examined, focus of analysis is placed on policy 
divergence within the Japanese political leaders. These foci are 
not treated separately in this thesis. Rather, the Soviet- 
Japanese normalization talks are dealt with in this thesis as an 
interaction among those abovementioned factors.
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PREFACE
On 19 October 1956, the Soviet Union and Japan normalized their 
relations after more than ten years of the lack of diplomatic 
relations. For Japan, normalization with Russia was one of the 
most crucial tasks which she had to carry out as an independent 
country after the San Francisco Peace Treaty had come into effect. 
For the Soviet Union, it was a crucial goal of her new foreign 
policy which was aimed to reduce international tensions between 
East and Vest. As a result of Soviet-Japanese normalization, the 
two countries terminated the state of war and exchanged 
ambassadors. But Soviet-Japanese territorial dispute over the
disposition of Japan's former northern islands, the Kuriles and 
southern Sakhalin, could not be settled. Since then, the 
territorial question between Russia and Japan has been a stumbling 
block to further improvement of their relations. Even now, when 
the leaders of both of the superpowers have declared the end of the 
cold war, the territorial question seems to prevent the Japanese 
and the Russians from expanding new horizon of Soviet-Japanese 
relations. In other words, the result of Soviet-Japanese
normalization in 1955-56 have been imposing negative effects on 
relations between the two, more than three decades. This thesis is 
primarily an account of the negotiations leading up to the Soviet- 
Japanese Joint Declaration of 1956, whereby the two countries re­
established their diplomatic relations.
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Although the official documents on this issue of the Soviet 
Union and Japan were still closed, it has recently become possible 
to have an access to British and American documents regarding
foreign policy in 1955 and 1956. In addition to that, several
important private diaries have also recently become open to public 
in Japan. It is now possible to examine the progress of Soviet- 
Japanese negotiations more deeply and more satisfactorily by relying 
on those materials. At the same time, American and British
attitudes towards the negotiations can be more positively 
examined. Researches for this thesis have mainly been carried out 
at the Public Record Office in Kew. I have also visited the
Rational Archives in Washington D. C. to consult the State 
Department files. This visit was financially assisted by the 
Central Research Fund of the University of London. Here I would 
like to express a gratitude to the Fund for enabling me to carry 
out the research in Washington/.
Finally, I would like to thank Professor Ian Nish for having 
offered me many interesting and stimulating suggestions without 
which I would not have chosen this greatly significant and also 
interesting topic and without which I could hardly have proceeded 
with this thesis.
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IWTRODUCTION 
RUSSO-JAPANESE RELATIONS,
XQSS— X^5 X
The Soviet-Japanese normalization which forms theme gf this thesis 
can only be understood against background of development of 
Russo-Japanese and Soviet-Japanese relations from the origins of 
their inter-governmental relationship in 1855 to the conclusion of 
the San Francisco Peace Treaty. While it is not necessary to 
deal with all aspects of relations between the two countries since 
the middle of the 1850s, it is necessary in this introduction to 
discuss some aspects of the relationship which have influenced 
the post-war Soviet-Japanese dispute.
Since Russia began to move into north-east Asia in the 1850s, 
the most important issues for the two countries were the 
definition of the Russo-Japanese frontier and the revision of 
their unequal treaty. The frontier questions were solved when 
Tsarist Russia and the Tokugawa shogunate hammered out a peace and 
friendship treaty in the Treaty of Shimoda <1855), whereby Japan 
entered into commercial and diplomatic relations with Russia. Its 
second article stipulated that the frontier should be drawn 
between Etorofu and Uruppu of the Kuriles and that Sakhalin should 
remained unpartitioned between Russia and Japan. C See MapIIIJ
y j
While they defined the frontier in the Kuriles, the question of 
Sakhalin remained unsettled until after the Meiji Restoration. In 
1875, Enomoto Takeaki, the then Japanese minister to Russia, and 
Peter Stremoukhov, director of the Asian Department of the Russian 
Foreign Ministry, finally settled the question along the line that 
the parties should exchange the Kuriles for Sakhalin. Thus, Japan 
became entitled to the whole of the Kuriles including 18 islands 
located to the north of Etorofu, in exchange for Japan's 
recognition of Russian possession of the whole of Sakhalin. This
agreement was contained in the Treaty of St. Petersburg (1875), 
which is also called the Treaty of the Sakhalin-Kuriles Exchange. 
In 1950s, the Japanese Foreign Ministry was to start to assert
that 'the Kuriles' did not include Etorofu and Kunashiri by 
interpreting the Treaty of St. Petersburg as that it defined 
the 18 islands as 'the Kuriles'.1 In this sense, the
Treaty of Petersburg was greatly important for the Soviet-Japanese
territorial dispute almost 80 years later.
In August 1889, a new treaty revised the peace and friendship 
treaty of 1855 and provided for the Russian renunciation of 
extraterritorial rights, and increased tariff rate for Japan and 
most-favoured-nation status for Russia. While relations in 1870s 
and 1880s were relatively stable, Russian expansionist attitudes 
seem to have planted in the minds of the Japanese people a sense 
of threat. At the beginning of the 19th century, the Russians had 
tried to open Japan under the Tokugawa shogunate by sending a 
mission headed by JTikolai Lezanov. This mission was met with a
strong refusal from the Japanese and tuned out to be a failure. 
On his way bach home, he ordered an officier, Lieutenant Khvostov, 
to attack the Japanese residents on the Kuriles and Sakhalin. 
Russian warships attacked Sakhlain and Etorofu, burned Japanese 
residences and abducted some Japanese inhabitants. Information 
about this incident was communicated to Edo (Tokyo), and led to 
its being alarmed by the threat from Russia.2 This sense of threat 
was confirmed by the Posadnik incident in 1861. A Russian warship 
Posadnik attacked and occupied Tsushima for more than six months. 
Long after the collapse of the Tokugawa shogunate, as a result of 
these incidents, the Japanese military and political leaders held 
the view that Russia was the most malignant menace to Japan's 
security.
With the arrival of the railway age at north China in the 1890s, 
the Japanese thrust towards Korea and Manchuria was intensified. 
This culminated in Japan declaring war on Russia in February 1904 
and defeating the Russian troops in Korea and southern Manchuria. 
The war came to an end in 1905 through good offices of President 
Theodore Roosevelt. As the victor in the war, Japan acquired the 
southern half of Sakhalin and substantial territorial and railway 
interests in Manchuria. Even then, public opinion in Japan was 
not satisfied with the result of the peace with Russia and showed 
in riots how hostile Japanese feeling towards Russia was. After 
the war, the two former-enemies tried to avoid any direct clashes 
by entering into various treaties; in 1907, they agreed to 
establish the first Russo-Japanese entente, which was revised in
1910 and 1912. The outbreak of World War I in 1914 even 
strengthened Japan's ties with Russia which needed Japanese 
assistance in the supply of war materials and manpower. In July 
1916, the two countries signed the Russo-Japanese alliance. Ten 
years after reaching a peak of tension, Russo-Japanese alliance 
reached a peace of cooperation.3
The success of the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 provoked the 
Japanese to fear communist infiltration from the Soviet Union. 
Relations now took on the character of relations between a 
communist country and an imperialist one, and created 
opportunities for pursuing Japanese imperialist ambitions in the 
east by taking part in the Siberian intervention from 1918 to 
1922. During this intervention, the Japanese occupied northern 
Sakhalin in 1920. The fact that the first encounter between 
Japan and the Soviet Union took a form of Japan's military 
intervention was an unfortunate one. Distrust towards Japan must 
have been deeply planted in the minds of the Soviet leaders. More 
than thirty years after the intervention, the Soviets were still 
quoting it as an example of Japan's violation of international 
rules.+
In May 1924, the first formal negotiations for the first 
normalization of Soviet-Japanese relations were convened in Peking 
between Yoshizawa Kenkichi, the Japanese minister to China, and L. 
Karakhan, the Soviet minister to China. Though there were sharp 
divergences, the two governments finally managed, in January 1925,
U
to hammer out an agreement on the establishment of diplomatic 
relations. The two countries exchanged ambassadors in the spring 
of 1925, Tanaka Tokichi being appointed to the Soviet Union and 
V.L. Kopp the first Soviet ambassador to Japan. In addition, 
Japanese troops which had been stationed in northern Sakhalin 
since 1920 were withdrawn in May 1925. A fishery agreement, 
worked out in January 1928, guaranteed stable fishing rights for 
the Japanese for the following eight years.
But there were ideological differences underlying the new 
relationship. These were raised to a new level by the actions of 
the Kwangtung Army in 'Manchuria' in 1931-3. The tensions between 
the two countries became even more acute, when the Anti-Comintern 
Pact was concluded between Japan and Germany in 1936. The Soviets 
retaliated by refusing to renew the fishery agreement of 1928. 
Moreover, Japan's economic interests in northern Sakhalin became 
considerably limited. At the end of the 1930s, the tense 
relations led to large-scale military confrontations over the 
border between the Soviet Union and Manchuria: in July 1938, 
Soviet and Japanese troops clashed at Chankufeng and in May 1939 
at Momonhan, the first clashes involving modernized armaments like 
airpower and tank warfare.5
The Japanese military reverses over the Soviet-Manchurian 
borders generated intense anti-Soviet feelings in the Japanese 
army and people. Within the Japanese government, however, there 
emerged a strong opinion that Japan should urgently improve her
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relations with the Soviet Union. It was Matsuoka Ydsuke, the 
foreign minister of the Konoe administration, who embodied the 
view by concluding the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact in April 
1941. Despite the conclusion of the Neutrality Pact, some 
influential Japanese political and military leaders began to argue 
for Japan's advance to the north. The outbreak of the Soviet- 
German war on 22 June 1941 not only changed the European situation 
drastically but also encouraged anti-Soviet hardliners among the 
Japanese leaders. The Japanese military insisted on attacking 
Russia in order to take advantage of the strategic situation which 
was favourable to Japan. After the cabinet reshuffle at the 
middle of July, the Japanese government finally decided not to 
attack the Soviet Union.6
As the Pacific war went unfavourable for the Japanese, the 
government approached the Soviet government with an offer for good 
offices for a Soviet-German peace. But the Russians rejected the 
proposal. It became the utmost goal for the Japanese to maintain 
Soviet neutrality in the Pacificwar, and they tried after 1943 to 
settle the problems relating to fishing and the liquidation of 
Japanese interests in northern Sakhalin. By the spring of 1944, 
these problems were solved on the basis of the compromises on the 
Japanese part. Although the Japanese were hoping that the Soviets 
would agree to renew the Neutrality Pact, the Soviet Union 
declared in April 1945 that she had no intention to renew it.r
As the state of the war became disastrous for Japan, the Soviet 
Union came to be perceived by the Japanese leaders as the last 
resort for achieving a dignified defeat. The Japanese government 
decided in May 1945 to ash for Soviet good offices to bring about 
peace with the Allied Powers. But the Soviet Union ignored the 
Japanese requests which continued until July 1945. The U.S.S.S. 
had already promised the Allied Powers, the U.S. and Britain, at 
the Yalta Conference in February to enter the war against Japan 
within b months of the surrender of Germany. Instead of accepting 
the Japanese request, the Russians declared war on Japan on 8 
August and their troops advanced southward to Japan through 
Manchuria and the Kuriles. The Japanese interpreted the Soviet 
advance into those areas as the violation of the Neutrality Pact 
because the Pact was still effective even though the Russians had 
refused to renew it. Consequently, many Japanese leaders came to 
hold a strong hostile feeling and mistrust towards the Soviet 
Union.
Faced with the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the two 
Atomic bombs and the Soviet entry into the war, the Japanese 
government finally decided to accept the Potsdam Declaration and, 
on 15 August, the bloody war which had been fought for almost four 
years was terminated by the unconditinal surrender of Japan. 
Because of the Russo-American discord over their interests in 
Japan, the occupation of Japan by the Allied Powers and the peace 
settlement with her became the stage for superpower confrontaion. 
During the occupations period, Soviet-Japanese relations evolved
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strictly within the framework of Soviet-American relations or the 
relations between the Japanese government and the Japanese 
Communist Party, which was greatly influenced by Soviet 
instructions. U.S.-U.S.S.R. power struggles took place over 
questions of form of occupation organizations, and questions over 
which socio-political regime post-war Japan should adopt. These 
struggles resulted with American victory: General MacArthur came 
to dominate the decision-making of occupation policy and finally 
succeeded in stopping expansion of influence of the Japanese 
progressives through the so-called 'Red Purge* and 'Reverse 
Course'.
Since 1947, the cold war had been intensified and spread to the 
far east. In October 1949, the People's Republic of China came 
into existence. The Korean war broke out in June 1950. The fate 
of Japan was affected by this development of the cold war in the 
far east. The Peace Treaty with Japan was concluded in San 
Francisco in September 1951. The Peace Treaty reflected this 
international context of the cold war. The Soviet Union refused 
to become a party to this treaty. As a result of this, the state 
of war between Japan and Russia remained unresolved. In theory, 
the Soviets were able to attack Japan without a new declaration of 
war. The American and British government did not hesitated to 
conclude the peace with Japan without Soviet participation. With 
the Peace Treaty, Japan signed the U.S.-Japanese Security Pact. 
The establishment of the U.S.-Japanese defense system meant a 
military confrontation between two camps in the far east.
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The United States played the most important and responsible 
roles in making the peace with Japan. In this sense, it was the 
U.S. which mainly dragged Japan into the cold war in the far 
east. But it must not be ignored that Britain, as one of the 
architects of the Peace Treaty, also contributed to this result. 
In fact, an original idea of a bilateral security arrangement 
which was embodied by the U. S.-Japanese Security Pact had been 
suggested to the United States by the British. The British
government also hastened to conclude the peace treaty with Japan 
even without Soviet participating the treaty. The two countries 
basically worked together to keep the Japanese in the western 
camp, though there were various differences between Britain and 
the U.S. over the issue of the peace with Japan: for example, the 
treatment of China and the disposition of the Kuriles and 
Sakhalin.a
On 28 April 1952, the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into 
effect. The Yoshida government made it clear that it did not
recognize any diplomatic authority of the Liaison Mission of the
Soviet Union for the Allied Council for Japan ih Tokyo, on the
ground that diplomatic relations had not yet been restored between 
Japan and Russia. The Japanese government notified on 30 May 
the Soviet Mission in Tokyo that it had already lost the legal 
ground for its stationing in Japan, with the termination of the 
A.C.J. In reply to the Japanese notification, on 11 June, the 
Soviet Mission refused to dissolve the Mission. Consequently, 
the Mission remained in Tokyo, but without any legal status as a
21
recognized diplomatic organization, Japan and the U.S.S.R. 
entered into a period during which both countries did not even 
have any official diplomatic channels for negotiating 
normalization of their relations.
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CHAPTER 1
CHAPTER 1 
SAUST FRANCISCO EE AGE TREATY
A3ST3D
GOVIET-JAPANESE 
TERRITORIAT QUESTION
YALTA SECRET AGREEMENT
One of the origins of Soviet-Japanese territorial disputes over 
the Kuriles, southern Sakhalin, the Habomais and Shikotan can be 
found in the Yalta Secret Agreement. According to this agreement, 
the Soviet entry into the war against Japan was to be carried out 
on the basis of several conditions. One of those conditions 
included the cession of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin from
Japan to the Soviet Union as a reward for the latter's joining in
the Pacific war. The agreement stipulated that the interests
which the Japanese had obtained in the Portsmouth Treaty which had 
been concluded as the peace settlement at the end of the Russo- 
Japanese war in 1905, should be restored to the Soviet Union.
Southern Sakhalin was defined as one of those interests. With
respect to the Kuriles, the agreement only provided: 'the Kuril
islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.'1
This agreement contained several problematic characteristics and 
they were to become sources of future disputes between the 
U.S.S.R. and Japan. First of all, it was secretly made without
26
participation of Japan. Although the Japanese accepted the 
Potsdam Declaration which provided that the future limitation of 
Japan's sovereignty would be defined by the four leading powers, 
the U.S., the U. S. S. R., Britain and China based on the wartime 
agreements, the Secret Agreement was to offer a good reason for 
the Japanese to claim that they were not bound by the agreement on 
the ground that they had not participated in it. Secondly, this 
agreement failed to define the range of the Kuriles. This lack of 
exact definition caused a complicated problem. Later, the 
Japanese government was to claim that -' Kunashiri and Etorofu 
were not part of the Kuriles. These problems were to rise up to 
the surface of the normalization talks between Japan and the 
Soviet Union a decade later.
Thirdly, the Yalta Secret Agreement was, in fact, totally 
contradictory to the non-territorial-expansion clause of the Cairo 
Declaration. The Cairo Declaration provided that Japan should be 
stripped of the territories of the following categories:
(1) All the islands in the Pacific which Japan has seized 
or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 
1914. °
<2> All the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, 
such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores.
(3) All other territories which she has taken by violence 
and greed.
In addition to that, the United States, Britain, and China, 
declared that they had no thought of territorial expansion as a
CHAPTER 1
result of the war!2 According to historical facts, the Kuriles 
were handed over to the Japanese in exchange for southern 
Sakhalin in the St. Petersburg Treaty in 1875. By this fact, the 
Japanese were given good reason to claim that the Kuriles were 
not territories which Japan had gained by violence and greed and 
that the possession of the islands by the Soviets after the war 
was an unmistakable example of the territorial expansion. The 
Soviet Union did not directly sign the Cairo Declaration but she 
joined the Potsdam Declaration after her entry into the war 
against Japan. The Potsdam Declaration clearly stipulated that 
the signatories should respect the wartime agreements, including 
the Cairo Declaration. No efforts were made to dissolve this 
contradictory nature of the Yalta Agreement and the Cafc/ijo 
Declaration, during the period between the Yalta Conference and 
the Potsdam Conference. In consequence, this contradiction 
complicated the legal aspect of territorial problems with respect 
to the Kuriles and left a room for the evolution of the Japanese 
irredentism.
The Yalta Secret Agreement had an aspect of being a product of 
the Anglo-American leaders' desire to maintain cooperative 
relationship with the U.S. S. R. in view of future stability in the 
far east. Roosevelt and Churchill seemed to mortgage the Kuriles 
and southern Sakhalin for future big powers harmony. It is still 
not very clear whether Stalin shared this idea with the other 
leaders. At any rate, if the desire to keep the great powers 
harmony had been constantly held by those leaders, then the Yalta
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Secret Agreement on the far east would not have caused complicated 
problems involveing the dispostion of the Kuriles and southern 
Sakhalin which Japan had to be faced with later. But shortly 
after the death of Roosevelt on the American part, at least the 
struggles for influence over Japan and the struggles in the 
context of the cold war overwhelmed the desire for harmony. That 
inevitablly affected international relations developing around the 
issue of the Kuriles and Sakhalin.
THE KURILES AMD SOUTHERM SAKHALIN DURING THE EARLY OCCUPATION 
PERIOD:
On 9 August 1945, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and 
immediately despatched her troops to Sakhalin and the Kuriles. It 
was on 18 August, three days after Japan's surrender, when Soviet 
troops reached Shimushu, the northernmost island of the Kuriles. 
By the 29 August, the Soviets occupied Urrupu and Etorofu. By 3 
September, Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and the Habomais were 
placed under control of the Soviet troops.
Hardly had Japan surrendered on 15 August, when a series of 
minor frictions over the Kuriles started between the U.S. and the 
U.S.S.R. On 20 August 1945, G.H.Q. issued the 'General Order 
No. 1' to facilitate the surrender of the Japanese forces and to 
provide instructions for the Allies stationing forces in Japan.
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Before the issuance of this, Soviet Premier Stalin claimed that 
the draft of the General Order should include provision for all 
the Kuriles and the northern part of Hokkaido in the regions 
where surrender of Japanese troops should be made to the Soviet 
Commander.3 U.S. President Harry S. Truman was prompted by 
Stalin's request to agree to include all the Kuriles in the area 
where the Japanese should surrender to the Soviet Union. But he 
firmly refused the Soviet request regarding northern Hokkaido and 
demanded the right to use one of the Kuriles as a U.S. air base 
for military purposes and commercial use. In the State 
Department, there had been an anxiety over the possibility that 
the Soviet Union would expand her sphere of influence beyond the 
rewards with which the Yalta Agreement provided the Soviets.5 
Holding this sort of suspicion, the Americans could not accept 
Stalin's request. Instead, they seem to have attempted to check 
the possible Soviet intention for expansion by requesting the 
right to use the Kuriles as an American base.
Hot surprisingly, Stalin angrily replied to Truman on 22 August 
and refused the U.S. request for the right to use the archipelago. 
Stalin's reply said, 'demands of such a nature are usually laid 
before either a conquered state or such an allied state which is 
in no position to defend with its own means certain parts of its 
territory."5 This implied that Stalin assumed that the Kuriles 
had already been the territory of the Soviet Union. But he 
accepted Truman's refusal to authorise the Russian troops to
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occupy the northern part of Hokkaido, though he expressed a 
displeasure with this American refusal.7
The U.S. officials quickly reacted to Stalin's refusal to accept 
their demand for American bases on the Kuriles and to his
implication that the Kuriles had already been under the Soviet 
sovereignty. On 25 August, Secretary of State James Byrnes
transmitted a message from Truman to Stalin, which was handed over 
to him on 27 August. In the message, the Americans withdrew their
first request for bases on the Kuriles and suggested that they
desired only the landing rights for U.S. aircraft on the Kuriles, 
and that it was very important in view of the occupation of Japan 
for the U.S. to use air bases on the archipelago.® Although the 
Truman administration was suspicious about Soviet intention to 
expand their influence over Japan, it seemed to be attempting to 
keep a cooperative relations with the Soviet Union. But the 
message clearly opposed the Soviet implication that the Kuriles 
had already been transferred to the Soviet Union. It said that 
the Kuriles were still Japanese territories, not Soviet ones.® At 
last, Stalin showed a conciliatory gesture and agreed to offer 
the Americans the landing rights on a temporary basis and for 
commercial use only.10 Stalin also tended to avoid having more 
serious friction with the United States aver this issue.
Although the minor friction described above resulted in a 
negotiated compromise, during the rest of 1945 and 1946, both of 
the two countries gradually came to show unilateral tendencies in
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dealing with the Kuriles and Sakhalin issue. Moreover, the 
difference in the interpretation of the nature of the Yalta Secret 
Agreement became clearer between -foe. bo-th superpowers.
The question over the disposal of the Kuriles and southern 
Sakhalin was discussed at the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference 
with the participation by James Byrnes, Ernest Bevin, the British 
foreign secretary, and V. M. Molotov, the Soviet foreign minister. 
On 24 December 1945, Molotov took up this territorial question. 
Byrnes stated that 'there was no agreement on this question, which 
could not well be discussed until they came to consider a peace 
treaty.' But he went on to say that 'as for specific islands, he 
only knew of a decision about the Kuriles’ and that 'he had only 
learnt recently that this had been agreed at Yalta.' Responding 
to this ambiguous remark, the Soviet foreign minister sharply 
counterargued: 'Yalta had settled the fate of the Kuriles and
southern Sakhalin.'11 Through this conversation, the gap between 
the Americans and the Soviets emerged clearly. Molotov 
unmistakably assereted that the Soviet possession of those islands 
was a fait accompli. But Byrnes implied that the Yalta Agreement 
should be confirmed by a peace treaty with Japan.
The British foreign secretary took a different stance. • Bevin 
assured that 'the British government were not going back on what 
Mr. Churchill had agreed and would not do so.'12 The British 
point of view was that, whatever further procedures might be
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followed, the government would support the Soviet claim based on 
the Yalta Secret Agreement on the far east.
In 1946, the great powers' divergence became much more explicit 
on this territorial issue. On 22 January, Dean Acheson, the U.S. 
under-secretary of state, publicly admitted the existence of a 
secret agreement signed at Yalta. He added that the Yalta Secret 
Agreement only granted the U.S.S.R. the right to occupy the 
Kuriles, but that the Agreement did not stipulate a final decision 
to hand them over to Russia. In response to this, Tass 
criticised Acheson's statement, saying, 'Mr. Acheson is indeed 
"mistaken" with regard to the Kurile Islands.' Then it claimed:
...idt is precisely stated that after victory over Japan the 
Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union,, 
and that the southern part of Sakhalin island and all 
islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet 
Union,13
After this, probably, as a measure to counter the American 
effort to deny the full validity of the Yalta Secret Agreement, 
the Soviet government launched on a series of unilateral 
activities to confirm Russian possession of those islands. The 
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet ordered the creation of 'southern 
Sakhalin oblast' and designated it a component of the Khabarovsk 
region on 2 February. At the same time, the Kuriles were also 
absorbed in the Khabarovsk region. This administrative absorption 
of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin was followed by the final 
step when the Soviet Constitution was amended to include the
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archipelago and southern Sakhalin as integral components of the 
U.S.S.R.14 In addition, the Soviet press started a propaganda 
campaign to present the world with the impression that the 
Kuriles and southern Sakhalin had already been the Soviet 
territories.13
/
Following Acheson's statement, the U.S. government finally 
decided to confirm to the public that the U.S. government had 
signed a secret agreement stipulating the cession of the Kuriles 
and southern Sakhalin to the Soviet Union. Secretary Byrnes 
officially admitted the existence of the Yalta Secret Agreement on 
11 February 1946 and the three signatories published the entire 
text of the Agreement. The British response to the publication of 
the Yalta Secret Agreement clearly differed from the U.S. 
position. As Foreign Secretary Bevin had promised at Moscow, the 
government expressed its support for the Russian claims to the 
islands. On 4 March 1946, there was a discussion over the 
validity of the Yalta Secret Agreement in the House of Commons. 
Asked if the British government would observe the Yalta Secret 
Agreement, Phillip J. Noel-Baker, the then minister of state, 
answered that the 'Government evidently must regard themselves as 
bound by what was done before.'13
EARLY PLANNING OF A PEACE TEEATY WITH JAPAN AND SOVIET-JAPANESE 
TERRITORIAL QUESTION IN  1947
S ¥
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When the American government raised the question of a peace treaty
with Japan in 1947, the interested powers were faced with the
of
question how to disposeAthe Kuriles and southern Sakhalin in the 
peace treaty. Although the question of the disposition of those 
islands would not became a focus of attention, and although no 
intensive negotiations took place during this period because soon 
after the U.S. proposals for convening a preliminary conference 
for a peace with Japan were quickly rejected by the Russians, some 
noteworthy development with regard to the Kuriles and Sakhalin 
question could be seen during this period.
In 1947, the State Department seemed to hold the view that Japan 
should retain the southern Kuriles, the Habo^s, and Shikotan. In 
August, the Borton group in the Department prepared a draft 
treaty. This 'Borton Draft' provided that the southern Kuriles, 
namely Kunashiri and Etorofu, and the Habomais and Shikotan should 
be retained under Japanese sovereignty.17 George F. Kennan 
also held the same idea for the disposition of the southern 
Kuriles. In P.P.S. 10, a policy paper prepared by the Policy 
Planning Staff, he wrote that the southernmost islands of the 
Kuriles should be retained by the Japanese.1® He considered that 
the presence of Soviet forces on those islands would constitute an 
imminent strategic threat to the security of Japan.1®
It is, however, essential to note that both Borton and Kennan 
did not intend to scrap the Yalta Agreement. Vhat they took up as 
a matter for consideration was not the question as to whether the
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Kuriles should be ceded to the Soviet Union, but the question 
which definition of the Kuriles should be adopted, a narrower one 
or a broader one. It seems that Kennan and Borton intended to 
take advantage of the vagueness in the definition of the Kuriles 
in the Yalta Agreement and to adopt the narrower definition. But 
this line was based on the assumption that the Yalta Agreement 
should basically be implemented. Furthermore, during that period, 
there was a legal view in the State Department that the Soviet 
Union was entitled to preserve the status quo post bellum vis-a 
vis Japan, so far as consistent with existing international allied 
agreements.20
Unlike the Soviet Union, the British government responded 
positively to the American proposal for a preliminary peace 
conference. From August to September 1947, the British 
Commonwealth convened the Canberra conference to discuss a peace 
with Japan. Prior to the conference, the Overseas Reconstruction 
Committee which was under direct control of the British Cabinet 
prepared a briefing for the conference, entitled 'Territorial, 
Political and General Clauses of Peace with Japan'. The article 
dealing with territorial questions did not directly mention the 
disposal of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. Rather, the main 
attention was paid to the small islands between Hokkaido and the 
Kuriles and between Hokkaido and the southern Sakhalin. The paper 
by the Committee stated that those small islands could be a future 
source of dispute between the U.S.S.R. and Japan if the peace 
treaty mishandled them.21 Thus, the British government does not
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seem to have had a very clear idea with regard to the disposal of 
the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin in the wake of the movement for 
a peace with Japan.
JAPANESE ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE TERRITORIAL PROBLEM IE  1945-9
At this point we should examine the preparation which had been
carried out on the Japanese part. While the Japanese government
were not allowed to conduct diplomacy by themselves during the
occupation period, they realised the necessity to get ready for
the coming peace treaty and hoped to exert some slight influence
in favour of Japan during the course of the peace making. For
this purpose, the Foreign Ministry of the first Yoshida
administration set up a committee to study the problems of a peace
treaty with Japan in November 1945.22 On 22 May 1946, this
committee prepared a series of papers containing their views with
regard to the peace treaty. Among them, there was a document
entitled 'Preparatory Measures of the Japanese Government for the
Supposed Conditions Which the Allied Fareces Will Present at the 
fleiwajy3yAfaj no Kotai—3ft ^  Sdtti? to vOago- Ribfran -to wo Hitoku
Japanese Peace Treaty Conference^. (Hereafter, this is cited as
'Preparatory Measures of the Japanese Government.')23 This
document was leaked to the media more than a year later in
December 1947 and disclosed to the public. In it, the following
paragraph was contained, dealing with the issue of the Kuriles and
Sakhalin:
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Territories (Probable .Conditions .of the Allied Powers?..
1. Formosa and the Hoko (Pescadores) islands will be
returned to China as stipulated in the Cairo and Potsdam 
Declarations.
2. Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands will be
returned to the Soviet Union under terms of the Yalta 
Agreement and the Potsdam Declaration.
(Japanese Counter-Proposals)
1. None.
2. Japan must make clear that she did not secure
possession of the Kuriles Islands by any aggression
whatsoever. At least the Southern Kuriles, Habomai, and 
Shikotan Islands (the latter off Northern Hokkaido) must be 
left as Japanese territories. The Northern Kuriles must be 
placed under United Nations trusteeship at most.24
The points that seem important in this document are as follows: 
first of all, the Japanese government had an idea that Etorofu, 
Kunashiri, the Habomais and Shikotan should be returned to Japan. 
This assertion was continuously held until the 1980s, 
Secondly, but more importantly, the government denied in regard 
to the northern Kuriles the validity of the Yalta Agreement on the 
far east. In other words, they desired that the northern Kuriles 
should not be possessed by the Russians.
Why did the Foreign Ministry come to these ideas? The adoption 
of a U.N. trusteeship for the territory would leave the Japanese 
with a hope to regain those islands in the future. But another
important reason for the proposal seems to have been the Foreign 
Ministry's legal views on the contradiction between the Yalta 
Agreement and the Cairo Declaration. The Allied Powers had issued 
the Cairo Declaration and made it clear that none of them had any 
intention to expand their territories as a result of the war. 
From the Japanese viewpoint, the treatment of the Kuriles in the
CHAPTER 1
Yalta Secret Agreement, was in contradiction with the Cairo 
Declaration. The Foreign Ministry caught this shortcoming of the 
Yalta agreement.25 Its claim in the document 'Preparatory 
Measures of the Japanese Government' was based on this 
understanding of the contradiction between the Cairo Declaration 
and the Yalta Agreement. Added to that, the demand of the Foreign 
Ministry for the return of Kunashiri, Etorofu, the Habomais and 
Shikotan was based on its contention that the Yalta Agreement had 
failed to define the territorial range of Kuriles. As a whole the 
Japanese Foreign Ministry took a position which seems to have 
resulted from its effort to find and utilise the loopholes of the 
Yalta Agreement.
Apart from 'Preparatory Measures of the Japanese Government', 
the Foreign Ministry of the Yoshida government prepared a series 
of explanation papers on the subject of territorial disposition in 
a peace treaty with the purpose of conveying the Japanese views to 
the American government. Those explanation papers asserted that 
the Kuriles, the Habomais, and Shikotan were historically and 
traditionally inalienable territories of Japan. There is no 
evidence to show that those reports were seriously taken into 
account by the U.S. government. But after 1948, these reports and 
papers could be delivered to the U.S. government through informal 
channels25
A direct step to influence the peace making on the territorial 
issue was taken by the Katayama administration in 1947. During
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the development of exchanges of views among the Allied powers 
after the American initiative in July, Foreign Minister Ashida 
Hitoshi of the Katayama Cabinet, managed to contact several G.H.Q. 
staff and tried to hand over a memorandum which contained nine 
requests of the Japanese government with respect to the peace 
treaty. This memorandum, the so-called 'Ashida Memorandum', 
contained a request dealing with the Kuriles and southern 
Sakhalin. Paragraph 7 of the memorandum said that the Japanese 
government hoped that the decision on disposal of the small minor 
islands adjacent to the main islands as mentioned in the Potsdam 
Declaration would be made by taking into account the historical, 
racial, economic, and cultural background of the relations between 
the minor islands and the main Japanese islands.27 This did not 
specifically refer to the Kuriles and Sakhalin, but probably the 
basic idea embodied in this memorandum may have been Ashida’s 
strong desire for the reversion of those islands. In fact, Ashida 
seemed to be seriously concerned about the possibility of the 
Soviet invasion through the Kuriles and Sakhalin and emphasized 
the necessity to offer the U.S. stationing troops the right to use 
bases in Japan if necessary.2® This memorandum, in consequence, 
was nottobe accepted by G.H.Q. which considered it would only 
irritate the Soviet Union and cause some unfavourable consequence 
for the Japanese.2®
In October 1948, Yoshida came back to office as prime minister 
after the downfall of the Ashida Cabinet. Under the second 
Yoshida Cabinet, the Foreign Ministry continued to prepare a
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series of explanatory papers on the territorial issues. Tht basic 
character of the government policy on the disposition of the
J
Kuriles and southern Sakhalin seems to have remained unchanged 
from that in the paper prepared in May, 1946. It seems that the 
government's line in 1946 on the future status of the Kuriles and 
southern Sakhalin was continuously held by his Cabinet in 1948- 
49. In fact, in December 1949 before the Standing Committee for 
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, Parliamentary 
Vice Foreign Minister Kawamura admitted that the government's 
interpretation of the status of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin 
was that Japan could assert her own title to those islands because 
the Potsdam Declaration did not refer to the Yalta Agreement.30 
It showed that the government position denying the validity of the 
Yalta Agreement had not changed since 1946 when the 'Preparatory 
Measures of the Japanese Government' had been prepared.
As for reactions to the Japanese view from the Allied Powers, it 
can safely be said that they basically ignored the Japanese 
claims. G.H. Q. refused to receive the 'Ashida Memorandum'. When 
the document entitled 'Preparatory Measures of the Japanese 
Government' was leaked to Japanese and American media in December 
1947, Chief of the British Mission in Tokyo, Sir Alvary Gascoigne, 
showed rather a cool response and the British Foreign Office did 
not show very much interest to it, either.31 In 1949, however, the 
State Department seemed to start to take into account Japanese 
views on the southern Kuriles'. In June, the State Department 
tried to avoid expressing any views and comments which would be
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able to upset the Japanese claims.32 Clearly, the U.S.
Department of State recognised that their view on the southern 
Kuriles and the Japanese view were basically identical in the
sense that both the Department and the Japanese Foreign Ministry 
desired to regain those islands. It seems, however, unreasonable 
to assume that the U.S. government were influenced by the Japanese 
claims. Instead, the Department may have intended to take 
advantage of the Japanese claims in order to materialise its own 
strategic goal in the far east. The Policy Planning Staff and 
Kennan desired those southernmost islands of the Kuriles to be 
retained by the Japanese. On the other hand, the divergence 
between the U.S. view and the Japanese view was clear. The State 
Department still took a position that the Yalta Agreement was 
valid if it was going to be confirmed by a peace treaty with 
Japan. But the Japanese government unequivocally asserted that
the Japanese government was not bound by the Yalta Agreement.
In this period, there was a confusion among American officials 
over the legal status of the southern Kuriles. In Tokyo, a 
political advisor to G.H.Q. argued that, based on historical 
background of the four islands, Japan was entitled to expect some 
re-adjustment of the Yalta Agreement over the disposal of them.33 
Contrary to this, the State Department argued in November that the
Habomais and Shikotan were leglly not part of the Kuriles but that
'there seems to be no sound legal reason for claiming that
Kunashiri and Etorofu are not part of the Kuril Islands.'34 This 
argument by the State Department seems to have been accepted as 
the official view of the U.S. government. In fact, during the 
peace-making in 1950-51, the U.S. State Department seemed to
adopt the line described above.
JOHN FOSTER DULLES1 1SEVER PRINCIPLES1 AMD BR ITAIN 'S REACTIONS
Whereas the British government were steadily preparing for the 
peace treaty with Japan, the U.S. government in the first half of 
1950 was still struggling with the stagnation caused by the 
divergence between the State Department and the Defence
Department. But after John Foster Dulles, the consultant for the 
secretary of state, was assigned to the peace settlement with 
Japan on 18 May, the stagnation began to be gradually overcome. 
His handling of the peace settlement with Japan reflected his 
perception of the existing divergence and of the necessity to 
dissolve it.
It seems to have been in early August 1950 that Dulles for the
first time dealt with the territorial disposition of the Kuriles
and southern Sakhalin. He prepared a draft treaty on 7 August, 
which provided, as far as the territorial issue was concerned, 
that the disposal of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin would be 
decided by the future decision by the four powers, namely, the
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U.S., Britain, China, and the Soviet Union, and that, in case of 
any failure among them to decide it, the General Assembly of the 
United Nations should decide the disposition.35 This idea became 
embodied in his 'Seven Principles' of the peace treaty on 11 
September.
The 'Seven Principles' dealt with the territorial issue as 
follows:
Territory Japan would (a) recognize the independence of Korea: 
(b> agree to U.N. trusteeship, with the U.S. as 
administering authority, of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands and 
(c) accept the future decision of the U.K., the U.S.S.R., 
China and the U. S. with reference to the status of Formosa, 
Pescadores, South Sakhalin and the Kuriles. In the event of 
no decision within a year after the treaty came into effect, 
the U.N. General Assembly would decide.33
The territorial clause in the 'Seven Principles' seemed to be 
an example of ignoring the Yalta Secret Treaty on the part of 
the U.S. government. The 'Seven Principles' showed that the 
disposition of the territories ceded by the Japanese should be 
left for future decision. Before the advent of Dulles, the State 
Department had held the idea that the American government should 
support the Yalta agreement at a peace conference. Their 
attention had, therefore, been focused on the question of the 
definition of the Kuriles. Dulles' 'Seven Principles' indicated, 
however, that the attention of the State Department and the 
government had moved to the question of whether the Kuriles and 
Southern Sakhalin should be transferred to the Russians or not.
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This was a clear expression of the American defiance of the Yalta 
Agreement.
The changes in the 'Seven Principles' were in a sense a 
reflection of the international situation and the U.S. domestic 
situation. First of all, the Korean War and the 'loss of China' 
intensified U.S.-Soviet tensions in the far east. The effect of 
superpower confrontation affected the various dimensions of the 
peace with Japan. The U.S. government intended to show a firm 
attitude towards the Soviet Union even in the peace treaty. The 
defiance of the Yalta Agreement in the territorial clause of the 
'Seven Principles' must have reflected the hard line policy in 
Washington.
The advent as the chief negotiator for the peace treaty of John 
Foster Dulles, who was well-known as a 'cold warrior', also 
considerably influenced the U.S. views on the peace with Japan. 
From his point of view, to show firmness was essential, in order 
to cope with the Soviet Union in the context of the cold war. 
Furthermore, compromise was regarded as a sign of weakness. He 
assessed that the strategic importance of the Kuriles and 
southern Sakhalin was very high. Undoubtedly the loss of these 
islands to the Soviet Union must have been considered as a great 
loss for the U.S. security interest in Japan,37 But it is 
hardly realistic to consider that Dulles believed that the 
situation where the Russians occupied those islands could easily 
be revised. Even so, he should show that he did not accept that
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situation. The defiance of the Yalta Agreement in the 'Seven 
Principles' was an indirect expression of his desire to refuse to 
accept reality.
Another important factor which may have exerted some 
influence on the American change of attitude, though seemingly 
very slight, was pressure from the Japanese. In May 1950, Ikeda 
Hayato, the finance minister of Japan, visited the U.S. and had 
a informal conversation with Joseph Dodge, the financial advisor 
to the S.C.A.P. In his conversations, Ikeda said, 'There is also 
the possibility that the Soviets may offer a peace treaty in 
advance of the United States and might include in that offer the 
return of Sakhalin and the Kuriles.'30 Ikeda intended to urge 
the U.S. government to step up progress in the peace settlement 
with Japan. But it cannot be denied that the Americans were 
faced with the necessity to pre-empt possible Soviet initiative 
as such.
The 'Seven Principles' were circulated to the major interested 
countries and Dulles launched a series of bilateral negotiations 
with them with the 'Seven Principles' as the basis of discussion. 
On 22 September, Dulles met Dening in New York and discussed the 
peace treaty. He commented on the 'Seven Principles' by saying 
that the peace treaty should just delimit the areas remaining 
under Japanese sovereignty without specifying precisely how the 
ceded territories were to be disposed of. Added to that, Dening 
disagreed with the idea that the General Assembly of United
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Nations should decide the future disposal of the islands, on the
ground that the U.K. did not have such an authority to relocate
the power relationships in international politics, and that, 
because of firm possession by the U.S.S.S. of such territories as 
the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin, it was not practicable to 
attempt to change such a situation.39
In replying, Dulles remarked that the territorial clause in the 
'Seven Principles' might be useful in talking to the Russians.AO 
He may have considered that, by taking a firm position against 
the Russians, the Western allies could stand on a strong 
bargaining position. In this sense, Dulles uses those islands as 
a barganing chip for negotiations with the Russians. This 
tendency of Dulles to regard these islands as a tool or bait 
towards the Soviet Union in the process of the peace making was 
to be appearing again in 1951.
After the discussion between Dulles and Dening, the Foreign 
Office started to define its official view on the 'Seven
Principles'. The main British overseas offices agreed with 
Dening. The chief of British Mission in Tokhyo, Sir Alvary
Gascoigne supported Dening's view. He sent the Foreign Office a 
memorandum prepared by G.L. Clutton, the counsellor of the 
British Mission in Tokyo. Dening's point of view had a defect 
in that it could not define the country to which the Kuriles and 
southern Sakhalin would be ceded. But Clutton considered that 
this defect would not do much harm. He wrote, 'if no juridical
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solution is reached, no harm will be done. There are plenty of 
territories throughout the world whose juridical status has never 
been determined by any international instrument.'441
The Far East (Official) committee, a subcommittee of the 
Cabinet and composed of higher rank officials of the Foreign 
Office, however, took a different view from Dening. On 7 
October, the Committee prepared a policy paper on the British 
view with regard to the 'Seven Principles', which was to be sent 
to the British delegation in New York, Ambassador Sir Oliver 
Franks and F.S. Tomlinson, the assistant at the Far Eastern 
Department. The view expressed in the policy paper indicated the 
strong influence of the 'Seven Principles'. As mentioned above, 
the British position was that a peace treaty with Japan should 
not include any names of countries to which the territories 
would be ceded. But the Far East (Official) Committee, on the
contrary, proposed that Japan should renounce all rights to the
islands to 'parties principal' of the peace treaty and that 
those parties would decide the disposal of those territories.**
This position implied the following points. Firstly, the 
British government seemed to change their previous position of 
supporting the Yalta Agreement. The new position clearly meant 
that the disposal of the territories which the Agreement had
decided to transfer to the new possessor would have to be decided
afresh by the 'parties principal'. This position was 
contradictory to the previous British position supporting the
final validity of the Yalta Agreement. Secondly, it is important 
to notice that the Far East (Official) Committee seems to have 
tried to expand the decision makers on the territorial issue from 
only the four great powers to more nations probably including the 
main British Commonwealth countries, such as Australia and New
Zealand. In fact, Australia and Hew Zealand had been asserting
that they should have more influence on the peace making with 
Japan. The British government could not ignore their assertions.
Thirdly, the British view seemed to be based on the idea of 
maintaining the status quo post bellum. The Committee indicated 
that Japan should renounce all rights and claims to the Kuriles 
and southern Sakhalin. This seems to have been intended to play 
a role of safety-Ydlvo in case of failure for the ’parties S
principal' to reach the agreement on the disposition. If Japan
renounced the right and title to those islands, the Japanese 
could not claim any de jure sovereignty over them. By making 
Japan renounce all right to those islands, the peace treaty could 
legitimise the status quo post bellum where the Soviet Union 
firmly held them. It is clear that the basic idea behind the 
British attitude on the territorial question, was that the peace 
treaty should not leave any questions which may cause disturbing 
facotrs for the far eastern stability.
This new policy line on this territorial issue set up by the 
Committee was conveyed to the British delegation to the United 
Nations General Assembly, Sir Oliver Franks and Tomlinson in
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New York on 23 October. But before it was sent to them, the 
Committee seemed to encounter a great dilemma. The dilemma was 
the fact that, though the government had clearly expressed its 
support for the Yalta Agreement, the new line of the Committee 
was, as mentioned above, in contradiction with the Agreement. 
The focus of problem for the Committee became the question as to 
whether the Yalta Agreement should be fully implemented or not.43
On 3 November 1950, the Foreign Office received from New York 
a reply prepared by Tomlinson. This memorandum emphasized that 
'the most practical and realistic course would appear to be for 
Japan to be asked to renounce her sovereignty over these areas in 
favour of the Soviet Union in the treaty of peace.' This 
suggestion was based on, at least, three considerations. 
Firstly, the reality that the Soviet Union had placed the 
Kuriles and southern Sakhalin under her firm control could not be 
ignored in the peace treaty. Tomlinson emphasized this fact and 
recommended that the treaty should recognise the reality. He 
concluded that the Soviet forces of occupation 'could be only 
dislodged by war.'44 Tomlinson assumed that the neglect of the 
reality would create an additional unnecessary source of friction 
with the Soviet Union but that the recognition of the status quo 
post bellum would not make such a disturbing situation for the 
stability of the far east. Secondly, the British government was 
already committed to the Yalta Agreement. Tomlinson did not
So
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think that his government could easily scrap their previous 
commitment.
Finally, he was afraid that, if the peace treaty had a clause 
implying that the disposal of those islands would be open to 
discussion, it would give the Soviets a good reason to put the 
onus for the Soviet non-participation on the shoulders of the 
U.S. and the UK. He argued that, in order to avoid that, the 
Kuriles and southern Sakhalin should unequivocally be ceded to 
the Soviet Union in the peace treaty.
Tomlinson's letter enjoyed full support from the Far East 
(Official) Committee and, consequently, his view came to be 
embodied in a new policy paper of the Committee on 22 November. 
This paper said on the territorial issue that Japan should 
renounce all right to southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles in favour 
of the U.S.S.R. The reasons for this position taken by the 
Committee were the same as mentioned by Tomlinson in his letter 
on 3 November.4® On 19 and 20 December, the Cabinet paper 
entitled 'Japanese Peace Treaty: General' was prepared contained 
the following recommendation on the territorial issue.
As provided in the Livadia Agreement Cthe Yalta Agreement], 
South Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands be cede by Japan to 
the U.S.S.R.'[My brackets]46
This paper was approved by the Cabinet on 2 January as the basic 
policy line of the British government on the dispostion of those
f /
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islands.'47’ This position would continue to be the fundamental 
standpoint of the British government until the creation of the 
Anglo-American joint draft in May 1951.
In late October, the 'Seven Principles' was delivered to the 
Soviet Ambassador to the U.N., Yakob Malik. On 26 October, Malik 
met Dulles and they discussed the 'Seven Principles' and an oral 
statement, which was attached to the 'Seven Principles', that 
the Soviet Union would gain the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin on 
condition that she would be a party to the peace treaty. Malik's
reaction to this was not straightforward. As far as the
territorial issue was concerned, he only stated 'there had been 
express agreement regarding the islands to be detached [from
Japan], i.e. Kuriles, Pescadores, and Formosa. ' My brackets]
Dulles' intention behind his remarks to Malik can be 
understood as follows. First of all, those islands were used by 
Dulles as a bait for the Soviet Union in order to drag them into 
a peace treaty with Japan. As an idea of this kind has been held 
in the State Department since, at least, 1947,43 Dulles may have 
considered that a confirmation of the disposal of the Kuriles and 
southern Sakhalin to the Soviet Union was one of the most
important benefits that the Russians could derive from the peace 
treaty with Japan. Secondly, although the American government 
had been determined as early as late in 1949 to carry out a 
peace settlement with Japan even without Soviet participation and 
although Dulles himself did not expect the Russians to become a
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party to any peace treaty, lie could not provide the Soviet Union 
with a good pretext to put the onus of her non-participation in 
the peace treaty on the U.S. violation of the Yalta Agreement. 
In fact, Dulles argued in his conversation with Dean Rush, the 
assistant secretary for far eastern affairs, that the additional 
statement indicating that the U.S.S.R. would be able to gain 
those islands when she participated in the peace treaty could be 
a good tool to avoid a Russian propaganda attack on the U.S. 
To avoid such an attack, Dulles had to indicate U.S. willingness 
to recognize the Soviet sovereignty over the Kuriles and southern 
Sakhalin on condition that Russia would become a party to the 
peace treaty.
The Soviet government reacted to the 'Seven Principles' by 
issuing an Aide-Memoire on 12 November. As far as the 
territorial issue was concerned, the Soviet counterargument was 
concentrated on the U.S. treatment of the Yalta Agreement.
According to the Aide-Memoire, the Soviets clearly understood 
that the 'Seven Principles' were intended to replace the Yalta 
Agreement and they insisted that the Agreement be implemented. 
The Aide-Memoire did not even touch on the oral proposal by
Dulles on 26 October, Obviously, Dulles had failed to prevent
the Soviet propaganda attack of which he had been afraid. A
month later, the U.S. government counterargued in their aide- 
memoire by saying that the Yalta Agreement and the Potsdam 
Declaration had to be confirmed by the peace treaty before they
SJ
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took effect. The superpowers cleavage became wider and
clearer.
DULLES-YOSHIDA COFSULTATIOWS
On 25 January 1951, Dulles arrived at Tokyo to have the first 
substantial consultation with the Japanese government. On the 
Japanese part, the Foreign Ministry had been preparing for 
negotiations with the United States on the peace treaty since 
President Truman had announced on 14 September 1950 the U.S. 
decision to convene preliminary negotiations for purpose. The 
preparation for the negotiations was called 'Operation D' and , 
as a result of this, the Foreign Ministry staff managed to 
complete a paper on 27 December which set out a general policy 
design for the peace treaty. After some amendments, this 
memorandum was submitted to Prime Minister Yoshida on 20 January 
1951. Yoshida ordered his Foreign Ministry staff to amend it 
further and the memorandum was completed under the title 'Our 
Views On Japanese Peace Treaty' (Vagaho Mo Kenkai).
This memorandum, which was submitted to Dulles on 30 January,50 
did not contain any reference to the Kuriles and southern 
Sakhalin. The original Foreign Ministry paper prepared during 
'Operation D'(Sagyo D), however, contained the Japanese request 
for the return of those islands, which was as follow:
CHAPTER 1
We are delighted that the U.S. government intends to leave 
the disposition of the Kuriles to the United Nations General 
Assembly. The attatchment of the Japanese people to the 
Kuriles is not at all weaker than that to Rykyu and the 
Bonins. Ve request the U.S. government to make every effort 
until the last stage in order to help us to materialise the 
desire of Japanese people.51
This paragraph seems to indicate that the Japanese government 
preferred to have the UN General Assemply defining the status of 
the islands to the four main Allied powers as stated in the 
'Seven Principles'.
But Yoshida ordered that the part dealing with the Kuriles and 
southern Sakhalin be omitted. He seemed to consider that it was 
not a proper thing for the Japanese government to request the 
U.S. to do something about the Kuriles which was an issue 
between the U.S.S.R. and Japan. Nishimura Kumao, then the 
director of Treaties Bureau, however, recalled that the prime 
minister may have wanted to avoid any possible delay in the 
peace talks which could have been caused by disputes over the 
disposal of the Kuriles. Indeed, Yoshida desired to achieve a 
peace as soon as possible by adopting a 'majority peace'.5:2 In 
addition to that, it can be argued that Yoshida had to cope with 
the more important territorial question: Okinawa and the Bonins. 
Yoshida, who strongly desired to obtain a guarantee from the U.S. 
government to return those islands to Japan, may have considered 
that too many requests should not be made on the other 
territorial questions. Consequently as a result of Yoshida's 
omission of the paragraph about the Kuriles and southern
CHAPTER I
Sakhalin from the original Foreign Ministry document, the 
disposition of those islands was not discussed during the 
consultations with Dulles in Tokyo.
Having finished with the first substantial consultations with 
the Japanese, Dulles and the State Department began to prepare a 
draft which was based on the result of Dulles' bilateral 
negotiations with the member states of the Far Eastern 
Commission. At the beginning of March, as part of the 
preparation for the draft, Dulles drew up a provisional 
memorandum in preparation for talks with the Japanese over some 
issues which had not been dealt with in Tokyo.
With regard to the disposal of the Kuriles and southern 
Sakhalin, the memorandum can be summarized as follows:
(1) Unless and until the Soviets dissociate themselves from 
the treaty talks, it appears to be preferable that the draft 
assumes their participation.
(2) The draft should provide for the return by Japan of 
southern Sakhalin and all islands adjacent to the Soviet 
Union and the handing over to the Soviets of the Kuriles as 
they may be defined by a bilateral agreement or by a judical 
decision under treaty disputes procedure.
<3) The provision would be operative only if the Soviets 
sign and ratify the treaty.S3
The nature of the territorial clause of this memorandum was 
remarkable in the sense that it dropped previous idea indicated 
in the 'Seven Principles' that the disposition of those islands 
would be entrusted to the United JTations General Assembly in case 
of failure of the four main Allied powers in deciding their
St
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disposal. This seems to have been because there had been
opposition from some quarters in the State Department to the
using of the UN organisation for final decision of the 
disposition. George Kennan criticized Dulles' idea saying that 
if the General Assembly dealt with this territorial question, 
those northern islands would 'become a bone of contention in the 
United Nations,' and argued that the UN was not a suitable 
organisation to alter power relationships in the world in the 
cold war situation.SA The second point of the provisional 
memorandum suggested that the U. S. government tried to avoid
involvement in some future Soviet-Japanese dispute over the 
definition of the Kuriles. The Americans actually hoped that
only directly interested states should be involved with this
question: Japan and the U.S.S.R.
As this memorandum was handed to Japanese Foreign Ministry 
officials, the Japanese quickly responded to this American 
intention and attempted to pull them back to the issue of 
defining the Kuriles. In their reply to the provisional
memorandum, the Japanese expressed their desire on 16 March that
the final disposition of the Kuriles should be decided, 'as they 
may be defined by the powers concerned, including Japan. 155 
The Japanese government did not want to cope with the Soviets to 
define the range of the Kuriles without direct American 
involvement. The Japanese also proposed that the territorial
clause over the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin should be
eliminated from the peace treaty if the Soviet Union did not
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participate in the treaty.ee The Japanese objective may have 
been to retain de jure sovereignty over the Kuriles and southern 
Sakhalin in case of Soviet non-participation.
On 20 March, Secretary Acheson sent a reply to the Japanese 
government, suggesting the following points. First of all, no 
specific way to define the range of the Kuriles should be 
stipulated in the treaty but the definition should 
automatically go to the World Court for elucidation. Secondly, 
it suggested, 'if it is apparent in advance that the Soviet Union 
is definitely out of picture, we would be prepared to reconsider 
whether reference to Sakhalin and the Kuriles should be totally 
eliminated from Treaty. ' S7’
It seems that the State Department persistently tried to avoid 
deep involvement in the dispute over defining the scope of the 
term 'Kuriles'. But simultaneously, they dropped from the treaty 
the possibility that the Japanese government would have to cope 
with the Russians alone on this issue. In this sense, the new 
line described in the reply from Acheson had an aspect of being a 
compromise with the Japanese. The second point in Acheson*s 
memorandum also contained another compromise. Basically, it 
accepted the Japanese claim to de jure sovereignty over the 
Kuriles and southern Sakhalin in the case of Russian absence from 
the peace conference. Apart from this memorandum by Acheson, 
Dulles also suggested on 21 March the possibility of the removal 
of the clause dealing with those islands from the treaty.se Thus,
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at this stage, the U.S. view on the handling of the Kuriles and 
southern Sakhalin was to some extent influenced by the Japanese 
demands.
It should, however, be emphasized that the U.S. government did 
not change their position that the peace treaty should provide 
that those islands would be ceded to the Soviet Union only if she 
became a party to the treaty. Indeed, because the Japanese 
government did not show any opposition to that part of clause, 
the Americans did not have to change their position. Moreover 
the consideration that the propaganda warfare might develop with 
the Soviets may have been in Dulles' mind. But in this period, 
Dulles seemed also to be under some domestic pressure. On 19 
March, Dulles explained the government's position regarding a 
Japanese peace treaty before the Far East Sub-Committee of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Alexander Smith 
asked Dulles whether any concessions the U.S. might hope to get 
from the Soviets justified her giving Russians title to southern 
Sakhalin and the Kuriles in the treaty. This question clearly 
implied the anxiety held by Congressmen over the possiblity that 
the peace treaty would provide the Russians with excessive 
benefits.ss?
Not only congressional pressure but also internal discord 
within the administration were influential. During the meeting 
with the Senators described above, Dulles had exposed the fact 
that the Pentagon desired the Soviet Union to participate in a
s?
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peace treaty with Japan and 'thereby terminate their belligerent 
rights.' Dulles went on to say that it would, therefore, be
useful to try to hang a certain amount of bait in front of the
Soviets.60 During the earlier stage of the peace making, the 
Department of Defence had adopted the line of an 'all-over 
peace' with Japan on the ground that peace without the Russians 
would provide them with belligerent rights and make it easy for 
them to launch a military attack on Japan. In August 1950, the 
Pentagon clearly abandoned this line once. But they still had a 
sense of Japan's vulnerability to Soviet attack through Hokkaido. 
In January 1951, during a meeting between Dulles and the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, the latter expressed an anxiety that 'early
conclusion of the treaty would be provocative' and that 'any 
steps taken in that direction might increase likelihood of overt 
Soviet action against Japan, particularly Hokkaido.'61 Although 
Dulles was fully authorized to promote the early peace with Japan 
before his visit to Tokyo, he, as a mediator between
the Pentagon and the State Department, could not ignore the
anxiety expressed by the Pentagon. In this sense, the Kuriles 
and southern Sakhalin were used by Dulles as the tool to hamper 
the Pentagon's apposition to an early peace treaty.
U.S. •MARCH DRAFT• AMD BRITISH •APRIL DRAFT•
60
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On 23 March, the State Department prepared the so called 'March 
Draft* partly based on the exchange of views with the Japanese 
government . But before that, the Truman administration had 
exchanged views with the British government also.
During the Yoshida-Dulles consultations in Tokyo, Dulles met 
Sir Alvary Gascoigne, the chief of the British Liaison Mission in 
Tokyo, on 30 January. Gascoigne expressed the view that southern 
Sakhalin and the Kuriles should be turned over to the U.S.S.R. in 
the treaty. In response to this, Dulles asked, 'why we should go 
out of way to clear the Soviets title to these territories if 
they were not parties to the treaty*.e;£ Knowing the view of 
Dulles, the British government decided to inform the U.S. 
government of the formal British view. On 5 March, the Foreign 
Office prepared an Aide-M6moire on the peace treaty with Japan,*53 
and sent the Department of State on 12 March. The paragraph 
relating the territorial issue was clearly based on the paper 
approved by the Cabinet on 20 January.
(Ill)As provided in the Livadia Agreement (Yalta Agreement) 
signed on the 11th of February, 1945: South Sakhalin and the 
Kurile Islands should be ceded by Japan to the U.S.S.R.6"*
The Department of State replied on 14 March. The contents of the 
reply with regard to the territorial issue were the same as the 
contents of Dulles' provisional memorandum of 12 March. The 
difference between the two governments was undeniable. The 
British argued that Japan should hand over those territories to
6 /
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the Soviet Union whether Russia would become a party to the 
treaty or not. But the Americans insisted that they should not 
be ceded to the Russians unless they signed the treaty.
On 21 March, John Allison, the acting assistant secretary of 
state for far eastern affairs, had a meeting with the Foreign 
Office staff in London and tried to coordinate the Anglo- 
American differences over the territorial issue. Allison 
referred to the territorial issue while they were discussing 
about the possibility and desirability of Soviet participation in 
the peace treaty. Both the British and American officers 
concurred with each other in understanding that though the Soviet 
Union would not agree to the present Anglo-American proposals on 
the peace treaty in general, she should be given the chance to 
become a party to the treaty. They differed, however, on the 
issue of the disposition of the Kuriles and Sakhalin. Allison 
reiterated the U.S. position which had been expressed in their 
Aide-M6moire to the British government of 13 March. Then, 
Allison added that, in case of Soviet non-participation, the 
suspending clause which would be contained in the peace treaty 
would prevent the Russians from gaining any benefits from it. 
The British under-secretary, R.H. Scott, refuted this in an 
indirect manner, saying 'suspension of legal transfer of the 
Kuriles until Soviet acceptance of the treaty would leave the 
Kuriles an open point of friction between the U.S.S.R. and 
Japan!63
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The British suggestions and criticisms during the consultations 
in London do not seem to have affected the American draft-making. 
Article 5 of the 'March Draft' dealt with the territorial 
question in these terms:
Japan will return to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands 
adjacent to it and will hand over to the Soviet Union the 
Kurile islands.es
This article has to be interpreted along with the suspending 
clause which was Article 19 in this draft:
....the present Treaty shall not confer any rights, title or 
benefits to or upon any State unless and until it signs and 
ratifies, or adheres to, this Treaty; nor....shall any right 
title and interest of Japan be deemed to be diminished or 
prejudiced by any provision hereof in favour of a State 
which does not sign and ratify, or adhere to, this treaty.*57.
After the London consultations, the Foreign Office started to 
re-examine their position on the territorial issue. The opinion 
on this issue in the Japan and Pacific Department was divided. 
The head of the Department, Charles Johnston, was supporting the 
U.S. position. He prepared a memorandum on 22 March, in which he 
compared the merits of British position with those of the 
Americans. As the beneficial points of the former, he listed the 
following elements: First of all, the British territorial view
on the disposition of the Kuriles and Sakhalin would clear the 
whole range of Japanese territorial concessions to the Soviet 
Union and would be 'a tidier settlement' than the American one.
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Secondly, the British view 'would also, by preventing the 
Japanese from exercising a theoretical claim to these territories 
in the future, remove one potential element of instability from 
the general far eastern situation. ‘ Finally, Johnston suggested 
that to cede those territories to the Soviet Union even in case 
of her absence from the peace treaty would become a gesture of 
civility towards Russia which would be useful from a propaganda 
point of view.ee
Johnston indicated the benefits of American view, as follows: 
Firstly, according to international law, he suggested, the peace 
treaty did not have to give any gain to Russia unless she did 
participate in the treaty. Secondly, by retaining an important 
territorial issue between Japan and Russia, 'the risk of Japan 
later joining the Russian camp is thereby proportionately 
reduced.' Thirdly, the Japanese communists would face a great 
dilemma between the pro-Soviet line and their necessity to obtain 
popularity from the Japanese nation which desired to get back the 
Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. Finally Johnston explained that 
the existence of an unsolved territorial problem with Japan could 
compel the Soviets to make more strategic commitment in the far 
east. As a result of the comparison between the merits of the 
British view and those of the American one, he reached a 
conclusion that 'the balance of advantage seemed to lie in favour 
of the American view.'e3
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Johnston's account was met with objections from his colleagues. 
George Clutton, the counsellor of the British Liaison Mission to 
Japan, suggested that the American clause regarding the Kuriles 
and Sakhalin would not become a bait to draw the Russians into 
the peace treaty, because the U.S. government had already made it 
clear in the 'Seven Principles' that they would not respect the 
Yalta Agreement. Secondly, if the British government agreed 
with the American view despite their clear recognition of the 
full validity of the Yalta Agreement, the Japanese would suspect 
that the British may attempt 'to provoke bad blood' against the 
Russians.70
C.P. Scott, an assistant in the Japan and Pacific Department in 
London, supported Clutton's contention. He suggested that the 
ceding of those islands to the Russians with no strings attached 
would prevent future Russian propaganda attacks on the peace 
treaty, and that the existing situation where the Soviet Union 
had already put down firm roots on those islands could not be 
altered without waging a major war against Russia,71 Moreover, 
the superintending under-secretary in the Japan and Pacific 
Department, Robert Scott, was on the side of Clutton and C.P. 
Scott. He discussed that the existence of an unsolved 
territorial problem would rather bring about an Russo-Japanese 
entente, which was undoubtedly against British interests. 
Consequently, Johnston's view was withdrawn and the British draft 
treaty which was in preparation embodied the position on the
&
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Kuriles ana Sakhalin problem which the British government had 
been taking since November 1950.
While the American government were preparing the 'March Draft', 
the British government also undertook a draft . treaty. -As a 
result of the effort, it accomplished their first official draft 
treaty on 7 April. Between the middle of February and the 
middle of March, the Foreign Office had prepared at least two 
drafts as the basis of discussion. Interestingly, as far as the 
Kuriles and Sakhalin clauses were concerned, there was a 
significant difference between these two drafts, on the one hand, 
and the official draft treaty dated 7 April, on the other. The 
former decided that the Kuriles, southern Sakhalin, and the 
Habomais should be. ceded to the Soviet Union. Especially, 
Britain's view of the status of the Habomais is suggested in the 
following draft provision:
Japan hereby cedes to the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics in full sovereignty the Kurile islands, that 
portion of South Sakhalin over which Japan formerly 
exercised sovereignty and the Habowai groups of islands, and 
agrees to the arrangement respecting these territories set 
out in (Annex).7'TMy Italics]
Furthermore, Article I of these drafts dealing with the 
delimitaxion of the range of Japanese sovereignty excluded the 
Habomais and even Shikotan from the range of Japanese 
sovereignty.
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But, in the official draft of 7 April, Article 3 dealing 
with the Kuriles and Sakhalin said:
Japan hereby cedes to the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics in full sovereignty the Kuriles islands and that 
portion of South Sakhalin over which Japan formerly 
exercised sovereignty.73
Added to that, Article I included the Habomais and Shikotan in 
the range of Japanese sovereignty.
What made this alteration is not very clear. Although, on 29 
March, the Foreign Office officials held a meeting to refine the 
second draft, they did not discuss the alteration of the Kuriles 
and Sakhalin clause.
On 16 April, John Foster Dulles visited Japan to assure the
Japanese that U.S. policy for the peace treaty would not be
changed even after General MacArthur had been sacked by President 
Truman. During the consultations between Dulles and Yoshida, the 
Japanese prime minister raised the question of the disposal of 
the Kuriles and Sakhalin. According to the Yoshida Memoirs, he 
requested Dulles to provide clearly in the peace treaty that the 
southern Kuriles should be excluded from the range of the 
' K u r i l e s ' D u l l e s  was, however, very reluctant towards
Yoshida's request. He answered that such an argument over the
territorial definition would considerably delay the conclusion of 
the peace treaty because it would be necessary to obtain the
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support of the interested states for the definition. Dulles 
seems to have been in too great a hurry for an early peace with 
Japan. Dulles suggested that the Japanese government would be 
able to announce their own view regarding the definition of 
the Kuriles at the peace conference.
ANGLO-AKER I  CAN JOINT DRAFT TREATY AND DULLES -  YOUNGER
CONSULTATIONS
As both the American and the British governments had prepared 
their own draft treaties, they had reached the stage where they 
had to undertake the efforts to work out a joint draft. For that 
purpose, an Anglo-American working conference was held from 25 
April to 4 May in Washington D.C.
It was on 2 May when the issue of the Kuriles and southern 
Sakhalin was discussed. Gerald Fitzmaurice, the second legal 
adviser of the Foreign Office, and John Allison, the deputy to 
Dulles, dealt with this issue. Fitzmaurice suggested to Allison 
that it might be better to exclude Article 5 of the U.S. 'March 
Draft' dealing with the disposal of those islands from the scope 
of Article 19, namely the suspending clause. Otherwise,
Fitzmaurice continued, southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles would
remain as a potential source of trouble between Japan and the
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Soviet Union. Allison opposed by pointing out that there were 
difficulties with U.S. Senate over this issue.''®
On 3 May, as a result of this consultation, the British and the 
Americans agreed on a joint draft. The territorial clause with 
respect to the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin u/as worded as 
follows.
Japan cedes to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the 
Kuriles Islands, and that portion of South Sakhalin and the 
islands adjacent to it over which Japan formerly exercised 
sovereignty.'7G
Indeed, the terms of the British draft regarding the disposition 
of those islands was fully embodied in the clause of the joint 
draft. But it was the British who made a substantial concession. 
Unless this clause was excluded from the scope of the suspending 
clause, the fundamental character of the treatment of those 
islands in this draft was totally based on the American position 
of the 'March Draft.' But in this joint draft, the Kuriles and 
southern Sakhalin clause was not excluded from the scope of the 
suspending clause.
Why did the British government made such a concession? 
Circumstantial evidence suggests the following two reasons. 
First of all, the reasoning by Allison of the American position 
may have been persuasive. The British could fully understand the 
vital importance of U.S. Congressional support for the peace
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treaty with Japan. Secondly, the retirement of Foreign Secretary 
Ernest Bevin and the new appointment of Herbert Morrison as the 
Foreign Secretary in March considerably affected the British 
attitudes. Morrison tended to put much greater emphasis on the 
significance of Anglo-American cooperation in the peace making 
with Japan. For instance, he prepared a memorandum for the 
Anglo-American consultations in Washington, which contained so 
many proposals for concessions to the U.S. that his cabinet 
colleagues did not give him full support. 77 This strong pro- 
American tendency of Morrison may have had a profound effect on 
the British decision to concede to the U.S. on the Kuriles and 
Sakhalin issue.
Through the Anglo-American consultations in Washington and 
their efforts to produce a joint draft, both countries managed to 
reach agreement on most of the main issues. There were, however, 
still some disagreements between them, especially the question of 
representatives from China. In this connexion, the disposal of 
Formosa was the most crucial point. To solve these problems, 
Dulles flew to London at the beginning of June. His main <• 
counterpart on the British side was Kenneth Younger, the minister 
of state for foreign affairs. During this London consultation, 
Dulles raised the question of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin 
on 5 June. He proposed to revise the clause of the joint draft 
with respect to the disposition of those islands. According to 
Dulles, the peace treaty should merely stipulate that Japan 
should renounce all claim and right to those islands. Moreover,
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he proposed to combine the Kuriles and Sakhalin clause and the 
Formosa clause into a more general clause. Regarding this 
proposal for the revision of the Kuriles and Sakhalin clause, 
Dulles pointed out that for the purpose of presentation it would 
be better for the treaty not to appear to confer a direct benefit 
on the Soviet Union.
On the British part, it was again Fitzmaurice who chiefly dealt 
with the issue of those islands. He did not directly oppose 
Dulles at all. Instead, he warned that the Soviet Union could 
obtain legal right to possess those territories even under such 
a provision as proposed by Dulles.7'3 Dulles' revision was 
brought to a Cabinet meeting for examination and decision. On 7 
June, the British Cabinet approved the revised territorial clause 
and Article 4 of the Anglo-American Joint Draft dealing with the 
Kuriles and Sakhalin was amended in accord with Dulles' proposal.
The background idea behind Dulles' proposal for the revision 
was a combination of several conditions and considerations. 
Firstly, as Dulles had mentioned in his conversation with
Fitzmaurice, Congress disliked any clause which appeared to 
confer any direct benefits on the Soviet Union whose 
participation in the treaty was now most unlikely. The 
territorial clause on the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin could 
have been one of the weakest targets for Congressional attack. 
The idea that the peace treaty with Japan should not be 
beneficial to the Russians was an expression of the general
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concept that American foreign policy should take a firm stand 
against Russia, in the cold war. These Congressional cold war 
sentiments exerted a great influence on Dulles' decisions with 
regard to the peace treaty in general, which were more clearly 
shown in his handling of the Chinese problem. Also the revision 
of the territorial clause on the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin 
was done under the great pressure of the cold war sentiment in 
the Congress. Dulles, as a cold warrior, may have played a role 
of a sounding-board for the Congress's cold war ideology.
Secondly, at this stage in the treaty negotiations , Dulles
did not have to take into account the necessity to hang some 
attractive bait in front of the Russians. As the Russian 
memorandum of 7 May indicated, it became most unlikely that the 
Soviet Union would be a party to the treaty. The Russians did 
not change their rigid attitude and refused to resume any 
negotiations for the peace with Japan. In addition to that, the
Defence Department had, under Secretary of Defence George
Marshall, started to take a conciliatory attitude towards the 
course taken by the State Department,®0 and therefore, the 
pressure on Dulles from the Pentagon to make an effort to draw 
the Russians into the peace treaty may have weakened. In the 
situation where the Soviet Union had continuously been showing
her unwillingness to resume negotiations for peace, the 
Pentagon's pressure which had been imposed at the time of the 
'March Draft', became impractical. Dulles, therefore, did not 
have to adopt the tactic of offering the Kuriles and southern
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Sakhalin to Russia only in case of her participation in the peace 
treaty.
Thirdly, in connexion with the second point mentioned above, 
the firm Soviet refusal to negotiate on the peace treaty actually 
released Dulles from the necessity to take into account the 
possibility of propaganda warfare developing. One of the most 
crucial reasons why Dulles had decided to add to the 'Seven 
Prinicples* an oral protocol that the Kuriles and southern 
Sakhalin would be ceded to Russia on condition that she should be 
a party to the treaty of peace, when he had met Malik on 26 
October 1950, was that Dulles had considered, that by showing 
America's willingness to cede those islands, the U.S. government 
would be able to avoid being accused by the Russians of violating 
the Yalta Agreement and to preempt the Soviet intention to pass 
the responsibility for their non-participation in the treaty onto 
the American shoulders. But now that the Soviets had solidly 
refused any resumption of the negotiations, the responsibility 
for non-participation of the Soviet Union could not be passed to 
the Americans.
In the fourth place, Dulles expressed the view during his 
consultations with the British in London that, with the clause in 
the Anglo-American Joint Draft, the sovereignty of the Kuriles 
and southern Sakhalin would legally be retained in Japanese hands 
and that the U. S. would be trapped into territorial disputes 
between Japan and U.S.S.R. Because the U.S. was intending to
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conclude a security pact with Japan, Dulles was concerned that, 
it would be possible for the American forces to the American 
forces to be dragged into some type of military 
involvement.®1The United States seemed to intend to avoid such 
a situation.
A linkage between the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin question 
and the Formosa question should not be ignored. At the last 
stage of the treaty making, one of the most vital and entangling 
questions between the two co-authors of the peace treaty was the 
question of the disposal of Formosa. The British government 
insisted that the peace treaty should provide that Formosa should 
be returned to 'China* without defining which China meant 
'China'. On the other hand, the American government disagreed 
with this. Because the U.S. neither recognized nor intended to 
recognize the PRC in the near future, it was impossible for her 
to agree to any provision which could be interpreted as implying 
the possibility of future recognition of the PRC by the U.S., 
The U.S. government asserted, therefore, that Japan should merely 
renounce all the right and title to Formosa without deciding 
which country it would be ceded to.®2 Dulles strongly desired 
the British to agree with the American idea. Furthermore, 
Dulles was faced with the necessity to cope with a claim from the 
Rationalist China regarding the disposal of Formosa. On 29 Xay, 
he met Wellington Koo, the ambassador of Republic of China to the 
U.S., and discussed the Formosa problem. Koo expressed the
7#
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desire of his goverment that Formosa be treated in the peace 
treaty exactly as were the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin.s3
Dulles had to cope simultaneously with these claims from 
Britain and the Nationalist China. But he did not intend to 
alter the U.S. position on the disposal of Formosa. Rather, he 
seems to have attempted to neutralise those claims from the UK 
and the Nationalist China, by altering the Kuriles and Sakhalin 
clause in the Anglo-American joint draft of May in such a way 
as to eliminate the distinction between this and the Formosa 
clause. In fact, during the meeting with Foreign Secretary 
Morrison on 6 June in London, Dulles explained that ’it was 
desirable to avoid any distinction in the treatment of Formosa on 
the one hand, and of South Sakhalin and of the Kuriles on the 
other.,&a He also explained to Secretary Acheson after the 
consultations which resulted in the British concession on the 
issue of Formosa that the British acceptance of the U.S. proposal 
on Formosa 'was made easier for U.K. by earlier U.S. suggestion 
that Sakhalin and Kuriles be similarly treated and not definitely 
ceded to U.S.S.R. by treaty.'es Thus, Dulles' considerations on 
the handling of the disposition of Formosa had some influence on 
the revision of the territorial clause in the Anglo-American 
joint draft.
As for the reasons why the British government accepted Dulles' 
revision of the territorial clause, the following can be pointed 
out. Firstly the British government were persuaded by Dulles'
7S
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explanation that, by making the Japanese only renounce all the 
rights and titles to the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin, the U.S. 
could avoid her military involvement in future territorial
disputes between Japan and the Soviet Union. On 7 June, Foreign
Secretary Morrison employed this reasoning by Dulles to persuade 
his colleagues at a Cabinet meeting.00 Secondly, Morrison 
suggested that, because under the revised clause the Soviet 
Union could secure her title to the Kuriles and southern 
Sakhalin, the Russians would be satisfied with the clause. In 
other words, Morrison emphasized that future stability in the 
far east could be maintained by revising the territorial clause 
along the lines of Dulles' suggestion.07
It is essential to note that the British government interpreted 
the revised clause as an indication of the recognition of Soviet 
sovereignty over the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. As 
Fitzmaurice had discussed during his consultations with Dulles on 
5 June, the British government took the stand that, because the 
Japanese would renounce all rights to those islands, the Soviet 
Union would legally be able to possess them. It seems that there 
was a background idea that the future situations in the far east 
could be made stable by the peace treaty in spite of the 
existing cold war. On the contrary, the intention of Dulles 
behind the revision was to indicate U.S. non-recognition of the 
Soviet possession of those islands. In other words, the
British seemed to recongize the status quo post bellum but the 
Americans did not. In this sense, the last edition of the
76
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territorial clause had only one appearance but different 
interpretations. Probably the divergence between the United
States and Britainjin interpreting the clause may have been a 
reflection of the differences between them in visualizing the 
cold war in the far east. To handle the cold war, the U.S. tried 
to show their intention to change the situation which obviously 
was not beneficial to the United States. The British tried, 
however, to stabilize the situation by recognizing them in the 
peace treaty and to base her containment policy on a situation 
which was already stabilized.
On 14 June, the revised Joint Draft was completed and the 
territorial clause with respect to the Kuriles and southern 
Sakhalin was decided as follows.
Article 2.....
(c) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the 
Kurile Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and the 
islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty 
as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 
1905.se
Apparently this clause does not contain any provision for the 
legal definition of the Kuriles. Both the U.S. and Britain 
endeavoured to avoid any commitment to a possible future dispute 
over this problem between Japan and the U.S.S.R. They seem to 
have intended to cape with this question in accordance with 
Article 22 which stipulated that disputes relating to the peace 
treaty should be remitted to the International Court of Justice.
7 7
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But they also intended to support the Japanese claims to the 
Habomais and Shikotan at the peace conference.
SAM FRAMCISCO PEACE COMFREREMCE AMD EATIFICATIOM OF PEACE 
TEEAT7
After several minor amendments, the Anglo-American draft was 
brought before the San Francisco Conference. The territorial 
clause regarding the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin was not, 
however, amended after the revision of 14 June. What newly 
emerged, as far as those islands were concerned, at the San 
Francisco Conference were the statements with respect to the 
status of the southern Kuriles, the Habomais, and Shikotan which 
were made by the representatives of the United States, and Japan. 
Because of the pressure and necessity of concluding the peace 
treaty as soon as possible, the U.S. and the Japanese avoided 
dealing with the definition of the Kuriles during the draft 
making process. At the conference, however, both governments 
decided to make a brief reference to the status of those islands 
which was questioned.
When Dulles made an explanatory speech at the second plenary 
session on 5 September, he clearly remarked that the U.S. 
government took the view that the Habomais were not a part of the 
Kuriles, and that, in the case of disputes over this question,
' U
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it could be brought to the International Court of Justice in 
accordance with Article 22.6,9 Dulles did not, however, even 
touch on the Southern Kuriles and Shikotan. His address was an 
indication that the U.S. government did not support the Japanese 
claim to the Southern Kuriles and Shikotan which had been made 
by the Yoshida administration and the Foreign Ministry. As 
mentioned before, the Department of State had investigated the 
legal status of the Southern Kuriles, the Habomais and Shikotan 
in November 1949 and reached the conclusion that the Habomais and 
Shikotan were legally not part of the Kuriles but that 'there 
seems to be no sound legal reason for claiming that Kunashiri and 
Etorofu are not part of the Kurile islands.'30 Dulles' speech 
seems to have been based on this State Department view, but it 
should not be overlooked that Dulles completely ignored Shikotan 
at the conference. The reason for his omission of Shikotan was 
not clear. It is, however, obvious that the U.S. government 
publicly supported only a part of the Japanese territorial claim.
The British representative showed an even clearer attitude of 
non-commitment. Kenneth Younger, the British representative, the 
then minister of state for foreign affairs, did not even touch
on the definition of the Kuriles. This does not, however, mean
that the British government did not have a clear idea on the the 
definition of the Kuriles. In fact, the British draft of April 
embodied the view that the Habomais and Shikotan came under 
Japanese sovereignty. In May, the Foreign Office also undertook
an re-examination of the legal status of those islands. R. S.
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Milward of the Research Department suggested that 'it would 
appear more correct in us to recognize Japanese de jure 
sovereignty and Soviet de facto occupation.' Vith respect to 
Shikotan, he recommended to keep open mind on this question.31
Furthermore, Milward discussed that ' It would do us harm with 
the Japanese - and little good with the Russians - to become a 
party to this Soviet theft, albeit a small one. It would seem 
necessary however to ensure that the Japanese realize that this 
does not in any way commit us to eject or to assist in ejecting 
the Russians. '32 The British Mission in Tokyo also supported the 
Milward memorandum.33 If the Foreign Office based their policy 
on the suggestion by Milward, all that the British delegates 
could do at the conference was to say nothing specific about the 
definition of the Kuriles.
The Soviet representative, Andrey Gromyko, also made a speech 
at San Francisco on 5 September. As far as the Kuriles and 
southern Sakhalin were concerned, he merely repeated the previous 
basic position of the Soviet Union. It clearly insisted that 
those islands were already Soviet territories, and that the peace 
treaty should confirm this reality by amending the territorial 
clause.3*
During the peace conference, the Japanese tried to make the 
best use of the opportunity to reveal their opinions on the peace 
treaty. One of the most typical examples was Yoshida's remark on
So
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the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin question. The points which 
Yoshida made were as follows. Firstly, Yoshida suggested that 
Kunashiri and Etorofu had been inalienable territories of Japan, 
quoting the historical fact that Tsarist Russia had never 
raised objections to the possession of those islands by Japan. 
Secondly, the northern part of the Kuriles was peacefully 
transferred to Japan by the treaty of St. Petersburg in 1875. 
This implied that those territories were not those that Japan had 
obtained through greed or violence. Thirdly, he insisted that 
the Habomais and Shikotan were part of Hokkaido, not of the 
Kuriles.
The position of the Japanese government was quite clearly 
expressed in the speech by Yoshida. First of all, Yoshida's 
speech seems to have been designed to make an appeal that the 
transfer of the Kuriles itself was against the Cairo Declaration. 
That Declaration had provided that the territories which Japan 
had gained through her greed and violence should be stripped off 
from her. Yoshida undoubtedly attempted to insinuate that the 
Kuriles, including Kunashiri and Etorofu could not be included 
in the category as described in the Cairo Declaration. In other 
words, Yoshida tried to affirm that the Kuriles had been 
legitimate Japanese territories. Here, one can see that he 
endeavoured to insist that the Soviet possession of those 
territories should be a case of violation of the Cairo 
Declaration, which provided that there should be no intention of 
territorial expansion on the part of the Allied powers. His
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suggestion about the status of the Habomais and Shikotan was 
slightly different. He directly indicated that those islands 
could not be included in the Kuriles and that, therefore, 'the 
Kuriles' in the peace treaty did not contain the Habomais and 
Shikotan. Yoshida's statements were only the expression of
views, and should not be regarded as reservations to the peace 
treaty. They did not, therefore, have any legal significance to 
alter or delimit the meaning of the territorial clause dealing 
with the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin.
The San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed on 6 September. The 
territorial clause of the treaty was approved as described in the 
Anglo-American draft of June. The problems contained in that 
draft were not solved at the peace conference but remained as 
they had been. First of all, the peace treaty failed to define 
the range of 'the Kuriles'. Especially, in the circumstances 
where the Japanese claimed that some islands were not part of the 
Kuriles, it was inconvenient that there was no territorial 
definition of the Kuriles. It left a crucial problem not only 
between Japan and Russia but also between the U.S., Britain and 
Japan. As mentioned above, both the British and American 
governments considered that Kunashiri and Etorofu, which the 
Japanese strongly wished to regain and which they considered as 
their inalienable territories, were part of the Kuriles. This 
certainly made possible, Anglo-Japanese or U.S.-Japanese 
cooperation in the future on this territorial issue^ very 
difficult.
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Secondly, the peace treaty failed to specify the country to 
which the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin would be ceded. This 
inconclusiveness in the terms of the treaty gave the Japanese 
good reason for believing that there was room for manoeuvre to 
get back those territories from the Russians. This became the 
main background against which the territorial probl(g£) constituted 
a stumbling block between the Soviet Union and Japan. In this 
sense, the legal inconclusiveness of the peace treaty created one
of the problems for the normalization talks between Japan and
the Soviet Union in 1955-6.
Thirdly, the fact that the territorial clause dealing with the
Kuriles and southern Sakhalin was interpreted in different ways 
by the co-authors of the peace treaty caused another future 
problem. As mentioned above, the territorial clause, Article 2 
(c), meant to the American government and probably Congressmen 
that the Soviets were being refused any territorial
benefits from the peace 
treaty and the clear expression of scrapping the Yalta Agreement. 
On the other hand, the British government interpreted that under 
Article 2 (c), as meaning that the Soviet Union could obtain the 
legal right to possess the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. The 
British government clearly showed their willingness to recognize 
the full validity of the Yalta agreement on the far east. 
Article 2(c) tacitly contained such an Anglo-American divergence. 
Five years later, this divergence would become an obstacle to 
Japanese efforts to construct an Anglo-American common front in
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favour of the Japanese during the negotiations with the Russians 
for the normalization.
The U.S. Senate ratified it on 20 March 1952. Before then, 
there had been a remarkable response from the Senate to Article 
2(c) and the handling of the Yalta Agreement on the far east. 
Although the Senate, when it ratified the peace treaty, made no 
reservations, it made a declaration with respect to its action. 
This declaration was mainly connected with the territorial issue 
between the Soviet Union and Japan, as follows:
As part of such advice and consent the Senate states that 
nothing the treaty contains is deemed to diminish or
prejudice, in favour of the Soviet Union, the right, title,
and interest of Japan, or the Allied Powers as defined in 
said treaty, in and to South Sakhalin and its adjacent
islands, the Kurile Islands, the Habomai Islands, the island 
of Shikotan, or any other territory, rights or interests
possessed by Japan on December 7 1941 or to confer any 
right, title, or benefit therein or thereto on the Soviet 
Union; and also that nothing in the said treaty or the 
advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification
thereof, implies recognition on the part of the United 
States of the provisions in favour of the Soviet Union of 
the so-called 'Yalta agreement' regarding Japan of February 
11 1945.
Although this was not a reservation, the fact that this 
declaration was approved by the Senate signified that it held a 
particular interest in the issue of the Kuriles and southern 
Sakhalin. At the same time, it seems that the refusal to treat
those islands and the Yalta agreement in favour of the Soviet
Union was an expression of the strong cold war sentiment
prevailing in the Senate. It is very easy to see how much
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pressure John Foster Dulles must have felt from the Senate with 
regard to the handling of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin 
during the peace treaty negotiations.
The British Parliament ratified the peace treaty on 3 January 
without very much difficulty. British members of parliaments
were more interested in the treatment of economic issues in the 
treaty than the territorial issue of the Kuriles and Sakhalin. 
In fact, it seems that the British Labour government tended not 
to provide members of parliament with much information on the 
process of the peace-making. Under these circumstances, the
territorial question of those islands, which was undoubtedly a 
minor issue for British national interests, did not attract much 
attention from parliamentarians.
The Japanese Rational Diet ratified the peace treaty on 18
Rovember '*• 1951. During the sessions at the Diet for
ratification of the peace treaty, the government made clear its 
interpretation with regard to the disposition of the Kuriles, 
southern Sakhalin, the Habomais and Shikotan. This will be dealt 
with in next chapter.
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CHAPTER 2
SOV I ET-JAPANESE RELAT I 025TS
F R O M
JSAIsT FRANC X SCO FEAOE TREATY 
TO DOWNFALL OF YOSHIDA
Soviet-Japanese relations from the conclusion of the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty to the middle of 1953 were much affected 
by the subversive activities of the Japan Communist Party 
(Hereafter cited as the J.C.P.). The party seemed to be 
basically obedient to instructions from the Soviet Union, while 
the Yoshida administration made continuous and strenuous efforts 
to counter the communist subversive activities. There was, 
therefore, an undercurrent of domestic confrontation which 
inevitably affected diplomacy with the Soviet Union
TACTICAL CHAMGE OF JAPANESE COMMUNISTS UNDER SOVIET INFLUENCE
The distinctive characteristic; of the communist subversive 
activities in Japan after the conclusion of the Peace Treaty was 
the J.C.P.'s tactical change from 'peaceful revolution', which 
had been adopted during the occupation period, to 'national- 
liberation democratic revolution' which was adopted in October
1951. The 'national-liberation democratic revolution' line gave
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more emphasis to militant and armed subversive activities, and 
ultimately aimed at the revolution through such violent 
operations. 1 The Soviet Union exerted a great deal of influence 
on this tactical change by the Japanese communists.
On 6 January 1950, the Cominform sharply criticized the 
•peaceful revolution* thesis in its bulletin For A Lasting Peace, 
For A People's Democracy, and denounced the thesis as 'anti- 
Socialism and anti-Democracy'.2 In August 1951, the leaders of 
the J.C.P., Tokuda, Rosaka, and some others, who had been in 
exile in Peking since 1950 were invited to Hoscow. They went 
there with a draft of a new party programme and sought advice 
from the Soviet leaders. Soviet Premier Stalin amended a part of 
the draft.3 In particular, a part describing the method for 
democratic reform and liberation of Japan, was altered to read, 
' It is wrangtnconsider that democratic reform and liberation of 
Japan can be achieved by employing peaceful methods.1 * On 15 
October, the J.C.P. convened the fifth Rational Party Congress 
(Go Zen Kyo) and finally adopted the draft programme which was 
revised by Stalin. The draft programme now became the new party 
programme which was the so-called 'Party Programme of 1951'
<51nen Kdryo). Based on this new party programme, a series of 
militant subversive activities were conducted by members of the 
J.C.P. from then on until July 1952.
During the occupation period, the communist subversive 
activities had been restricted by the Political Organization
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Restriction Act (Dantai To Kiseirei) which was part of the 
Potsdam Ordinance issued by General MacArthur. With the 
termination of the occupation, the Japanese government foresaw 
the urgency to make its own legal restrictions on the 
activities of organizations which would possibly undertake 
subversive activities and prevent their establishment. Prime 
Minister Yoshida, who clearly assumed the close linkage between 
the Japanese communists and the Soviet Union, regarded the task 
of setting up an anti-communist regime as a crucial policy goal 
of Japan which was to achieve independence in April 1952.® In 
March 1951, the government began its investigations into new 
anti-subversive regulations. As the result of this, the 
Ministry of Justice prepared the first draft of a new 
restriction at the end of August. According to the summary of 
the draft which was issued on 28 September, the following
activities were banned as illegal: firstly, activities inviting
into
and assisting aggression. Japan from foreign countries and, 
secondly, destructive activities inflicted on American forces 
stationed in Japan.® These attempts by the government to set up 
a new restriction was to be embodied in the Anti-Subversive Act 
(Hakai Katsudo Boshiho) which was to be passed by the Diet in 
July 1952.
The effort' by the government was, however, faced with strong 
opposition from the intellectuals and the labour unions. They 
became anxious about the possibility that the Act would be used 
to restrict freedom of speech and political activities. But the
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May Day incident was a fatal blow to the opposition movements. 
On 1 May 1952, the people who had been participating in a May Day 
rally at the Outer Garden of the Meiji Shrine clashed with the 
police on the guard of the Plaza. It turned out to be a riot, 
which resulted in a tragedy with two demonstrators shot dead, 
over 2,000 injured and 1,230 demonstrators arrested. Some of 
the demonstrators were reported to have been equipped with bamboo 
spear5 and the riot was alleged to have been planned by groups 
related to the J.C.P.
Faced with the May Day incident, the Yoshida administration 
stepped up its effort for establishing anti-subversive 
restrictions. In July, it finally succeeded in getting through 
the bill for the Anti-Subversive Activities Act, by exploiting 
effectively the antipathy against the communists aroused in 
public opinion by the incident.
It now became clear that the aim of the J.C.P. described in 
its 1951 Party Programme had failed to be achieved. The J.C.P. 
had aimed at securing at least the following two goals: to
overturn the government through violent activities, and to 
promote support for the communist cause from broader segments of 
the Japanese progressives. The subversive activities led by the 
J.C.P. had, however, invited the legislative response of the 
Anti-Subversive Activities Act, and generated strong antipathy 
against the J.C.P.(s revolutionary activities in public opinion 
and even among the socialists. Under these circumstances, the
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number of communist subversive activities began to decrease after 
July 1952.
Moscow seems to have reacted to this disadvantageous situation 
for the J.C.P. and for Soviet political strategy towards Japan. 
On 3 August, the Pravda published the article by Tokuda Kyuichi, 
one of the most influential leaders of the J.C.P., entitled 'For 
the 30th Anniversary of the Communist Party of Japan' C K  30-i 
gadavshchinie kommunisticheskoi partii yaponii') The article 
called for the alteration of tactics of the J.C.P.. It stated 
that the weakness of the present tactics of the J.C.P. lay in 
placing too much emphasis on demonstrations and sabotage and, as 
a result of this, in ignoring legal activities to increase the 
political influence of the party.7
It is highly likely that Tokuda's article reflected a change of 
foreign policy principle on the part of the Soviets themselves. 
The principle of Soviet foreign policy seemed to alter its 
centre of emphasis at the latest in February 1952. The change 
could be seen in an article written by Stalin entitled 'Economic 
Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.' In this article, Stalin 
implied that the Soviet Union should soften her foreign policy 
towards the western countries.® It seems reasonable to argue 
that the Soviet leaders may have considered that it would be 
better for them to recommend the J.C.P. not to take too radical
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and militant a course which would possibly provide the Japanese 
government with a good reason for taking a firmer anti-communist 
attitude in its domestic and foreign policy, and which would 
prevent the contradiction between Japan and the U.S. from being 
intensified.
A disastrous defeat for the Japanese Communists came at the 
time of the general election for the Lower House in October
1952. The 25th general election in 1952 saw a sharp decline of 
the J.C.P. It lost all seats which it had won in 1949. It seems 
that its militant subversive activities bad deprived the J.C.P. 
of public support. Nov, the Japanese Communists had to alter the 
militant revolutionary strategy. For instance, in the middle 
of November, the J.C.P. announced that it would re-start its 
party activities as the 'lovable Communist Party'.3
Thus, the phase of the confrontation between Yoshida's anti- 
subversive efforts and the J.C.P.-Soviet subversive operations 
substantially ended before the end of 1952. Yet Yoshida 
continued his further endeavours to consolidate the anti­
communist regime in Japan. An example was his attempt to amend 
the Police Act in order to centralise the police system to cope 
with the communist activities more effectively. Communist 
activities lost the previous militancy and in late 1954, it 
started to draft a new party programme again under Soviet 
influence, which would be approved at the 6th Rational Party 
Congress <6 Zen Kyd) in 1955. Through this process, the
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national-liberation democratic revolution policy was entirely 
replaced by a new soft line policy emphasising the importance of 
peaceful legal activities.
JAPAN'S ATTITUDE TOVARDS PEACE WITH RUSSIA, 1951
Immediately after the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty, the Japanese government made clear its negative attitude 
on restoring diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. The 
prime minister implied on 15 October 1951 at a plenary session 
of the Upper House of the Rational Diet that the government had 
no intention to normalize the relations with the Soviet Union.10 
This negative attitude was to be basically maintained throughout 
the Yoshida period, though some changes took place especially 
over the territorial issue between the Soviet Union and Japan. 
What factors made the government take this negative attitude 
towards normalization?
Firstly the Yoshida government considered that there were at 
least two crucial problems which must be solved before a peace 
treaty or normalization could be negotiated: namely, the
repatriation of Japanese detainees in the Soviet Union, and the 
reversion of a part of the former Japanese islands which were 
occupied by Russia.11 Shortly after the end of the Pacific War,
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ex-Japanese soldiers began to be repatriated to Japan by the 
Allied powers. The Soviet Union did not, however, send them back 
to Japan, but took them away to Siberia, Outer Mongolia, and 
Central Asia for hard labour. In 1946, facing strong pressure 
from G.H.Q. , the Soviets had started to repatriate the Japanese 
detainees. But on 22 April 1950, the U.S.S.R. had announced that 
repatriation had been accomplished except that of suspected war 
criminals.12 The Japanese government assumed that there must be 
more detainees in the Soviet Union. It was, therefore, a 
crucial task for the government to get back those Japanese.
As for the territorial question, Yoshida stated that the 
Habomais and Shikotan should be returned to Japan if the Soviet 
Union desired to normalize the diplomatic relations with Japan.13 
At this period the Japanese government held a stance that the 
Habomais and Shikotan had not been renounced in the peace treaty 
because they were not part of the Kuriles, which the Japanese had 
renounced in the Peace Treaty. The government seemed to be 
determined to regain those islands from the Soviets, as this 
intention had been expressed in Yoshida's address at the Peace 
Conference. An interesting point is that at this stage the 
government did not claim that Kunashiri and Etorofu, or the 
Kuriles should be returned. All it wanted to regain was the 
Habomais and Shikotan. This view was repeatedly revealed at the 
Diet by high-ranking officials of the Japanese Foreign Ministry.
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On 19 October, Nishimura Kumao, the director of the Treaty 
Bureau, stated that the Kuriles which were mentioned in the Peace 
Treaty included Kunashiri and Etorofu, though the historical 
background and status of these two islands were very different 
from the rest of the Kuriles.1** Vice Minister Kusaba also 
confirmed that the Japanese government had renounced in the peace 
treaty the Kuriles including Kunashiri and Etorofu as a result of 
taking into account all aspects of those islands such as their 
historical, geological and political backgrounds.1s The
government argued that even the Kuriles were under wartime 
occupation because the disposition of sovereignty over the 
archipelago must be confirmed by concluding a peace treaty 
between Japan and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, it admitted 
that Japan had definitely renounced Kunashiri and Etorofu.16
The second main reason for Japan's reluctance to normalize her 
relations with the Soviet Union was Soviet attitude towards the
S.F.P.T. which had been expressed by Gromyko at the San 
Francisco Peace Conference. Gromyko's statement at the
conference was substantially against the existence of a post-war 
U.S.-Japanese coalition. This Soviet attitude meant the denial 
of the fundamental premises of post-war Japan's foreign policy. 
Faced with this Soviet attitude, the Japanese government must 
have realized that it was unrealistic to conclude a peace treaty 
with Russia. The third reason was a fear of communist 
infiltration into Japan which could be enhanced by Soviet- 
Japanese normalization. Yoshida was reported to have spoken to
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the effect that 'to enter into friendly relations with communist 
nations would mean the encouraging of communist infiltration into 
Japan. Accordingly the government had absolutely no intention of 
taking such an action.'17
Finally, it must be emphasised that Yoshida held a firm 
dichotomous view about the world situation. He often stated in 
the Diet that the most important task for Japan was to reduce the 
strength of the communist world, by firmly placing herself in 
the western bloc as an anti-communist country. In replying to 
an interpellation in October 1951 which asked about the 
government's intention to conclude a peace treaty with the Soviet 
Union, he maintained that in a world divided into two blocs, the 
communists and the capitalists, Japan could not take a position 
like 'Hue'.1® (Hue is an imaginary creature appearing in the 
Tale of Heike , which has a monkey's head, a racoon's torso, the 
tail of a snake, and tiger's hands, arms and legs.) Thus, 
Yoshida clearly excluded the possibility that Japan would take a 
neutralist position in the world of the cold war. For Yoshida, 
to take up a position favourable to normalization or peace 
settlement with the U.S.S.R. meant nothing but to take a 
neutralist position like 'Hue'.
CHARGE IS  SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS JAPAN: 1952-3
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Many of the analysts contend that the change in Soviet foreign 
policy took place after the death of Stalin. But it seems that a 
significant change occured during the last part of Stalin era. 
It seems to have been the beginning of 1952 that a new foreign 
policy framework was confirmed. The principle of Soviet foreign 
policy seemed to alter its centre of emphasis at the latest in 
February 1952. The change could be seen in an article written by 
Stalin entitled 'Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.'. 
He first wrote it in February and later published it in 
Bolshevik in September.13 It was argued in the article that 
contradictions among the western capitalist countries had become 
and would become more salient and that war between the capitalist 
and the socialist worlds would be less likely than war amongst 
the capitalist countries themselves.2:0
In connexion with this overall analysis, Stalin explained with 
regard to the Situation of Japan.
'Let us pass to the major vanquished countries: Germany
(Western) and Japan. These countries are now languishing in 
misery under the jackboot of American imperialism. Their 
industry and agriculture, their trade, their foreign and 
home politics, and their whole life are fettered by the
American occupation "regime".........To think that these
countries will not try to get on their feet again, will not 
try to smash the U.S. "regime" and force their way to 
independent development is to believe in miracles.'21
This argument logically suggests that the Soviet Union should 
wait for, and encourage, the contradictions in the capitalist 
countries to become sharp and should take advantage of them.
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According to Stalin, Japan was also included in the capitalist
out
world and was expected to stand^against the U.S. control over her 
economic life and national security. In other words, the new 
framework of Soviet foreign policy towards Japan was to take
(rather/a soft 1 ine^ ) than^hard one which could evoke the Japanese
resentment in public opinion towards Russia and lead the 
Japanese government to consolidate its ties with the United 
States. Nevertheless, there was no clear soft line policy
towards Japan taken by the Soviet Union in 1952 except the 
message by Stalin on the New Year's Day of 1952. Considering 
that the Stalin article was written in February 1952, it is
likely that he had already had in mind a crude outline of the new 
framework of foreign policy before his New Year Message. 
Stalin's Message may have reflected his new policy framework, 
because the message was obviously intended to indicate . good 
will towards the Japanese.
In 1953 the Soviet Union was faced with significant and large-
scale changes. At the beginning of March, Stalin died and Gieorgy
M. Malenkov succeeded him as the premier. Malenkov had been an
advocate of Stalin's new foreign policy principles. At the 19th
Party Congress in October 1952, where the new principles was
confirmed as official policy guidelines of the Soviet Union, he
had unequivocally supported Stalin's new line. In fact, he
to
launched a series of 'detente' policies after he came iiy office.
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In the far east, Soviet softening of Soviet policy was shown 
in her positive attitude towards the armistice of the Korean war. 
On 28 March 1953, the Soviet government agreed to exchange the 
prisoners of war who were badly injured or seriously ill, and 
proposed to resume the armistice talks which had been suspended 
in 1952. This Soviet initiative led, at last, to the cease-fire 
of the war in Korea on 27 July 1953. The termination of the 
Korean war prepared the way conditions for Soviet peace overture 
to Japan. While the Korean war was being fought, Russia could 
not undertake such an overture because that could have injured 
her relations with Communist China. But the end of the war 
swept away this restriction of Sino-Soviet relations. In fact, 
Communist China also started to express her desire to normalize 
relations with Japan two month after the armistice.*2
The first expression of Soviet readiness to resume diplomatic 
relations with Japan came in a speech of Premier Malenkov to the 
Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. on 8 August. He stated that 
’normalization of relations between all the Far Eastern states, 
and with Japan in particular, is a matter of urgent moment.' He 
suggested that the stumbling-block to the normalization was U.S. 
foreign policy which prevented Japan from achieving her true 
independence and made her a bridgehead of U.S. far eastern 
strategy against Russia. The Japanese people should, he went on, 
overcome these obstacles in order to resume the normal relations 
with 'all the Far Eastern states'. Malenkov concluded that 'Any 
steps that Japan takes along these lines will meet with the
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sympathy and support of the Soviet Union and all ' peace loving 
nations.123 This speech indicated that the Soviet Union was
ready to normalize her relations with Japan on condition that 
Japan should change her relationship with the United States.
What were the main motives behind Malenkov’s overture? Why did 
Russia have to take a new approach towards Japan? First of all, 
as long as Soviet foreign policy towards Japan was a part of her 
world strategy, the new approach to Japan reflected the grand 
framework of Soviet foreign policy which Malenkov had repeated 
since the death of Stalin. It should be, however, pointed out 
that there were some motivations particular to Japanese-Soviet 
relations. Firstly, the Japanese Communists had lost so much
support in domestic politics in 1952 because of its too much 
dependence on revolutionary subversive activities. For the 
Soviets to reconstruct the Japanese domestic basis of support for 
the U.S.S.R. and to consolidate the Japanese progressives against 
the American course, they had to adopt a foreign policy which 
would generate a broader level of support from the Japanese 
public.
Japanese reaction to the Malenkov Speech came quickly. On 10 
August at the plenary session of the Upper House of the Diet, 
Foreign Minister Okazaki stated that, if the U.S.S.R. approved 
the S. F.P.T. and the U.S.-Japanese Security Pact, the government 
would not be unwilling to consider a peace settlement with
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her.2* The Japanese government had not basically changed its 
negative attitude towards the issue of a peace with the U.S.S.R.
The Japanese government did not seem to alter its Soviet policy 
even after the death of Stalin. The non-alteration of the Soviet 
policy of the Japanese government reflected its rigidity of 
perception with regard to the change in Soviet foreign policy.
On 7 March, the Foreign Ministry transmitted to the British 
Foreign Office its views on the effect of the change in Soviet 
leadership, saying that it did not expect any drastic and 
immediate change in Soviet foreign policy towards the far east 
and Japan, though it expected that ' the Communists may become 
well disposed towards peace' in Korea.25 In addition to this, an 
official of the fifth division of the Bureau of Europe-American 
Affairs was reported to have express^dthe opinion that it was 
unlikely that Soviet policy towards Japan would be affected by 
the death of Stalin.25 Thus, as far as the Foreign Ministry was 
concerned, the death of Stalin did not affect the general ^  
framework of perception about Soviet foreign policy towards 
Japan. As a result of this, basic Japanese policy towards Russia 
did not change.
As early as the end of July 1953, the Japanese Foreign 
Ministry actually predicted that the Russians would undertake a 
new overture towards Japan. Before the end of July, the Ministry 
obtained information that two Russian officials of the Soviet 
Mission in Tokyo, were recalled to Moscow. The Foreign Ministry
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interpreted this move as a sign that the Soviet Union would 
launch some new movement towards Japan. A Japanese official 
said that he was sure that the recall of the Russian officials 
had something to do with the resumption of normal relations 
between the U.S.S.R. and Japan.27
The same information was passed to the American Embassy in
Tokyo. Given this information, Ambassador John Allison
recommended the secretary of state, who was scheduled to arrive
at Tokyo on 8 August, as follows:
Ve have now learned informally from Japanese Foreign Office
official that in his opinion Russians are preparing make 
Csic] bid any day to impose relations with
Japan possibility of some overt friendly gesture by
Russians is yet another important reason for us to announce 
N.S.C. decision regarding Amami group soonest. If
announcement were made only after Russian move, it would 
look like hasty defensive action on our part rather than 
genuine initiative by us. Under such circumstances
pshychological benefit to us would be nil.23
The United States government had already decided, as the document 
quoted above shows, to return the Amami group of islands to 
Japan, aiming at some favourable psychological effect on the 
Japanese people. Allison tried to prevent the psychological 
effect of the return of the Amami group from being diminished by 
the possible future Soviet friendly gesture. But it is also 
undeniable that he may have intended to counter and pre-empt
possible Soviet peaceful overtures by announcing the reversion of 
the Amamis. For it is not realistic to consider that he was not
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aware of the counter-effect of the announcement of the reversion
suggestion, Dulles made an announcement on 8 August that the U.S. 
government would return those islands to Japan as soon as 
necessary arrangement would have been made between the two 
governments.
The speech by Malenkov of 8 August was revealed by the Japanese 
press later than Dulles' announcement of the return of the 
Amamis. The Japanese government seemed to use the American 
reversion of the Amamis in order to neutralize the effect of the 
Malenkov speech. A Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman even 
went as far as to announce that Malenkov's speech had been aimed 
at reducing the value of U.S. decision to return the Amami 
islands.3°Thus the return of the Amami islands was used as a 
tool of psychological warfare against the U.S.S.R.'s overture for 
the normalization of Soviet-Japanese relations. The Soviet 
government seemed well aware of U.S. and Japanese intentions. 
On 26 August, Pravda issued an article which sharply condemned 
the U.S. government for its still possessing Okinawa and the 
Bonins.31
Thus, it can be argued that Soviet-Japanese relations developed 
to some extent in the context of Soviet-American psychological 
warfare over Japan. An important point is that both the U.S. and 
the U.S.S.R. were trying to manipulate Japanese nationalism. The 
return of the Amamis was seemingly intended to satisfy the
of the Amamis on the Soviet overture. Following Allison's
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Japanese public, who held intensified nationalistic sentiments, 
in order to neutralize effects of Soviet friendly gestures 
towards Japan. At the same time, the Soviets seemed to attempt 
to keep anti-American sentiments by reminding the Japanese that 
the U.S. were still occupying some of Japanese territories.
CHANGE IF  JAPANESE POSITION ON THE TERRITORIAL ISSUE
On the territorial issue, an interesting change in the Japanese 
government's standpoint may be seen in the statement issued 
immediately after the Malenkov speech by the Foreign Ministry on 
the territorial issue. Foreign Ministry sources were reported to 
have spoken to the effect that 'Even for propaganda purposes, 
the Soviet regime under Malenkov was not in a position to 
intimate its intention to return the K u riles  and Sakhalin in the 
current situation prevailing in that country.' 3;2C My Italics. 3 
The Japanese government had continuously taken a position since 
the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty that Russia 
should return the Habomais and Shikotan to Japan. But, by the 
time of the Malenkov speech, the government seemed to amend its 
previous position. The Foreign Ministry now seemed to request 
not only the reversion of the Habomais and Shikotan but also the 
return of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. When and how did 
the Japanese government change their position on this issue? 
Circumstantial evidence indicates that the government had
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gradually amended its position somewhere between February and 
August 1953.
A sign of the alteration had appeared at the beginning of
elected a new president in November 1952, had issued his first 
Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union on 2 
February. In his message, the president expressed his intention 
to repeal a 'secret understanding of the past'.33 The Japanese 
government did not fail to catch the implication of this part of 
Eisenhower's message. Though the speech by Eisenhower did not 
define the precise meaning of the 'secret understanding', the 
Japanese regarded it as the Yalta Secret Agreement. N.H.K., the 
national broadcasting company of Japan, announced in a radio 
programme that Japan had beared no brighter news than the 
Eisenhower address since the day of the surrender.3-1 In response 
to the Eisenhower message, Prime Minister Yoshida stated before 
the Upper House on 3 February that he would make utmost effort 
to regain the Kuriles and other former territories of Japan.3® On 
the next day, Okazaki, the foreign minister, made a statement 
following Yoshida's line and expressed his hope that the Kuriles 
and southern Sakhalin would be returned to Japan. Given the fact 
that the Japanese government had adhered to the idea that Japan 
could expect only the return of the Habomais and Shikotan in late 
1951, the statements by Yoshida and Okazaki were a clear 
departure from the^ previous line.
February, shortly after President Eisenhower who had been
CHAPTER 2
Interestingly, the Japanese Foreign Ministry took quite a 
different stance from its prime minister and foreign minister. On 
3 February, after its executive meeting, the ministry issued an 
official statement that, because the Kuriles and southern 
Sakhalin had already been renounced in the S.F.P.T., the possible 
American abrogation of the Yalta Agreement would have no effect
on Japanese position over the territorial issue.3S Another
a ^
source provides /clearer picture of the ministry's position. ^
According to a report prepared by Sir Esler Dening, the British
ambassador to Japan, the Foreign Ministry was reported to have
indicated its view that even if the U.S. abrogated the Agreement,
Japan herself was not in a position to claim the Kuriles and
southern Sakhalin but that the Yalta understanding to cede the
Kuriles and southern Sakhalin to the U.S.S.R. would be
c a n c e l l e d . T h i s  divergence between the ministry officials
and the prime minister and foreign minister seems to have been
dissolved in favour of Yoshida and Okazaki. On 5 February, when
asked for his comment on the Foreign Ministry's official
statement, Okazaki promised to warn the ministry officials.33
Given the fact that Yoshida had a very strong influence on the
Foreign Ministry through Okazaki who was very obedient to Yoshida,
it can safely be said that the Foreign Ministry was forced to
adjust its view to that of the prime minister and foreign
minister.
It was the British Foreign Office which reacted to the 
Eisenhower Speech with acute anxiety over the rather over-
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excited Japanese response to Eisenhower's speech and U.S. 
carelessness in evoking Japanese irredentism. Immediately after 
Eisenhower's speech, alarmed Foreign Office staff made an inquiry 
to the U.S. Department of State about the meaning of the 
repudiation of the secret understanding of the past which had 
been referred to in the presidential speech. Secretary of State 
John Foster Dulles replied that the 'secret understanding' in the 
speech meant the Yalta Secret Agreement, but added that it had 
only referred to the Agreement relating to the relations between 
the U.S.S.R. and China.33 The Foreign Office could not be 
satisfied with that ambiguous reply from the U.S. government and 
considerably disturbed by the possibility that the Japanese 
irredentaiism would be provoked by the speech. Moreover, the 
British concern came to reality when Yoshida and Okazaki showed 
their clear intention to extend their efforts to get back the 
Kuriles and 'other former Japanese territories'. Under these 
circumstances, the Foreign Office decided to prevent the 
Americans from scrapping the Yalta Agreement.
The British had endeavoured to hinder Dulles' attempt to 
nullify the Yalta Agreement during the making of the S.F.P.T. 
This basic position was still held by the Foreign Office in 1953. 
On 4 February the staff quickly prepared a memorandum in which 
desirable British positions were clarified. This memorandum 
recommended Anthony Eden, the foreign secretary, to take the 
following position.
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(a) Her Majesty's Govennent are not in favour of unilateral 1 
repudiation of international agreements.
<b) Japan has already renounced her rights to their northern 
territories (S. Sakhalin and Kuriles). Therefore Japan does 
not have any rights to assert title to these territories. 
Logically, the repudiation of Yalta agreement does not have 
any effect on irrelevancy of Japanese calling for reversion 
of these territories. 40
The anxiety over the Japanese intentions towards her former
territories was also expressed in the House of Lords. On 11
February, Viscount Elibank questioned with regard to Yoshida's
statement on 3 February. He was concerned about the possiblity
that the Japanese would start to ignore and erode S.F.P.T. and
other agreements bit by bit. He argued that the British
government should not become a party to any attempt to break the
agreement and the peace treaty in relations to those territories.
-the.
In reply to Elibank, ^ [Marquess of Reading, the minister of state 
in charge of foreign affairs in the Lords, clearly declared that 
the British government did not intend to depart from the 
international agreements governing the position of these 
territories.41 This issue was also brought in the House of 
Commons on 16 February. This time, Eden made it clear that the 
government did not agree to repudiate the agreements 
unilaterally. This was a sharp but indirect criticism towards
expectations
the Americans and poured cold water on the Japanes^.4i In the ^  
United States, there had been a movement in the Senate for 
making a resolution to repudiate the Yalta Agreement since the 
speech by Eisenhower, but at last this did not materialize. The
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British influence m y  have been one of the reasons for this 
failure.
While the British officials seemed to assume that the Americans 
had carelessly made such a statement as the Eisenhower address, 
the possibility cannot be denied that . , Eisenhower's statement 
was a well-calculated one to evoke anti-Soviet and pro-American 
sentiment in Japanese public opinion. In January 1953, the 
Rational Security Council approved a programme, entitled 
'Psychological Strategy for Japan'.43 As already examined by 
some scholars, the Eisenhower administration tended to emphasize 
the significance of psychological warfare in the cold war.44 
Eisenhower's reference to the abrogation of the Yalta Secret 
Agreement m y  have been a result of the application of 
psychological strategy to the foreign policy towards Japan.
During 1953, despite the first Soviet expression of their 
readiness for normlization, Soviet-Japanese relations were
not at all improved. Partly this was because of the rigid anti- 
Soviet attitude of the Japanese government, which was even 
intensified by its making tougher its position on the territorial 
issue, and partly it was because the Soviet Union m d e  the 
alteration of U.S.-Japanese relations a necessary condition for 
the normlization. But Soviet efforts were to be continued in 
1954 and became more vigorous as international tensions were 
reduced and the Japanese political scene became rather 
disorderly.
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VISHISSKY AMD MOLOTOVS PEACE OVERTURES IF  1954.
Soviet overtures for normalization towards Japan tended to become 
clearer and more positive. During 1954, the Soviets undertook 
totally three peace overtures: First Deputy Foreign Minister
ViShinsky's expression of a desire to restore diplomatic relations*'" 
with Japan in July; Foreign Minister Molotov's reply to an 
inquiry from the editor of a Japanese newspaper in September; and 
the Sino-Soviet Joint Communiqu6 in October. These vigorous 
attitudes on the Russian side seem to have reflected changes in 
the international and Japanese domestic situation in 1954.
Basically, there were in 1954 growing potential threats for the 
Soviets, as far as Soviet-Japanese relations were concerned. 
First, Japanese rearmament reached a new stage in 1954. The 
Yoshida government had been trying to rearm Japan gradually since 
1950 under U.S. pressures, though Yoshida, who had attached more 
significance to Japan's economic recovery, had tried to resist 
undue American demands for more rapid rearmament. At any rate, 
beginning with the Rational Police Reserve which had been 
established in July 1950 under MacArthur's instruction, Yoshida 
continued his efforts for the gradual intensification of 
rearmament and increase in size. In July 1952, the government 
managed to set up the Rational Security Forces, almost doubling 
the manpower of the Rational Police Reserve. This rearmament was
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virtually to place Japan more firmly in the orbit of U.S. anti- 
Soviet military strategy in the far east. Even so, the Japanese 
had tried to limit the use of these farces to the case of 
disruption of internal security. In other words, in principle, 
Japanese rearmament until 1954 was supposed to be aimed at anti- 
subversion operations.
But in March 1954, the Mutual Security Assistance Agreement was 
worked out between Japan and the U.S. This agreement obliged 
Japan to use U.S. aid to sophisticate and modernize tbt equipment 
of her military forces. Based on the agreement, the Japanese 
government decided to expand significantly the Rational Security 
Force and to set up the Self Defence Force. In June 1954, the 
Self Defence Force Act was approved by the Diet, which clearly 
stipulated that the S.D.F. could be used against attacks from 
both inside and outside Japan. low it became unequivocally clear
This rearmament must have been perceived by the Soviets as an 
enlarged threat. Many articles in the Soviet press explicitly
showed the alarmed concern. IZVESTIA sharply criticized two
pieces of legislation which were defence related, namely the
Self Defence Force Act and the Act for Establishing the S.D.F.
Agency, which had been approved by the Diet in March. The
Soviets called the S. D.F. Agency the 'Ministry of War'."*®
Soviet News also critisized the combination of the M. S.A.
Agreement and the two defence related acts, saying that the
been
that the S.D.F. had ven a role as an anti-Soviet force.
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Americans and the Japanese aimed at 'restoration of militarism' 
in Japan. In addition to this, the combination of the M.S.A. and 
two defence bills was also described as 'An Asian variant of the 
notorious "European Defence Community"'*e The perception of 
threat from the Japanese rearmament may have driven the Soviets 
to set up a less tense relationship with Japan.
The domestic political situation in Japan provided Russia with 
an opportunity to weaken the power of the Japanese conservatives 
and to strengthen that of the Japanese progressives by showing 
friendly gestures towards the Japanese people. The popularity of 
the Yoshida administration sharply declined. A fatal event for 
Yoshida was the shipbuilding scandal which lasted from January to 
late 1954. When the Public Prosecuters Offices decided to
arrest Sato Eisaku, who was the General-Secretary of the Liberal 
Party and one of the right hand men of Yoshida, the minister of 
justice abused the right of command to stop the arrest. There was 
no doubt that the minister of justice did it under a strong
pressure from Yoshida. The attitude of public opinion over this 
scandal was clearly against Yoshida. Moreover, public opinion 
may have been bored by Yoshida's foreign policy, which was well- 
known as 'whole hearted pro-American' line. Since the
achievement of Independence, nationalistic sentiment in Japan 
had grown up and the Japanese people began to support a foreign 
policy which was free from U.S. pressures. Anti-American
sentiment was also provoked by the Fifth Lucky Dragon incident.
Under these circumstances, the Soviet Union wa5 in a position to
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be able to take full advantage of the weak position of the 
Yoshida government in order to obtain broader support for the 
course of Russia from the Japanese public.
Turning our eyes to broader international aspects surrounding 
the Soviet Union, it seems that the Soviet leaders had to cope 
with threats from inside and outside the Soviet bloc. The 
prospect for the German rearmament was still positive. The 
Russians still feared a 'double frontal war', unless they 
established stable relationship with Vest Germany or Japan, or 
both. In Asia, Chinese attitude on the Taiwan issue became 
tougher than in 1953. The Soviet Union still had to try to 
constrain the Chinese from aggressive actions. In order to break 
'through these international situations, the Soviets may have had 
to step up their efforts to normalize Soviet-Japanese relations.
On 21 July 1954 Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Vishinsky 
suggested that the Soviet Union desired to promote trade 
relations and cultural exchanges with Japan and to normalize 
relations between Japan and the U.S.S.R. On the same day at 
Geneva, the armistice of the Indochina war was worked out. The 
achievement of a cease-fire in the war in Indochina may have 
triggered Vishinsky's announcement. V.A. Molotov, the Soviet 
foreign minister, played a very important role as a co-chairman 
to bring the Indochina war to an end at the Geneve Conference. 
More than that, the Soviet role in the Conference would, the
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Soviets may have considered, add more persuasive power to the
Soviet peace overture towards Japan.
The statement by Vishinsky included several specific proposals. 
He told a Japanese delegation of Diet members visiting Moscow 
that the Soviet government aspired to the restoration of 
diplomatic relations with Japan, and suggested that the Soviet 
government would agree to the Japanese sending marine 
transportation" experts in order to discuss the issue of Japanese 
fishermen who were forced to land at Soviet fishery ports
because of bad weather. Moreover, he suggested that the Soviets 
would accept a Japanese trade mission to Moscow in order to 
expand Soviet-Japanese t r a d e . I t  is notable that the proposal 
for normalization was accompanied by other minor proposals. 
This showed that, unlike the Malenkov speech in 1953, the Soviet 
overtures began to become more positive. In fact, there was 
another sign that the Soviet Union intended to undertake more 
positive and more realistic means to deal with normalization 
with Japan. In March and May 1954, the Polish overseas office in 
Paris approached its Japanese opposite number and proposed to 
restore the diplomatic relations between Poland and Japan. 
Interestingly, the Polish proposal for normalization included a 
statement that, even without any alteration of the present U.S.- 
Japanese relations, it was possible to normalize Polish-Japanese 
relations. It is difficult to imagine that the Polish did so
without Soviet instructions. It is, therefore, highly likely
that the fact that the Poles were prepared to drop their
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insistence on the adjustment of U.S.-Japanese relations was an 
indirect indication of the Soviet preparedness to do so also. 
The Japanese government and the Foreign Ministry, however, 
ignored the Polish proposal.43
Japanese reactions to the Vishinsky proposal were not at all 
receptive. On 22 July, the Foreign Ministry issued its official 
comment on Vishinsky's statement. It stated that, if the Soviet 
government really intended to normalize the relations with Japan, 
it should clarify its position with regard to the San Francisco 
Peace Treaty because the Japanese government had already clearly 
indicated that a peace settlement with the Soviet Union should be 
based on the S.F.P.T.so As the Foreign Ministry assumed that the 
U.S.S.R. would not accept the S.F.P.T. or any peace settlement 
based on it, the official comment on the Vishinsky statement was 
substantially a rejection.
On 13 September, Pravda revealed full contents of Foreign 
Minister Molotov's reply to several questions with regard to 
Soviet-Japanese relations ashed by editor of the Chubu Nippon 
Shinbum, Suzuki Mitsuru. Molotov stated in the reply that the 
Soviet Union was willing to restore nomal diplomatic relations 
with Japan. In answering to a question about Soviet intention to 
conclude a neutrality pact or a non-aggression pact with Japan, 
he clearly denied existence of such intentions on the Soviet 
side. But he clearly stated that 'As for the Soviet Union, it 
expresses its readiness to make normal its relations with Japan,
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bearing in mind that Japan will display a similar readiness.'31 
His reply contained, however, several conditions which should be 
fulfilled by Japan for the normalization, though they were not 
explicitly indicated. He related:
The chief barrier hindering the restoration of normal 
. relations between the two countries, in my opinion, is the 
fact that certain circles in Japan follow the dictate of the 
ruling circles of the United States, which strive to retain 
Japan in the position of a dependent country.S2
This passage meant that Japan should change her relations with 
the United States.
The fact that Molotov made the alteration of the present U.S.- 
Japanese relations based on the S.F.P.T. and the U.S.-Japanese 
Security Pact a condition for normalization meant that the 
Soviet Union had not basically changed her attitude from that 
earlier expressed by Premier Malenkov. This aspect of Molotov's 
reply caused western observers to judge that his statement was 
mere another example of a 'peace offensive'. The British embassy 
in Moscow reported that there was not even a rumour in Moscow 
about the moves for normalization with Japan, and concluded that 
Molotov's statement was a 'peace offensive'.153 The Japanese 
Foreign Ministry reacted to the statement by Molotov in the same 
way as the British did. According to Asahi, the Foreign
Ministry also defined the statement as 'peace offensive' and 
issued an official comment:
The Japanese government are prepared to conclude a peace 
treaty, as provided in Article 26 of the S.F.P.T., with the
1 2 2
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U.S.S.R. if it is identical or substantially identical with 
the S.F.P.T. 164
Regarding repatriation and territorial questions, the Foreign 
Ministry was reported to hold the view that, if the Soviet Union 
declared the termination of war against Japan and if de facto 
normalization was achieved, Japan would be willing to accept 
normalization on condition that the Soviets agreed to enter 
into negotiations on territorial and repatriation questions 
immediately.ss .ASoviet declaration of the termination of war 
against Japan was now added to the previous Japanese position 
as a new condition. This meant that the Japanese government had 
tightened its attitude towards normalization.
Immediately after the announcement by the Foreign Ministry, the 
U.S. Department of State issued its comment on the Japanese 
reaction to the Molotov letter. In this, the Department of State 
made clear that it was satisfied with the Japanese response and 
that the statement by Molotov was part of a 'peace offensive*. 
In addition, the State Department assessed that some form of 
Soviet-Japanese normalization was possible, though it would 
depend on the conditions attaching to it. But it declared that 
normalization with the People's Republic of China would be 
impossible.es This announcement indicated that the United States 
government took the view that the Japanese could restore 
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union on condition that the 
terms attaching to normalization were acceptable to the United
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States. Though the Americans did not seem to show explicitly any 
items of those terms, it seems reasonable to assume that they 
were the terms included in the S.F.P.T., because the Americans 
were satisfied with the Japanese treatment of the Molotov 
statement.
In addition to the State Department announcement, the American 
government seemed to attempt to neutralize the effect of the 
Molotov letter. On 25 September, Charles Bohlen, the American 
ambassador in Moscow handed a lengthy note of protest regarding 
an incident in which a U.S. B-29 bomber had been shot down above 
the Habomais on 7 October 1952. In the note, the Habomais were 
defined as Japanese territories. The note also contained the 
resolution issued by the U.S. Senate at the time of its 
ratification of the S.F.P.T. in order to demonstrate that the 
Americans had not yet recognized that those territories and the 
Kuriles were already under Russian sovereignty. This note was 
undoubtedly intended to evoke anti-Soviet nationalism in Japan 
and to neutralize the effect of the Molotov letter on the 
Japanese public. But unfortunately for the U.S., this event did 
not draw very much attention from the Japanese press.
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SINO-SOVIET JOINT DECLARATION
It seems that, in October, the Soviet leaders had further stepped 
up their efforts for restoration of diplomatic relations with 
Japan. At the end of September, the Soviet delegation visited 
Peking. The delegation was chiefly composed by N.A. Bulganin, 
the first vice premier of the U.S.S.R. , A.I. Mikoyan, the vice- 
premier, and Nikita S. Khrushchev, the first secretary general of 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Both the Soviet and 
the Chinese leaders worked out several agreements and issued a 
joint communique on 12 October. The Sino-Soviet Joint 
Communiques included a joint declaration towards Japan. The 
joint declaration contained the usual condemnation of the U.S. 
control over Japan. But it also included an expression of 
readiness on the part of the Soviets and the Chinese to 
establish normal relations with Japan:
They (=the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China) 
also express their readiness to take steps to normalize 
their relations with Japan and declare that Japan will meet 
full support in her striving to establishing political and 
economic relations with the Soviet Union and" the Chinese 
People's Republic and that all her steps to provided 
condition for her peaceful and independent development will 
meet full support.®7 [My brackets]
The significance of this joint declaration can be explained as
follows. First of all, it was important that this overture for
normalization was issued as a joint declaration with Communist
China. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance^/ Mutual
And
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Assistance A provided that each of the contracting countries 
should conclude a peace treaty with Japan on condition that they 
reached some agreement on this issue. It seems that the Sino- 
Soviet Joint Declaration in 1954 was an official indication that 
the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. had reached an agreement to start 
their joint effort to restore normal relations with Japan. On 
the basis of Sino-Soviet agreement, the Soviet Union was now able 
to take more concrete and positive steps for normalization with 
Japan.
The second significant point was that this Joint Declaration 
did not include any pre-conditions for normalization, unlike the 
previous Soviet overtures. Although the Joint Declaration 
contained criticisms of the continuation of the U.S. 
'occupation. regime' in Japan, they did not amount to a 
condition for normalization. This must have demonstrated that 
the Soviet Union would take a realistic and flexible position on 
the issue of Soviet-Japanese normalization. The Japanese
government had continuously claimed that normalization or a 
peace settlement whould have to be based on the S.F.P.T. The 
Soviet removal of the condition previously insisted on, namely 
the alteration of the existing U. S.-Japanese relations, may have 
been intended to convince the Japanese government of the 
sincerity of the Soviet desire for normalization.
The response of the Japanese government to this joint 
declaration was a mere repetition of its previous attitude. On
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12 October, the same day that the joint declaration was issued, 
the director of the Public Information and Cultural Affairs 
Bureau of the Foreign Ministry published the following statement:
No change in the attitude of the Soviet Union and Communist 
China towards Japan can be observed in the Sino-Soviet joint 
declaration on Japan reported by Peking Radio today, in 
which the two countries express their readiness to normalize 
their relations with Japan. The contents of the declaration 
indicate that they are still adhering firmly to their policy 
of opposition to the San Francisco Peace Treaty and Japan's 
relations with the U.S. and other free countries. The 
declaration can be considered only as continuation of the
Communist peace offensive........There will be no change in
Japan's established policy not to enter into normal 
relations with the P.R.C. and the U.S.S.R. so long as they 
fail to accept the principles underlying the San Francisco 
Peace Treaty.
This was a plain rejection of the Soviet overture. The Japanese 
government still adhered to its principle that it would agree to 
start to negotiate normalization on condition that the Russians 
accepted the S.F.P.T. and the present U.S.-Japanese relations. 
The Japanese government ignored the subtle change in Sino-Soviet 
attitudes shown in the Joint Declaration.
Prime Minister Yoshida, who had left Japan on 26 September for 
Europe to meet the European leaders, also stated that the Joint 
Declaration was merely an example of a 'peace offensive'. He 
defined the Joint Declaration as a Sino-Soviet attempt to 
separate Japan from the U.S. and assured that Japan would not be 
hoodwinked by such an attempt. Turning to the possibility of 
Soviet-Japanese and Sino-Japanese normalization, he argued that 
if the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. were truely sincere about their
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desire for the normalization, they shoud have repudiated the 
anti-Japanese alliance before they proposed the normalization 
with Japan. He held to a strong suspicion about Sino-Soviet 
intentions because he, 'as a Japanese, cannot forget the fact 
that the Soviet Union had abrogated the Soviet-Japanese non- 
aggressive pact of 1941 as if she was tearing a piece of 
paper.'ss> Thus, Yoshida held a strong anti-Soviet suspicion and 
that his suspicion caused him to ignore the significance of the 
Sino-Soviet Joint Declaration.
DOWNFALL OF YOSHIDA
Prime Minister Yoshida had been travelling around Europe and the 
United States from the end of September to November. To visit 
European and American leaders appeared to be the main purpose of 
this overseas journey. But one of the most vital goals of this 
journey seemed to be closely connected with domestic politics in 
Japan. The Yoshida administration had been faced with a crisis 
which was caused by the shipbuilding scandal. The overseas 
mission by Yoshida was widely regarded as a measure for surviving 
his domestic political crisis. He may have intended to transfer 
public attention from the scandal to his diplomatic achievements. 
But he returned to Japan alomost empty-handed.
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Moreover, the domestic political crises had broken out just 
before his departure. The opposition parties had continuously 
raised questions about the way the government had prevented the 
arrest of Sato Eisaku. In August, Yoshida had made a remark that 
the questions raised should just be neglected. Reacting 
furiously to this remark, the opposition parties decided to 
summon Yoshida to the Lower House Standing Budget Committee to 
interrogate him. On 18 September, however, Yoshida refused to 
be summoned on the ground that he had already planned to depart 
for Europe and the United States. The Standing Committee adopted 
a motion to accuse him. Yoshida entirely ignored it and left 
Japan on 28 September. The Japanese public, which had already 
been disappointed enough by the scandal itself, was disgusted by 
his irresponsible attitude. Public opinion which had been
disenchanted over this never supported Yoshida after his return 
from the overseas mission.
More importantly, domestic power struggles veered in an 
unfavourable direction for Yoshida. The Liberal Party, headed by 
Yoshida, had been faced with inner struggles led by an anti-
Yoshida faction, especially since Hatoyama Ichiro had been
depurged in 1951 and had come back to political life in the 
following year. In 1946, Hatoyama had been the president of the 
Liberal Party when it obtained a majority in the first general
election after the end of the war. But he was purged by G.H.Q.
when he was appointed the prime minister. His colleagues had to 
find someone who could take his place and decided on Yoshida
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whom they regarded as the right figure. When Yoshida agreed to 
become prime minister for Hatoyama, there were some agreements 
between him and Hatoyama providing that, when Hatoyama was 
depurged, the status of prime minister and president of the 
Liberal Party would revert to Hatoyama.eo Yoshida did not, 
however, concede his status when Hatoyama came bach to political 
life in 1951, and did not show any sign of doing so after that 
time. Furthermore, Hatoyama considered that Yoshida tried to 
prevent him from being depurged. Hatoyama and his close
political colleagues, such as , Kono Ichiro and Miki Bukichi 
were, therefore, determined to make Hatoyama the prime minister 
by replacing Yoshida, after he came back to political life.
In 1954, another conservative party, the Progressive Party 
headed by Shigemitsu Jfamoru, also endeavoured to seize power. 
In 1953, the Liberal Party had attempted to merge with the 
Progressive Party in order to consolidate conservative power in 
the Diet. But the latter had not agreed with it. When in
September 1954, the anti-Yoshida factions in the Liberal Party 
showed their intention to walk out of the party to make a new 
political merger with the Progressive Party, it showed a great 
willingness to cooperate with the anti-Yoshida movement. The 
leaders of the Progressive Party, which was the second strongest 
party in the House of Representatives, may have regarded this 
occasion as a great chance to seize power because the members 
of Hatoyama faction and others were less than that of the 
Progressive Party. On 19 September 1954, six anti-Yoshida
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political leaders, namely Hatoyama, Shigemitsu, Kono, Kishi 
Nobusuke, and Ishibashi Tanzan, met and agreed to set up a new 
anti-Yoshida party and established a preparatory committee for 
the new party two days later. Hatoyama was appointed the 
chairman of the committee at the beginning of November.
It was on 24 November that the Democratic Party was established
as a result of the activities of the committee. Hatoyama became
the president of the party. The new party came to have 121
members in the Lower House of the Diet. A special session of the
Diet was summoned on 30 November. The Democratic Party decided
C Fu&hinnihdiyi)
to introduce a no -confidence^ bill with the cooperation of both 
the Leftist and Rightist Socialist Parties. The bill was 
scheduled to be submitted to the House on 7 December. On the day 
before, Yoshida and other executives of the Liberal Party met to 
consult about how to cope with the no -confidence bill. Yoshida 
stubbornly insisted on the dissolution of the Diet. But Vice 
President of the Party Ogata Taketora and others forced him to 
announce the resignation of his Cabinet en masse. Yoshida 
finally accepted their contention and resigned from the president 
of the party. The Yoshida administration resigned en masse on 7 
December, not waiting for the submission of the no -confidence 
bill.
As explained above throughout this chapter, the Yoshida 
administration had been continuously refusing to accept a series 
of Soviet overtures for normalization. Instead, it had been
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stiffening its rigid negative attitude towards Russia since the 
conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. This attitude 
reflected Yoshida's anti-communist sentiments, his rigid 
perception of the cold war, and his anti-Soviet strategic idea. 
Now Yoshida walked out of the government and Hatoyama who had 
already in 1952 made it clear that he intended to normalize 
Japan's relations with the Soviet Union came into office. The 
previous pattern of Soviet-Japanese relations was to be changed. 
In fact, under the Hatoyama government, Japan and Russia managed 
to restore their diplomatic relations in 1956.
Regarding American and British attitudes towards Soviet- 
Japanese relations, the pattern of their involvement did not 
basically change during the era of Hatoyama. The U.S. 
government occasionally attempted to intervene in Soviet-Japanese 
negotiations for normalization in indirect ways, for instance, by 
expressing its support for the Japanese territorial claims. 
Though it did not obviously try to impose any direct influence on 
the process of the normalization talks in 1955-6, it did attempt 
to prevent the Japanese from making too many concessions to the 
Soviet Union. The tactics often employed were psychological 
methods; mostly taking the form of subtle warning. The British 
government was to endeavour to neutralize American efforts. As 
they recognized that the status quo established by the S.F.P.T. 
should be maintained in the interest of stability in the far 
east, the British intended to restrain U.S. and Japanese efforts 
to change the status quo by trying to assert the latter's
raz
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territorial rights to the renounced Kunashiri and Etorofu (the 
southern Kuriles).
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C H A P I T E R  3  
R O A D  T O  T H E  L O W I D O l S r  T  A L K S
On 9 December 1954, Hatoyama Ichiro was appointed prime minister. 
Although his Democratic party did not initially have a majority 
in the Diet, it managed to obtain support from both Socialist 
parties to form its administration on condition that his 
government should dissolve the Diet at an appropriate time. 
The advent of Hatoyama as prime minister had a significant 
impact on Soviet-Japanese relations. Unlike Yoshida, the new 
prime minister was one of the most positive advocates of Russo- 
Japanese normalization and was determined to achieve this goal as 
part of his government's policy. But Hatoyama and his foreign 
policy advisers, who were also positive advocates of the 
normalization, were surrounded by various disturbing
circumstances, from Hatoyama's view point, in domestic and 
external politics.
AJDVEST OF THE HATOYAMA ADMINISTRATION AMD AMMOUMCEMEMT OF IT S  
MORMALIZATIOM POLICY
After the first meeting of the Hatoyama Cabinet, on 10 December 
1954, the prime minister held a press conference and expressed
r s ?
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his desire to establish good relations with the U.S.S.R. and 
Communist China and expand Japan's trade with them in order to 
avoid another major war.1 The next day, Foreign Minister 
Shigemitsu Mamoru issued a statement to outline the foreign
policy of the new cabinet. In it, Shigemitsu exposed the 
government's desire to restore Japan's normal relations with the 
Soviet Union and Communist China on mutually acceptable 
conditions based on the principle that Japan would maintain basic 
cooperative relations with the free world.2
What were the government's motivations behind the announcement 
of its positive attitude towards normalization? The
announcement of the government's policy idea had an aspect of 
being propaganda and advertisement for the coming general
election. Their emphasis on completing Japanese independence in 
their initial policy programme reflected their understanding of 
an increasing nationalistic sentiment in Japanese public opinion. 
It can be assumed that the Democratic Party leaders recognized 
that normalization with the Soviet Union and Communist China 
would attract this nationalist sentiment because it would be 
regarded as an indication of the government's determination to 
carry out a foreign policy independent of American pressure. 
When Kishi NobusuRe, the secretary-general of the Democratic 
Party, had a conversation with George A. Morgan, the counsellor 
of American Embassy, on 21 December, he told him that the 
announcement of the government's intention for normalization was 
made with the purpose of taRing over the issue from the
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Socialists.3 Matsumoto Takizo, the deputy chief cabinet
secretary, who enjoyed close relations with Hatoyama, also 
suggested on 31 January 1955 that 'The Prime Minister's talk of 
normalizing relations with the Communist bloc was almost entirely 
for election purposes.'4 It cannot be denied that the leaders of 
the Democrats held that the normalization policy had to be 
announced in order to win the domestic political struggle 
between the conservatives and the progressives.
But the fact should not be ignored that Hatoyama was very much 
devoted to the idea of normalization itself. According to the 
memoirs of Kono Ichiro, then the minister of agriculture and 
forestry, Hatoyama insisted in his conversations with Kono and 
Miki Bukichi, the executive board chairman of the Democratic 
Party, he was firmly determined to achieve his main policy 
goals, namely the revision of the constitution and the Russo- 
Japanese normalization, especially the latter.s In fact, Hatoyama 
seriously desired to restore normal relations between Japan and 
the Soviet Union, based on the interpretation of world politics 
in which he and his foreign policy advisers' believed.
What were Hatoyama's basic foreign policy ideas which supported 
his approach to normalization? First, they included the view 
that the international political and strategic situation around 
Japan was such that sheUasfaced with the necessity to reduce 
tensions in order to get rid of the potential dangers of the cold 
war. Moreover, the change in Soviet policy towards Japan since
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1953 provided a good opportunity. Thanks to his policy advisers 
composed of ex-diplomats with distinguished careers, such as 
Sugihara Arata and Matsumoto Shunichi, Hatoyama seemed to adapt 
rather progressive ideas with regard to Japan's foreign policy. 
Hatoyama's basic idea was that Japan should contribute to 
reduction of international tensions between East and West, and at 
least in the far east, through restoring normal relations with 
communist countries. This view was based on their interpretation 
that the trend of 'detente' were dominant in the world politics 
in the middle of the 1950s. Unlike Yoshida, Hatoyama and his 
advisers understood the Soviet peace overtures in the context of 
'detente' and that they were not examples of a 'peace 
offensive', but a clear indication of substantial alteration of 
her foreign policy towards Japan. This understanding of the 
international change in the middle of the 1950s constituted a 
fundamental background for Hatoyama's positive attitude towards 
normalization with the Soviet Union.
jRESPONSE FSOX TEE SOVIET UVIOE: Approach Through The D oanitsky  
L e tte r
When the Shigemitsu statement was issued, the Soviet leaders did 
not, however, fail to catch the expression of a positive
Japanese attitude towards normalization. On 15 December, Radio 
Moscow announced that the Japanese govenment was ready to
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restore diplomatic relations between Japan and Russia without 
altering existing U.S.-Japanese relations.® Radio Moscow
broadcast on the following day; a statement by Foreign Minister 
Molotov, which was a direct reply to that by the Japanese foreign 
minister. It suggested that the Soviet Union understood that the 
new Japanese administration was prepared for the re-establishment 
of Soviet-Japanese diplomatic relations. It went on to say that 
the Soviet Union was ready to take a practical step towards 
negotiations for normalization.7 Considering the Soviet response 
to the Shigemitsu statement was so quick, it would seem that 
the Soviet leaders had been waiting for some positive reaction 
on the normalization issue from the Japanese government since the 
fall of Yoshida.
Unlike the Soviet response, Japanese reaction to the Soviet 
statements was ambiguous and ill-prepared. On 17 December, the 
Japanese government convened a cabinet meeting to discuss the 
Soviet positive responses to the Shigemitsu statement. After 
this cabinet meeting, both Shigemitsu and Hatoyama adopted a 
cautious attitude. Shigemitsu said that he could not conclude 
whether the Molotov statement was a sincere proposal or a mere 
example of 'peace offensive' and proposed that the government 
should wait and see the future developments to know the real 
Russian intention.® Hatoyama also admitted that cabinet 
ministers could not reach any conclusion regarding how the 
government should respond to the Molotov statement.3 As 
mentioned above, the Hatoyama cabinet's positive policy on
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Japan's relations with her communist neighbours had been issued 
to a great extent as part of its election campaign. Moreover, 
there was already a divergence of ideas over this issue within 
the cabinet. It was, therefore, impossible for the Japanese 
government to evolve a specific and detailed policy for the 
normalization with the Soviet Union at this stage.
Despite these ambiguous and slow response from the Japanese, 
the Soviets did not stop their vigorous efforts to seize this 
opportunity. On 22 December, Izvestia confirmed that Japan 
would not have to alter her relations with the United States in
order to achieve normalization with the U.S.S.R.10 Five days
later, the Russians stepped up their overtures. On 27 December, 
the Soviet government instructed the Soviet Mission in Tokyo 
headed by A. I Domnitsky, to contact the Japanese Foreign Ministry 
as soon as possible and to deliver a letter which proposed to 
start normalization talks. This was called the 'Domnitsky
letter*.11
Because the Soviet Union had not participated in the S.F.P.T., 
she did not have authorized diplomatic representatives in Japan 
which were recognized by the Japanese government. Hence the
Russians had to rely on unofficial channels in order to contact 
the Japanese government. From the end of December to the 
beginning of January 1955, they attempted to contact the Foreign 
Ministry and the prime minister through Fujita Kazuo, a newsman 
of the Kyodo Hew Agency, and Majima Kan, the then chairman of the
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National Conference for Soviet-Japanese and Sino-Japanese 
Normalization which Nad been established in October 1954. While 
Foreign Minister Shigem(t$su was reluctant to receive these 
unofficial approaches, Hatoyama finally decided to see Domnitsky^
The first meeting between Hatoyama and Domnitsky was convened
on 7 January. An important fact about this meeting was that 
*fc
Domnitsky skejshed in some aspects of the Soviet plan for the 
negotiations. According to Matsumoto, Domnitsky remarked during 
the conversation that the Soviet Union desired to terminate the 
state of war between the two countries by a declaration, to 
exchange official documents normalizing Soviet-Japanese 
relations, to exchange ambassadors, and, after these, to 
negotiate various specific problems about territorial disputes, 
trade, war criminals and Japanese admission to the United 
Nations.12 It can, therefore, be argued that the most 
significant objective for the Soviets was to terminate the state 
of war and-to normalize Soviet-Japanese relations. Solving the 
specific problems between the two countries was given only a 
secondary priority.
On 25 January, Hatoyama saw Domnitsky again and received the 
'Domnitsky letter'. Although this letter was unsigned and 
undated, it was obviously intended to convey to the Japanese 
government^ . Soviet willingness to start the normalization talks 
as soon as possible, It was composed of only four paragraphs.^ 
In the first paragraph, it stated that the Soviet Union had
m
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consistently proposed to normalize her relations with Japan as 
indicated by the Sino-Soviet Joint Declaration of 12 October and 
the statement by Molotov on 16 December 1954. The letter also 
showed that the Soviet government understood that the Japanese 
government was now willing to normalize Soviet-Japanese 
relations as expressed in Hatoyama's various speeches and in 
Shigemitsu's statement on 11 December. It then suggested that it 
was the right time to start to exchange views for the purpose 
for normalization, and proposed to open the negotiations in 
either Moscow or Tokyo.13
Shigemimtsu was sceptical about the authority of the letter 
because it was undated and unsigned.14 But the Japanese 
government received through Ambassador to the U. R. Sawada Renzo 
from the Soviets a confirmation that the 'Domnitsky letter' was 
officially authorized.15 The same day, Radio Moscow assured 
that Domnitsky had handed over the letter under instructions 
from the Soviet government.1eHow, the Japanese government had to 
decide its position about whether it would accept the Soviet 
proposal to start the negotiations for normalization.
JAPAN'S DECISION TO OPEN THE NEGOTIATIONS VITH THE U .S.S.R .
There had already been divisions over the normalization issue 
within the Hatoyama cabinet ever since it was established.
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Despite Hatoyama's enthusiasm for normalization, the government 
contained some leading members who opposed the Russo-Japanese 
normalization. Miki Bukichi was one of these. He was one of the 
closest and oldest of Hatoyama's friends and had contributed 
enormously to bring Hatoyama to the premiership. But he strongly 
disagreed with Hatoyama's policy for normalization.17 Miki, who 
already seemed to hold the vision of a future conservative merger 
with the Liberal Party,10 could not take a positive position in 
favour of normalization which was likely to obstruct the merger.
Foreign Minister Shigemitsu was not enthusiastic about this 
issue either. On 27 December, he remarked in his conversation 
with John Allison, the American ambassador to Japan, that his 
statement on 11 December had been designed to show a positive 
attitude towards Communist China in order to satisfy and calm 
down rising nationalistic and anti-American sentiment in 
Japan.13The statement by Shigemitsu was presumably intended to 
show that the government's positive approach was not towards the 
Soviet Union but towards Communist China, and this primarily for 
election purpose.
Furthermore, Shigemitsu, as a prominent and very cautious 
diplomat,20 tended to be anxious about the concerns which were 
supposed to be held by foreign governments over the advent of the 
Hatoyama administration and the possibility that the Japanese 
were beginning a neutralist drive. When he was informed on 25
7*T
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January that the prime minister received theDommtskyJette^  he called 
American Ambassador John Allison to discuss this Soviet approach. 
Shigemitsu assured Allison that 'he had no intention of making 
any precipitate reply to Soviet approach,' but that ' in view of 
present government's announced policy of hoping to normalize 
relations with U.S.S.R., it would be necessary to make some sort 
of reply.' He also promised that 'every effort would be made by 
Japanese to prevent this demarche being used by the Soviet for 
propaganda purposes.'21 He could not accept Hatoyama's rather 
careless treatment of the Soviet approach.
As the gap between the prime minister and foreign minister 
seemed to become wider, the other leaders of the government 
attempted to resolve the divergence. On 28 January, Tani Masayuki, 
the then counsellor for the foreign minister, tried to persuade 
Hatoyama that the prime minister should leave the Foreign Ministry 
and the foreign minister to deal' with the main diplomatic 
issues.22 Moreover, in the morning of 29 January, Hatoyama was 
visited by General Secretary of the Cabinet Memoto, and Sugihara 
Arata, then the vice chairman of Research Committee for Political 
Affairs of the Democratic Party. These two influential political 
leaders also tried to persuade the prime minister to restrain 
himself.23 Even so, Hatoyama reiterated his strong hope that the 
Soviet Union would declare an end to the state of war and that, 
after the declaration, both of the countries could move on to the 
economic issue, and then to the political issue, such as the
/*<$>
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territorial issue. His enthusiasm for the normalization was so 
strong that his various colleagues could not stop him.
On 4 February, a cabinet meeting was held to discuss as to how to 
proceed with the normalization talks. Hatoyama and Shigemitsu 
there sharply collided. Hatoyama insisted that the government 
should negotiate with Russia with the objective of inducing her to 
issue a declaration for the termination of the state of war , and 
that political issues such as the territorial question and 
economic problems such as trade issue should be negotiated after 
the state of war had been terminated.2* Dn the other hand, 
Shigemitsu said that the declaration of terminating the state of 
war had no legal relevance and argued that specific issues such 
as the territorial question and the safety of the Northern Water 
fisheries should be solved first and that on that basis 
diplomatic relations with Russia should be restored. Moreover, he 
expressed his anxiety that the Soviets would shelve those specific 
issues and establish their embassy in Japan if diplomatic 
relations were resumed first.25 This anxiety was also shared by 
the Foreign Ministry officials. According to one of its Soviet 
desk officers, the Soviet Union would not discuss the various 
significant questions between her and Japan if the termination of 
the state of war was realised first.25 The foreign minister and 
the Ministry assumed that the vital interest of the Soviets an the 
normalization issue was to terminate the state of the war and to 
establish their official diplomatic representatives in Japan.
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Facing this sharp divergence, the cabinet members, who were 
basically in agreement to negotiate with Russia for 
normalization, finally reached a compromise. They stepped aside 
from the main source of the divergence: the question which should 
be done first. The cabinet meeting worked out an agreement that 
the government should start negotiations by dealing with some 
specific problems which were relatively easy to settle. At the 
same time, it figured out the main objectives of the negotiations 
as to obtain Soviet support for Japan's admission to the UN; to 
solve the territorial problem; to make arrangements over trade 
and economic issues; and to obtain early repatriation of Japanese 
detainees in the Soviet Union.27 This compromise was of a very 
ambiguous kind. It was not at all clear whether the Japanese 
would walk out of the negotiations if those four objectives were 
not met by the Russians. This ambiguity was the result of the 
precarious compromise between the prime minister and the foreign 
minister and was not to be satisfactorily resolved even after the 
beginning of the negotiations in London,
As for the government's attitudes towards specific issues, its 
position on the territorial question was also specified, though 
not the final policy formula. The government seems to have 
favoured a demand for the return of not only the Habomais and 
Shikotan, but also the Kuriles. On the day of the cabinet 
meeting, Minister Shima of the Japanese Embassy in Washington made 
it clear to a State Department officer that the Japanese 
government was considering requesting U.S. to back Japanese claims
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for return of the Kuriles, probably to be put forward before 
beginning the negotiations with the Soviets and before the general 
election. The Japanese minister argued that taking such a firm 
position against the Soviet Union over the territorial issue was 
very important in order to obtain support from the Japanese 
public which was showing strong nationalistic sentiments. He
said that it would be helpful if the U.S. government implied in 
some form that it had been wrong in agreeing to offer the Kuriles 
to the Soviet Union in the Yalta Agreement. With regard to the 
legal basis for this Japanese demand for the reversion of the 
Kuriles, Shima explained that Japan believed that those islands 
had not been seized by Japanese aggression as defined in the Cairo 
Declaration. He mentioned the minimum demand by the Japanese
government on the territorial issue, as follows:
Foreign Office (=Japanese Foreign Ministry) feels Soviets 
will agree at once to support Japan’s membership in UM and 
will agree also to give later favourable consideration re 
fisheries and return POV s. Thus crux would be territorial 
question, on which Foreign Office hoped to maintain position 
that minimum acceptable condition would be return Habomai
and Shikotan, with hope Soviets would agree later 
consideration Jap claim to Kuriles.' My brackets]
Shima's account being reliable, it can be argued that the 
Japanese government intended to request the Russians to return the 
Habomais, Shikotan, and the Kuriles, at an early stage of the 
negotiations. It also seemed to intend to strengthen its request 
by extracting U.S. support. But the Foreign Ministry defined the 
return of the Habomias and Shikotan as the minimum condition for a 
peace settlement with the Soviet Union. Added to that, the
rsr
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ministry seemed to plan to make efforts to secure some sort of 
Soviet agreement to consider the issue of the Kuriles later on.
Another important fact was that the cabinet agreed that
negotiations should be conducted by the foreign minister and his 
ministry.2'3 As a result of this, the negotiating, channels had 
become limited to the Foreign Ministry and press releases had 
to be made by it.30 Shigemitsu insisted on this because he and 
the Foreign Ministry wished to monopolize the influence on foreign 
policy, and to prevent interference from outside the Ministry.
Based on the decision reached by the cabinet meeting, the
Japanese government started to take a further step towards 
normalization. Sugihara and Tani were assigned to formulating 
more detailed and specific policies for the negotiations. Based 
on the work by these two men, the final policy for the 
normalization talks were embodied in Instruction Mo.16 (Kunrei 
16 Go) on 24 May.31 Immediately after the cabinet meeting 
Shigemitsu sent another instruction to Sawada to hand the Soviets ' 
a ’Mote Verbale ’ saying that the Japanese government officially S'
agreed to the Soviet proposal for ’exchange of views on the 
question of possible steps aimed at the normalization of the
Soviet-Japanese relations.’32 The Japanese had finally taken an 
actual step towards normalization talks.
At that moment, the Soviet government was faced with a change 
in its leadership. On 8 February, Malenkov resigned as Chairman 
of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and Bulganin was
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promoted to occupy his position. This change in Soviet 
leadership was widely regarded as the start of the Khrushchev era. 
For example, the.-British Embassy in Moscow concluded that it was 
clear that Khrushchev had become the most influential figure among 
the Soviet leaders by obtaining the primacy of the Party over the 
government.33 But the impact which this would have on the foreign 
policy of the Soviet Union was not clear.
On the same day, Foreign Minister Molotov made a speech at the 
Supreme Soviet and referred to his policy towards Japan. In his 
speech, he reported that direct channels had been successfully 
set up with the Japanese government for the purpose of talks and 
that he expected a fruitful result from the normalization 
negotiations.3A This speech clearly indicated that, as far as 
Soviet foreign policy was concerned, previous policy had not 
changed despite the change in the leadership. Actually, the 
influence of Malenkov in the Soviet government foreign policy 
making had already diminished in the autumn of 1954,3S If so, it 
seems that Khrushchev, the first secretary of the Soviet Communist 
Party, had been in charge of foreign policy making since the 
decline of Malenkov's influence. The fact that he played the most 
significant role in the Sino-Soviet negotiations (September- 
October 1954) shows Khrushchev's dominance in foreign policy. 
Moreover, the exclusion of Molotov from the Soviet delegation to 
China was also a sign that the foreign minister had already lost 
some of his power. Given the fact that the Soviets started in 
October 1954 to adopt a more positive policy on normalization by
753
CHAPTER 3
permitting Japan not to alter her relations with the U.S., it can 
be argued that it was Khrushchev who was one of the main makers of 
this positive policy towards Japan. If so, Malenkov's downfall 
could not very much affect Soviet foreign policy towards Japan.
The Japanese correctly recognized that there would be no drastic 
alteration in Soviet attitude towards Japan. On 11 February, 
Foreign Minister Shigemitsu was reported to have announced at the 
cabinet that he did not assume the Soviet attitude towards Japan 
to be affected by the change in the Russian leadership because 
Soviet policy to Japan had previously been based on Khrushchev's 
idea.3e Thus, the alteration in the Soviet leadership did not 
affect either Soviet foreign policy towards Japan nor the response 
of the Japanese government.
From February to the end of April, the Soviet and the Japanese 
governments exchanged views on the site for normalization talks. 
At first, the Japanese government, especially Shigemitsu, desired 
to have the negotiations in New York. But the Soviets disagreed 
with it. Instead, they proposed Tokyo or Moscow. The Foreign 
Ministry disliked this proposal, because it was afraid that the
as
Russians would appoint the unrecognized Soviet XissionAthe Soviet 
representatives for the talks. Moreover, Japanese negotiators 
would not be able to use sufficient diplomatic facilities in 
Moscow because there was no Japanese overseas office there. While 
the Japanese started to think of Paris and Geneva as a suitable 
venue for negotiations,the Soviet government proposed London and
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Geneva as the options for the site for the negotiations. In 
London, Russia had a prominent 'Japanese expert', Yakob Malik, as 
the ambassador to Britain, who had been ambassador to Japan 
during the Pacific war. The reason for the Russians proposed 
London in addition to Geneva was probably that they considered 
that Malik was the right choice as the chief negotiator. Faced 
with this new proposal, the Japanese were inclined to agree to 
have the negotiations in London.
The British Foreign Office received information from its 
embassy in Tokyo that the Japanese government would like to hold 
the normalization talks in London. On 19 April, Matsumoto, who 
had been already designated as plenipotentiary, met Sir Esler 
Dening, the British ambassador, and indicated that he preferred 
London since 'he knows the ropes' because he had been Japanese 
ambassador to Britain. Dening asked the Foreign Office for its 
view on this matter, attaching his basic agreement to invite the 
negotiations to London. He said, 'my own feeling is that the 
Japanese would feel happier in London and to extent that they may 
seek our counsel you may consider it in our interests that 
negotiations should take place there.'37
In fact, Anglo-Japanese relations were not very good in the 
middle of the 1950s. In particular, relations between Britain and 
Japan had got worse over the problem of Japan's entry into 
G.A.T.T. and problems caused by the so-called 'unfairness' of 
Japanese trade practices. Dening was one of those who were most
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alarmed by this deterioration of Anglo-Japanese relations. He may 
have, therefore, thought that, by supporting the Japanese in the 
normalization talks in London, Anglo-Japanese relations could be 
improved. More importantly, we should not overlook the fact that 
Dening was sceptical about American diplomacy in Asia. In 1954, 
while he had made various suggestions regarding the principles to 
govern Britain's foreign policy towards Japan, he mentioned that 
Britain could exert some influence on Japan by helping to maintain 
U.S.-Japanese relations.30 It is not difficult to imagine that 
Dening assumed that the British would be able to exert influence 
on the Japanese by playing a role to check U.S. overreactions to 
Japanese conduct in the negotiations, if they were held in London. 
He in fact said, 1... I believe that we can be of help to the 
Japanese and since they know thatwevill, not give them away they 
will be more likely to come to us for advice than to the 
Americans.'33
Vithin the Foreign Office, there seemed to be no opposition to 
the Soviet-Japanese normalization talks taking place in London, 
It was rather broadly recognized that having the negotiations in 
London would be convenient to the Japanese. R.T. Higgins, the 
Japan desk officer at the Foreign Office, commented on Dening's 
contention described above, saying that the Japanese could escape 
the political pressures which would be brought to bear on them in 
Tokyo and could use much better communication facilities in 
London than in Moscow or Geneva. Moreover, 'there is no clamorous 
public opinion to satiate with results of what is very
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likely.. . . to be an abortive negotiation."10 In fact, Japanese 
Minister Oda of the Japanese Embassy in London, stated that one of 
the reasons for Japan's preference for London was that the 
political atmosphere was tranquil there. A1
On 20 April, the Foreign Office accepted the Japanese desire 
for having the negotiations in London. Its spokesman was 
reported to have announced that the British government did not 
know whether the Soviet Union and Japan would accept London as the 
site for the negotiations or not, but that the two countries were 
free to convene their talks in London or in other capital cities 
of Europe."12 On 23 April, Sawada delivered a 'Mote Verbal* to 
Sobolev and informed him that the Japanese government hoped to 
start the negotiations in early June in London. Two days later, 
the Soviets agreed with the Japanese proposal and the next day 
Sobolev indicated that Russia agreed to start the negotiations on 
1 June.
JAP AM'S BASIC POLICY FOB THE NEGOTIATIONS: In s tru c tio n  No. 16
Since the decision by the cabinet meeting on 4 February to start 
the normalization talks, the Japanese government had been 
endeavouring to devise a more specific policy for the 
negotiations. The Hatoyama cabinet had reached an inner agreement 
to make efforts to terminate the state of war with Russia while 
simultaneously negotiating to solve various problems pending
7S?
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between Japan and Russia. Row its main task was to specify what 
Japan could concede to the U.S.S.R. , what she could not, and what 
kind of basic positions should be taken on the various problems, 
such as the territorial question, and the issue of repatriation of 
Japanese detainees in the Soviet Union. This specific policy was 
embodied in the government guidelines called 'Instruction Ro. 16' 
(Kunrei 16 Go) which was approved by the cabinet on 24 May and 
handed to the plenipotentiary, Matsumoto Shunichi two days later.
This instruction was a top-secret document and, therefore, has 
not yet been declassified by the Japanese Foreign Ministry. It 
has, however, become known because one of the most recent works 
on Soviet-Japanese normalization written by Kubota Masaaki, a 
Japanese journalist who was engaged in reporting the normalization 
talks, has exposed the existence of this extremely important 
document.*43
As this document is greatly significant, it is worth while 
quoting the whole contents here, though it is rather long.
' Instruction JTq.-16.'_
In negotiating with the U.S.S.R. with the purpose of 
normalizing our diplomatic relations with her, the 
delegation should make every effort to realise the following 
points.
1. (The Purpose of the negotiations) The negotiations are 
aimed to conclude a Soviet-Japanese Peace Treaty (including, 
the establishment of peaceful relations, the exchange of 
diplomatic representatives, the solution of existing various 
problems) in order to normalise Soviet-Japanese relations.
/ s ?
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2. (The Basic Position of the Japanese Government) Japan 
unequivocally belongs to the free world by the San Francisco 
Peace Treaty, the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty, and other 
arrangements. The delegation should, therefore, examine 
Soviet views on this basic point before starting to discuss 
specific issues. Added to that, the delegation should 
argue that, in the wake of normalization, neither of the 
two countries should undertake any propaganda activities 
in each other's country which might possibly cause domestic 
disorder. Before entering into discussions on specific 
issues, the delegation should obtain from the Russians the 
promise not to undertake such activities.
3. (The Problems to be Solved during the Negotiations) If 
it becomes clear that the Soviets do not have any 
disagreement on our basic position described in paragraph 
2, the delegation should start to negotiate in order to 
settle the following questions:
a. The commitment by the Soviet Union not to veto 
Japan's entry into the United Nations;
b. The release and repartriation of all of the Japanese 
detained by the Soviet Union including the war 
criminals;
c. Territorial problem:
(1) the return of the Habomais and Shikotan;
(2) the return of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin;
d. Fishery problems (including the repatriation of the 
fishing boats and fishers captured by the Russians):
e. Commercial problems.
4. (Crucial Points in the Negotiations) The delegation 
should make every effort to achieve our goals on the issues 
listed in paragraph 3. The delegation should not concede on 
the issues, in particular, of the release and repatriation 
of the detainees and the return of the Habomais and 
Shikotan. In event of Soviet refusal of the release and 
repatriation of all detainees, the delegation can accept the 
imprisonment in Japan of the war criminals. It will be 
necessary for us to decide our position by taking into 
account the co-relation among those various problems, 
depending on Soviet reactions. The delegation should, 
therefore, send detailed information frequently and ask for 
instructions.
5. (Unacceptable Conditions) Conditions which may be offered 
by the Soviets and which should not be accepted by us are as 
fallows:
a. To abolish or revise the U.S.-Japanese Security 
Treaty;
b. To conclude a Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact;
c. To demilitarize some parts of the Japanese 
territories including territorial waters;
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d. To restrict the size and equipment of Japan's
defensive forces and the sovereignty of Japan;
e. Reparations.-** -
The Instruction indicated the following significant points. 
First of all, the Japanese intended to proceed with 
normalization within the limitations set by the S.F.P.T., and the 
U.S.-Japanese Security Pact. The Japanese had no intention to do 
anything in contradiction to the S.F.P.T. and the U.S.-Japanese 
Security Pact. For example, the goal of the negotiations was 
limited to concluding a peace treaty. They clearly excluded the 
possibility of concluding a neutrality pact with the Soviet Union 
and of disarming Japan. Secondly, the Japanese government 
regarded the territorial issue and the repatriation of Japanese 
detainees as the most crucial problems to settle. The return of 
the Habomais and Shikotan and the repatriation were set as 
conditions prerequisite to the conclusion of a peace treaty.The<^  
relatives of the detainees became an influential political factor 
when the negotiations approached. They set up an organization 
called Association for the Families of the Detainees (Rusukazoku 
no kai) and tried to put pressure on the Hatoyama
administration and Plenipotentiary Matsumoto.*5 The territorial 
problem had also been widely recognized as one of the most 
important issues between the two countries since the conclusion of 
the Peace Treaty. In July 1952, July and November 1953, the Lower 
House of the Diet passed resolutions to express a strong desire 
for the return of the Habomais and Shikotan. This reflected the.
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strong desire of the Japanese for the reversion of those 
islands.415
Thirdly, this Instruction indicates that the Japanese government 
had decided to endeavour to conclude a peace treaty based on the 
solution of the various crucial problems listed in paragraph 3. 
It denied the possibility of terminating the state of war with 
the Soviet Union without solving those problems. But no item was 
included about what the negotiators should do in case of a Soviet 
refusal to return those islands and the repatriation of the 
detainees. Whether the negotiatiors would walk out of the 
negotiations or not; depended on the government leaders in Japan. 
In fact, the Japanese did not decide what should be done in that 
event. Shortly after the Instruction had been made, Tani Masayuki 
met American Ambassdor Allison. When ashed by Allison whether 
it was firm Japanese policy to obtain agreements on specific 
questions before consenting to establish diplomatic relations with 
the Soviets, Tani answered as follows: 'This was at present
Cabinet's position and was definitely position of Foreign Office 
[=the Foreign Ministry], but that domestic political 
considerations might make it impossible strictly to adhere to this 
principle.'47[ My brackets? In this sense, the instruction had an 
ambiguous nature.
This ambiguity of Instruction lo. 16 was partly a product of 
struggles within the government. The Foreign Ministry seemed to 
take the position that, if the specific problems were not
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settled, the restoration of diplomatic relations between the 
Soviet Union and Japan should not even be considered, not to 
mention the peace treaty. The Ministry even attempted to 
authorize the delegation to walk out of the negotiations in case 
of failure to obtain Soviet concessions on vital issues such as 
the territorial issue. But some of the pro-normalization 
Democrats, including Hatoyama, blocked this attempt by the Foreign 
Ministry.<tte
Shigemitsu and his colleagues at the Foreign Ministry seemed to
design the Instruction to make the negotiations prolonged. As long
as it set the reversion of the Habomais and Shikotan as a
prerequisite condition and ordered the negotiators to settle the
specific questions before agreeing to the normalization, the
negotiations could not be ended in a short time. The Foreign
Ministry seemed to take into consideration the possible results
of the coming Four Powers Summit Meeting due to be convened in
July. Tani stated in his conversation with Allison that the
•the
Japanese intended to prolong the negotiations until^results of the 
coming Summit Meeting in Geneva became c l e a r . T h e  Japanese may 
have expected that the Summit Meeting would produce the
international circumstances which would make it easier for the 
Soviets to make concessions to Japan. In this sense, it can be 
argued that the Japanese leaders expected that as some successful 
results of the Summit Meeting the Soviets would soften their
attitudes towards Japan more.
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It seems that the United States government exerted some 
influence on the making of the Instruction. On 23 January,
U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles prepared a secret 
memorandum in which American attitudes towards Soviet-Japanese 
normalization were described. The Dulles memorandum was intended 
to exert indirect influence on the Japanese. In the second 
paragraph, Dulles listed 'several important considerations' which 
Allison could discuss with Tani and Shigemitsu. This part was 
virtually a statement of what the Americans could not accept on 
the issue of the normalization talks: they did not expect the
Soviet-Japanese normalization to alter the existing treaty 
relations in which Japan was involved, particularly, the U.S. - 
Japanese Security Treaty and the Peace Treaty between Japan and 
Rationalist China. Soviet-Japanese normalization should not 
affect the substance of the S.F.P.T. or be inconsistent with 
it;the United States would continue to support Japan's claim that 
the Habomais and Shikotan were not part of the Kuriles; the U.S. 
government expected Japan to obtain a favourable agreement on 
fishery problems and the release of the Japanese detainees in the 
U.S.S.R. In addition, he expressed his hope that the Japanese 
would obtain a Soviet guarantee of unconditional support for 
Japan's application to the United Rations; that Japan would resist 
any Soviet attempts to bring the Communist China into the 
discussions; and that the American government expected that Japan 
would ensure any arrangements reached would minimize the
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inevitable Soviet efforts to extend espionage, subversion, and the 
propaganda network in Japan.so
The substance of the Dulles memorandum was conveyed to Tani by 
Allison on 28 January. Tani responded by saying that its contents 
were in fact identical with what Shigemitsu and he had in their 
minds with regard to normalization.*51 It is highly likely that 
Shigemitsu and his close colleagues who took a cautious stance 
over the normalization had already held positions similar to 
those mentioned in the Dulles memorandum. But it still cannot be 
denied that they were influenced by American attitudes. 
Shigemtisu and his close colleagues like Tani were firmly 
convinced that Japanese-American relations should not be affected 
by normalization between the U.S.S.R. and Japan. Moreover, they 
were willing to receive information and advice from the United 
States government.52 It is, therefore, arguable that the Japanese 
leaders were ready to listen to American suggestions with regard 
to normalization. At the cabinet meeting on 4 February,
Shigemitsu's contention that the government should try to settle 
various problems laid between the Soviet Union and Japan before 
terminating the state of war may have reflected some influence of 
the suggestions in the Dulles memorandum. It must be noted that 
the main lines of Instruction Mo. 16 were very similar to the 
American suggestions included in the Dulles memorandum. Rather, 
it seems that the Instruction was based on the latter. There is no 
evidence suggesting that the Japanese leaders made the Instruction 
in accordance with the memorandum. It seems, however, unreasonable
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to exclude the possibility that the Foreign Ministry may have 
drawn up it in accordance with the American suggestions.
INSTRUCTIOW WO. 16 AND JAPAN1 S POLICY ON THE TERRITORIAL QUESTION
After the government's decision to open negotiations with the 
Russians was made at the beginning of Feruary, the necessity to 
define the government's normalization policy grew. Political 
leaders now started to make a move with regard to the territorial 
issue. On 11 March, Kishi Nobusuke, the general-secretary of the 
Democratic Party, maintained at a press conference that it was 
possible for Japan to demand the return of the Kuriles and 
southern Sakhalin. But he argued that it was wrong to consider 
rigidly that, even if the Soviets refused this demand, Japan 
should not agree to exchange the ambassadors.53 On the other hand, 
Hatoyama appeared to try to prevent the government from making 
tough territorial demands its fixed negotiating policy. On 25 
March, Hatoyama stated at the plenary session of the Upper House: 
' Japanese sovereignty over the Habomais and Shikotan is 
uncontestable. But as regards the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin, 
we cannot claim the return of them because we renounced all rights 
to them in the San Francisco Peace Treaty.,s* Clearly, Hatoyama 
disagreed with demanding the reversion of the Kuriles and 
southern Sakhalin from the Soviets.
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Shigemitsu took a cautious position. On 26 March* he stated at 
the House of Representatives that Japan's sovereignty over the 
Habomais and Shikotan was uncontestable. Regarding the other 
islands, he declined to comment, saying that the government had 
not yet defined its policy about them. ss But it seems that 
Shigemitsu had already made up his mind over the territorial 
question during March. In the Shigemitsu Diary, he did not write 
anything in this month except a short note. The note 
reads:'territorial problems, the views of the U.S. government, 
southern Sakhalin, the Kuriles, the Habomais, Shikotan.' 
Although this note is too short for us to draw any definite 
conclusions, it suggests that Shigemitsu took into account the 
American attitude on the territorial question and decided to 
choose the hardest policy. In the middle of March, the U.S. 
government declassified its secret documents relating to the Yalta 
Conference. Asahi reported that an American official stated that 
the government had intended to support the Japanese and that it 
would not recognize the Soviet possession of the Kuriles and 
southern Sakhalin.57 If this report is reliable, it is highly 
likely that Shigemitsu took this American attitude as a kind of ^  
indirect warning, and that he may have considered that adopting a 
hard line was suitable in the light of U.S.-Japanese relations.
The territorial policy, which was embodied in Instruction Mo. 16, 
was made under those inner divisions in the Japanese cabinet. The 
Japanese position on the territorial question in the Instruction 
can be simply summarized. Firstly, it instructed the Japanese
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negotiators to demand the reversion of the Habomais, Shkotan, the 
Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. This was equivalent to asking for 
all of the territories that Japan had lost to the Soviet Union at 
the end of the Pacific war. But, secondly, the Instruction 
clearly divided those islands into two categories: those
territories which could be given up during the negotiations, and 
those that should be demanded to the last, as a condition 
prerequisite to normalization. The latter contained the Habomais, 
Shikotan, and the farmer the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. These 
policy guidelines on the territorial question reflected the 
position which the Foreign Ministry had adopted in February, and 
the ideas held by Kishi and Shigemimtsu. Hatoyama's soft line 
seemed to be withdrawn. It seems that the Foreign Ministry played 
a dominant role in the making of the Instruction.
The Instruction No.16 was merely a general guideline for the 
negotiators. The Foreign Ministry also prepared a more specific 
negotiating strategy on the territorial issue. Shimoda Takezo, 
then the director of the Treaties Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, 
recalls in his memoirs:
 before Plenipotentiary Matsumoto left for London, we
examined within the Foreign Ministry how to proceed with 
negotiations. At that time, the following plan which 
consisted of three stages was discussed: (1> To assert that
the Kuriles, southern Sakhalin, the Northern Territories 
[=the Habomais and Shikotan] are Japanese territories. (2)
To make the restoration of Kunashiri, Etorofu, the Habomais 
and Shikotan the condition for normalization; (3) To demand 
the reversion of the Habomais and Shikotan to the last. As 
a result of this examination, the first option was adopted 
as the policy of the government, because it was considered
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reasonable to put forward the maximum demand.seM [ My 
brackets]
According to these memoirs, the Foreign Ministry's strategy can 
be explained as follows. First of all, the Japanese delegation 
should make the maximum demand on the Soviet Union: demand for the 
reversion of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. The Japanese 
attempted to derive some concessions from the Russians, by taking 
that hard line with them. If the Russians refused the maximum 
Japanese demand, the negotiators should move to the second stage. 
At this stage, the Japanese delegation were expected to promise 
to renounce the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. But the delegation 
was to request the reversion of Kunashiri and Etorofu, which 
constituted the southernmost part of the Kuriles, as well as the 
return of the Habomais and Shikotan. If this proposal was 
rejected, the negotiations were to proceed to the final stage and 
the Japanese were to insist strongly on the reversion of the 
Habomais and Shikotan —  the minimum acceptable condition.
An additional instruction based on this three-stage strategy 
was handed to Plenipotentiary Matsumoto before he left for London. 
Matsumoto admitted this fact in an interview with the American 
scholar, Donald C. Heilman.
Plenipotentiary Matsumoto Shunichi had been given 
additional insturctions specifying that three distinctions 
in regard to the disputed territory were also factors in the 
negotiations. First, the Habomais and Shikotan were to be 
claimed unconditionally as inherently Japanese, and most
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importantly, the return of these islands was to be 
considered satisfactory grounds for a treaty. Second, 
priority was attached to the Southern Kuriles, which were 
demanded for "historical reasons" but were not deemed 
essential for an overall settlement. Finally the northern 
Kuriles and Southern Sakhalin were claimed simply for 
bargaining purposes. 'ss> (Heilman*s italics)
How a significant fact which should be pointed out is that 
Japanese demands for the reversion of the Kuriles, southern 
Sakhalin, and Kunashiri and Etorofu had a characteristic as 
bargaining cards. In other words, the Japanese government 
originally recognized that those islands were not vital to Japan's 
national interests.
BRITISH ATTITUDE TOVAJRDS NORMALIZATION: January to  May 1955
Unlike the U.S. government, the British government exerted no
significant influence on Japanese policy before the negotiations ;
started. Public opinion in Britain was not interested in the
Russo-Japanese normalization talks. In fact, one of the reasons
why the Japanese government chose London as the venue for the
■the
negotiations was that the Japanese assessed that  ^political 
atmosphere in London was tranquil.*50 But the British government 
had been interested in the development of events with regard to 
the normalization. Between January and May, the British were
keenly observing Japanese and Soviet attitudes on this issue and . 
trying to settle their own standpoint.
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In order to understand the British attitude towards the Russo- 
Japanese normalization, it is useful.to look back to the Foreign 
Office's of policy to Japan which had been outlined early in 
1954. On 6 January 1954, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, the then 
Permanent Under-Secretary, instructed the Far Eastern Department 
to prepare a general guideline on British policy towards 
Japan.ei In response to this instruction, the Department prepared 
a draft, which was approved as a cabinet paper C<54)92 in 
F e b r u a r y . T h i s  policy guidelin reflected British apprehension 
about the possibility that the Japanese would be dragged into the 
communist camp. Particularly they feared that Japan would 
establish a Sino-Japanese coalition: 'The combination of Japanese 
technical skill, equipment and drive with Chinese manpower would 
mean a decisive shift in the world balance of power.'e3 In order 
to prevent this Sino-Japanese coalition, the guideline suggested, 
the British government should try to improve Anglo-Japanese 
relations by softening the hostile feelings of the British people 
towards Japan, and should try to assist Japanese economic recovery 
through promoting her trade with the sterling area. The guideline 
of British foriegn policy towards Japan seemed not to be altered 
in 1955. The anxiety which the Foreign Office had held in 1954 
continued to be held in 1955.
From the end of January to the beginning of February 1955, it 
became clear that the Hatoyama government started to aim at 
normalization by positively responding to Soviet overtures. This
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^  government
move wasA \ extraordinary^ step for any care-takerAto take.
Faced with this unexpected development, the British began to be
worried by the possibility that Japan would be dragged into the
communist bloc. Ambassador Dening was most alarmed by it, and
sent a recommendation to the Foreign Office on 1 February, urging
that the British government should attempt to do something more to
improve the relations with Japan, in order to counter the Sino-
Soviet attempts to woo Japan.®4
It was Prime Minister Hatoyama’s attitude on the normalization 
issue that worried the British ambassador. He argued that ’the 
Japanese Foreign Office attitude towards the Russian approach 
appears both correct and sound', but that 'that of the P.M. may 
play into the hands of the Russians and get Japan into 
difficulties with the United States.'®sHe knew that the Japanese 
government did not intend to proceed normalization at the expense 
of relationship with its western allies.®® Nevertheless, he could 
not get rid of his anxiety because he was aware of the fact that- 
'Though unsound, the P.M.'s attitude has more popular appeal to 
the elector than of that of the Foreign Minister.'®7 Dening was 
afraid of the possibility that the Japanese people would be 
misled, from his viewpoint, into the communist hands by Hatoyama's 
unsound diplomacy.
The Foreign Office agreed with Dening's analysis. At the 
beginning of February, the Foreign Office prepared a statement 
for the Commonwealth Conference. It warned that Japan's capture
77r
CHAPTER 3
by communism would be a serious disaster for the Commonwealth.ea 
Moreover, British representatives in the far east also expressed 
anxiety over relations between Japan and communist countries. At 
the beginning of March, the British representatives to the far 
east held a conference in Mallaig and the participants were aware 
that the Soviet Union and China intensified the efforts to 
establish relations with Japan, 'with the obvious purpose of 
undermining her internal situation and of weakening her 
association with the free world'.ea
Thus, the British government seemed in 1955 to fear that Japan 
would be dragged into the communist camp. But it did not intend 
to interfere with the Japanese efforts for normalization. Rather, 
it tended to emphasize the significance of improving Anglo- 
Japanese relations in order to keep the Japanese in the western 
camp. As shown above, Dening urged his government to do something 
for that purpose. Malcolm MacDonald, the then High Commissioner 
for South East Asia, also reported that the British 
represetntatives to the far east 'recognized the necessity to 
improve Anglo-Japanese relations in spite of the prejudices 
created by the war and the difficulties created by Japanese
CHAPTER 3
economic competition, and to encourage the Japanese in their
present tendency to look to Britain as the greatest stabilising 
influence in international affairs.'71
Why did the British take this indirect measure? What restrained 
them from adopting more direct policy to prevent the Japanese from 
going to the communist camp? One of the reasons is that the 
British government recognized that the United States was to take 
the main responsibility for Japanese issues in post-war period. A 
cabinet paper which had been prepared in 1954 suggested that
Britain should assist the Americans in keepping the Japanese in
the western camp.72 Secondly, the Foreign Office was fully aware 
of the intensification of nationalist sentiments in Japan in the 
middle of the 1950s. Regarding characteristics of the Hatoyama 
administration, the Foreign Office held the view that the new
government had the stronger nationalist tendency. Prime Minister 
Hatoyama was described as an 'anti-American traditionalist*73 
Dening also suggested: 'However things go, we should now expect
that nationalism, economic and otherwise, is bound to be a more 
potent influence in Japanese policies whether these are directed 
by Messrs. Hatoyama and Shigemitsu or by any of their likely 
successors.'74 After Hatoyama had announced his desire for 
normalization, a Foreign Office minute characterized the mood in 
Japan as a combination of a 'hysterical nationalistic mood' and a 
susceptibility to Sino-Soviet peace overtures.7S It can be argued 
that the Foreign Office may have assumed that under these 
situations any direct warning or pressure would irritate the
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Japanese and might provoke anti-western sentiments among the 
Japanese public.
More importantly, the British seemed to recognize interrelations 
between the intensified nationalist tendencies in Japan and the 
Japanese desire for normalization with the Soviet Union. This can 
be seen in their observation that it was Hatoyama Ichiro, who had 
a reputation as an 'anti-American traditionalist' and a 'symbol of 
a return to pre-war Japanese p o l i t i c s ' w h o  were the most 
enthusiastic about normalization with the Soviet Union. In fact, 
Hatoyama's normalization policy was enthusiastically supported by 
the Japanese people. The Japanee public had been showing anti- 
American tendencies and normalization with the communist countries 
seemed to become a symbol of foreign policy independent of 
American influence. In other words, the intensified nationalist 
sentiments encouraged the Japanese to get away from the shackle of 
cold war policy of the United State. The British seem to have 
recognized this even as early as in the summer of 1954. They had 
observed that after the Geneva Conference the Japanese public 
became more nationalistic and came to tend to argue for 
normalizing relations with the communist powers.77 If so, it can 
be argued that the British may have realized that any direct 
warning and pressure on the Japanese would further intensify the 
nationalism in Japan and would provoke them to take more positive 
steps towards the communist orbit. This was, needless to say, what 
the British government disliked. On 31 May, the British government 
stated that, though it welcomed the negotiations taking place in
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London, it would take no part in the normalization talks.7® 
Probably, this non-committal attitude reflected the British ideas 
explained above.
Among the various issues to be discussed in London, the one of 
greatest concern for the British was the territorial question. 
Britain had had to deal with it as a signatory of the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty and as a country which had taken a hand in 
drafting the Japanese treaty with the United States in 1950-1. 
Moreover, Britain was a country which had participated in the 
Yalta Conference and signed the Yalta Secret Agreement. Britain 
agreed to hand the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin to the Soviet 
Union. She could, therefore, expect Japan to request them for 
support for her claims to those islands in the negotiations with 
Russia. In 1955, what kind of position did the Foreign Office
take with regard to this controversial question?
It was in the middle of March when the Foreign Office examined 
the British position, on the territorial issue. On 19 March, 
Gerald Fitzmaurice, the Foreign Office legal adviser, issued a 
brief account of the disposition problems of the former Japanese 
northern islands. In the memorandum, he developed a legal 
interpretation of the status of the Kuriles, southern Sakhalin, 
the Habomais and Shikotan. As for the Kuriles and southern 
Sakhalin,. Fitzmaurice admitted the relevance of the American 
argument that Russia's occupation of these islands was only a
war-time occupation and that no actual cession of them had yet
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been made to the Soviet Union. But he considered that this 
American argument could only remain true immediately after the 
conclusion of the S.F.P.T. He concluded that 'with the passage of 
time, Russia can acquire sovereignty to these territories on an 
independent basis of occupation, control and effective 
administration, or she can acquire a sort of prescriptive title. • 
It is obvious that his interpretation was based on the idea of 
'prescriptive title', that is, territory can be acquired as the 
result of the peaceable exercise of de facto sovereignty for a 
very long period over territory subject to the sovereignty of 
another. The Soviet position regarding the Kuriles, he
continued, was also based on the fact that Japan had renounced 
the territories in the San Francisco Treaty and that those 
islands had become res nulllus.
As regards 'the Habomais and Shikotan, he employed the same 
argument. Although he argued that they could be assumed not to be 
a part of the Kuriles, and that the Russians were in unlawful 
occupation of them, he admitted that it would still be possible 
for the Russians to acquire them on the basis of prescriptive 
rights, if they stayed on long enough. The period of peaceful 
occupation of the Habomais and Shikotan was not supposed to be 
long enough, but the possibility that the Soviets might acquire 
de jure sovereignty over them as time passed was not denied by 
Fitzmaurice.
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Based on the contention of Fitzmaurice, the Foreign Office drew 
up a position paper of its own views on the territorial question 
in May 1955, in order to prepare for the Russo-Japanese talks 
which were.about to begin. A summary made by a Foreign Office 
official is available to us. Because of its great significance, 
it is quoted here in full.
For our own views on the former Japanese islands see
Research Dept paper of May 1955 at FJ1O81/0. Ve consider 
that:
a) The Russian claim to South Sakhalin is incontestable.
b) Japan has lost de. lure sovereignty over the Kuriles,
while the U.S.S.R. had acquired sovereignty dfi. f&£io. and 
probably also dfi. lure.
c) The legal position on the Habomais and Shikotan is in 
doubt, our advisers inclined to the opinion that Shikotan is 
part of the Kuriles, and the Habomais are part of Japan. Ve 
should not object, of course if both were handed back to 
Japan.'30
It is interesting that Fitzmaurice and the Research Department 
paper introduced above did not even mention Etorofu and Kunashiri. 
It seems as if the British had not even recognized the distinction 
between the two islands and the rest of the Kuriles. Perhaps, the
Foreign Office may have held on to its view of 1951 that the
border between the Soviet Union and Japan should be drawn between 
Hokkaido and Kunashiri.
Thus, the British views on the territorial issue were very 
unfavourable to Japanese territorial claims against the Soviets. 
The Americans took the position that, though the Kuriles and 
southern Sakhalin had been renounced by Japan, those islands were 
not yet under Soviet sovereignty. The British Foreign Office,
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however, tended to recognize Soviet possession of the Kuriles and 
Sakhalin. Moreover, it was doubtful even about Japanese 
sovereignty over Shikotan. This Anglo-American difference of 
views reflected the difference which had already surfaced during 
the making of the S.F.P.T. The British had tended to support the 
decision at Yalta on the territorial disposition of the Kuriles 
and other former Japanese northern islands and to try to maintain 
the status quo in the far east which had been established as a 
result of the Pacific war in order to avoid causing instability in 
that region. In 1955, the British government must have based 
its view on the territorial issue on the same kind of basic 
attitude that had been adopted four years earlier.
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CHAPTER 4 
THE EIKST LONDON TALKS:
E H A S E  1
The London Talks in 1955 can be divided into two phases. The 
first phase is from the start of the negotiations to the sixth 
negotiation on 28 June, during which the Soviet delegation and the 
Japanese delegation exchanged their own hard line positions as an 
opening gambit and reached stalemate. The second phase is from 
the eighth negotiation to the end of the London talks, during 
which the Soviets indicated their intention to make a concession 
to Japan on the territorial question but faced Japanese refusal, 
and during which they reached deadlock again. The first phase 
will be dealt with in this chapter.
THE START OF THE MEGOTIA TIONS
On 1 June, Matsumoto Shunichi, visited the Soviet Embassy at 13 
Kensington Palace Gardens on a courtesy call, and had an informal 
meeting with his Soviet counterpart, Yakob Malik, the Soviet 
Ambassador to Britain. They did not enter on any discussions an 
the main agenda, but reached an agreement with regard to the 
procedure and schedule for the negotiations. Regarding the form 
of the negotiations, they agreed that both parties would first
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hold an introductory plenary meeting with all members of each 
delegation but, after the first meeting, they would only hold 
confidential meetings between both plenipotentiaries, twice a
week. Concerning the place for the negotiations, they decided to
meet alternately at each Embassy and agreed to use both the 
Russian and Japanese languages for negotiation.1
The Soviets seemed to try to create a peaceful and conciliatory 
atmosphere. At this meeting, Malik was very friendly and seemed 
very eager to settle the negotiations. The next day, Malik 
returned Matsumoto's visit and had an informal meeting, during
which they spent forty minutes in talks whose contents were not
publicised. In his memoirs, however, Matsumoto emphasised Malik's 
friendly attitude.2 These Soviet attempts to make a peaceful 
gesture towards the Japanese were also carried out at the other 
places. On the occasion of Khrushchev and Bulganin's visit to 
Yogoslavia, for example, the latter, at a reception in Belgrade, 
told the Japanese Minister there that their government was very 
anxious to conclude the normalization talks rapidly. The Japanese 
Minister in London was also similarly assured.
The Japanese expected, however, that despite the Soviet 
expression of their desire for an early conclusion, the 
negotiations would take a long time. At the press conference held 
after the first informal meeting, Matsumoto said that he had not 
had the impression that the Soviets were in any hurry to conclude 
the normalization, because it had been they who proposed to have
7$6
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meetings twice a week.3 Some of the staff of the Japaense Embassy 
in London seemed to have a suspicion that the Soviet attitude was 
only a part of their policy of creating a conciliatory 
impression.*
On 3 June, the first formal meeting was held at the Soviet 
Embassy as scheduled two days earlier by plenipotentiaries. 
This was an introductory meeting, and both plenipotentiaries 
introduced all members of each delegation to each other but did 
not enter into a discussion. At this meeting, Matsumoto and 
Malik exchanged some words in private. The former suggested that 
it would take a long time to conclude the negotiations. Malik 
replied to it, 'I think it will be concluded in two or three 
months.'6
What can be assumed about the Soviet negotiation plan? The 
Soviet Union, at that stage, may have expected the negotiations 
to reach a dead-end, sooner or later, on the territorial issues, 
because it was very clear from the statements in the Japanese 
Diet and elsewhere that the Japanese government was anxious to 
secure the reversion of some of the former Japanese northern 
territories. Even if this was so, Malik still predicted an early 
settlement. This might indicate that the Soviet Union had an 
intention to conclude normalization rapidly by conceding some 
of the northern territories at some stage when the negotiations 
reached a stalemate. Otherwise, they would have underestimated
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the Japanese determination to get back their former northern 
islands, and to solve the other questions prior to normalization.
The main .discussions started on the second formal meeting which 
took place on 7 June, at the Japanese Embassy. Although Malik 
and Matsumoto brought their advisers, the two plenipotentiaries 
took charge of almost the whole discussion. At this meeting, 
Matsumoto submitted a memorandum which consisted of seven points 
describing Japan's fundamental purposes and position in the 
negotiaitons. The seven points had the following contents.
First of all, the Japanese government requested the Soviet 
Union to start and complete immediately the repatriation of the 
Japanese detainees held on Russian soil and to offer full 
details regarding the Japanese detained by the U.S.S.R. The aim 
of this demand was to emphasise the importance which the Japanese 
attached to the issues. It insisted that they must be solved 
immediately and separated from other questions. The Japanese 
government attempted to make it clear that the Japanese regarded 
the solution of repatriation issues as a precondition for 
beginning the negotiations for normalization.6 This attempt was 
aimed at deriving Soviet concessions, by taking advantage of the 
U.S.S.R.'s strong desire for normalization.
The second point was concerned with mutual respect for existing 
international obligations and rights in which each country was at 
present involved, which included the obligations which Japan
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should carry out with respect to the U. S.-Japanese Security Treaty 
and the San Francisco Peace Treaty. The Japanese intended to 
assert that they would never accept any conditions which would 
jeopardize II. S.-Japanese relations.
Thirdly, based on the historical evidence, the memorandum 
insisted that the Habomais, Shikotan, the Kuriles, and southern 
Sakhalin were Japanese territories. But Matsumoto simultaneously 
made it clear that they were ready to exchange frank views on the 
disposition of these islands. Matsumoto's intention regarding 
this issue was to show the Soviet side that, although Japan would 
insist on her sovereignty over all of the northern territories, 
she would not mean to demand the reversion of all of them at the 
last stage of the negotiations. He emphasises in his memoirs that 
he had intended to demonstrate that Japan would take a flexible 
position on the territorial issues. In fact, before he left for 
London, Matsumoto had received Instruction Mo. 16 and additional 
instructions concerning the territorial questions, from the 
Foreign Ministry. According to these the delegation should take 
the hardest line at the first stage of the negotiations by 
demonstrating that the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin were 
inalienable Japanese territories, and afterwards move to the less 
firm demand, the reversion of Kunashiri and Etorofu, while at the 
last stage, the instruction authorized a retreat up to the 
reversion of only the Habomais and Shikotan. But at the meeting, 
Matsumoto indicated that there was room for concession on the 
Japanese part on the territorial issues by implying that Japan did
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not intend to get back all of the islands. Here it became quite
clear that he was trying to direct the stream of the negotiations
to attain an early normalization, by modifying the original harder 
in
stance contained the instructions from the Foreign Ministry.7
A
On the fourth point, the Japanese requested the Soviets for 
favourable consideration to avoid troubles and obstacles in 
fishing on the high seas in northern waters and strongly demanded 
immediate repatriation of crews arrested and boats confiscated by 
the Russians. The fifth point referred to encouragement of 
economic transactions between the two countries. The Japanese
government proposed that both countries should immediately 
start special negotiations to enhance economic transactions 
between themselves.
In the sixth article, the Japanese emphasised that both 
countries should mutually assure that each country would respect 
the U.IT. Charter, each other's territorial rights, the peaceful
solution of conflicts and non-intervention in the internal
affairs of the other. The final point stated the strong Japanese 
hope that the Soviet Union would unconditionally support Japan's 
admission to the United Nations.®
These seven points were basically in accordance with 
Instruction Mo.16 and additional instructions which had been 
given to Matsumoto by the Cabinet before he left Japan. This
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meant that he exposed all of Japanese bargaining positions on 
which she would base her assertions during the negotiations. The 
foreign minister, Shigemitsu, confirmed that the seven points 
memorandum was inaccordance with the governmental instructions to 
Matsumoto. But, in fact, in Tokyo, Shigemitsu seems to have been 
irritated by Matsumoto's activities at the second formal meeting. 
He did not hide his displeasure at the way Matsumoto was carrying 
on the negotiations. When he saw Esler Dening, the British 
Ambassador to Japan, at the Queen's Birthday Party held by the 
British Embassy, he told Dening rather sarcastically that
Matsumoto was a brave man and that he had laid all his cards on 
the table.3 Shigemitsu's idea was to show the Russians that 
the Japanese would stand firm, in order to derive greater 
concessions from them. In addition to this, the Foreign Ministry 
intended to prolong the negotiations at least until result of the 
Geneva Four Powers Summit became clear. Matsumoto seemed, 
however, to ignore this intention of the Foreign Ministry.
Shigemitsu's strong intention to control the negotiations from
Tokyo was obvious. For example, on 4 June, he stated that, if 
southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles were returned to Japan, she
would not fortify them.10 This statement seemed to be designed to 
emphasise the Japanese desire for the reversion of South Sakahlin 
and the Kuriles. Although this statement implied that Japan was 
prepared for concessions in order to obtain the return of these 
two territories, it is quite clear that Shigemitsu intended to 
control the negotiations in London by showing the Japanese
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eagerness to demand the return of them. Matsumoto implied, 
however, to the Russians that it would be possible for the 
Japanese to compromise on the territorial questions. Thus, the 
policy divergence between Hatoyama and Shigemitsu was reflected in 
the London talks as a tacit friction between Matsumoto and 
Shigemitsu.
To the seven points in the Japanese memorandum, the Soviet 
plenipotentiary did not show much reaction, except to say that he 
would refer the memorandum to his government and that he doubted 
whether its contents could be fitted into the peace treaty in 
question.11 But at the third meeting on 14 June, Malik 
clarified Moscow's position. At the opening of the meeting, he 
submitted the Soviet draft of a peace treaty consisting of twelve 
articles. The first article referred to the mutual respect of the 
signatories for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non­
aggression and non-interference in internal affairs. As Matsumoto 
indicated in his seven points, the Japanese government paid a 
special attention to the importance of the non-interference 
principle. In Japan there were strong feelings that the Soviet 
Union was looking for any chance to subvert Japanese domestic 
politics and that the Soviets had the motivation to establish the 
Soviet Embassy in Tokyo as the centre for espionage activities. 
That is why the Japanese should put special emphasis on the non­
interference principle. The first article of the Soviet draft, 
however, included this principle and in this sense it was not in
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conflict with one of the most significant lines which the 
Japanese government took.
The second article was not, however, one which the Japanese 
could accept. It referred to the restriction an Japanese attempts 
to establish any military alliances directed against countries 
which had fought against Japan in the last war. This article was 
not at all new, because in 1951 at the San Francisco Peace 
Conference, A.A. Gromyko had already proposed to amend the Anglo- 
American draft treaty and to include the same clause in a peace 
treaty with Japan. But this article in the Soviet draft came to 
have a different meaning from the clause submitted at the San 
Francisco Conference.
The International situation had changed since the conclusion of 
the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Japan was now one of the most 
important allies of the United States in the Far East, because of 
the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty, concluded together with the 
San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951. In these circumstances, the 
second article of the Soviet draft must imply that the Soviet 
Union wanted to abolish the existing U.S.-Japanese military 
alliance. This article was, therefore, incompatible with the 
Japanese position described in the second paragraph of the seven 
points. Matsumoto sensitively responded to this article and asked 
Malik whether this provision was directed against the U.S.- 
Japanese Security Treaty. Malik did not answer directly and just 
asked him to refer the proposal to the Japanese government. ia
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Article 3 stipulated that the Soviet Union renounced all 
reparation claims while the fourth . article provided that Japan 
should renounce all claims against the U.S.S.R. which had arisen 
as a result- of the war. These articles did not, therefore, became 
crucial items in the talks.
The fifth article was concerned with territorial problems, 
which were the most controversial questions between the U.S.S.R. 
and Japan, The article said:
Japan recognises the full sovereignty of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics over the southern part of the island of 
Sakhalin, with all the islands adjacent to it, and over the 
Kurile islands, and renounces all rights, titles and claims 
to these territories. The state frontier between the 
U.S.S.R. and Japan lies along the middle of the Strait of 
Nemuro-Kaikio, Notsuke-Kaikyo, as shown on the map appended.13
This provision was also the same as that which Gromyko had 
proposed in 1951, except that the clear definition of the national 
border between the two countries was included in the draft treaty. 
At any rate,in this article, the Soviet Union clarified that they 
would urge Japan to recognise the de facto and de jure sovereignty 
of the U.S.S.R. over the whole of the Kuriles and southern 
Sakhalin. This was in sharp conflict with the Japanese position. 
Matsumoto did not comment on this article at that moment, but the 
territorial issues would be literally the key to normalization 
of relations.
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Article 6 provided that both countries should not hinder the 
free navigation of commercial ships in the Straits La 
Perouse/Soya, Remuro Kaikio, Rotsuke-Kaikio, and Koemai-Kaikio, 
and that Japan should not prevent free navigation in the Straits 
Sangarski/Tsugaru and Tsushima. In addition to these, the second 
paragraph stipulates that the Straits mentioned above should be 
open for the passage only of those warships which belonged to 
powers adjacent to the Sea of Japan. What this article meant was 
that only warships of the P.R.C., the U.S.S.R., Japan, and both 
north and south Korea could navigate through those straits. In 
other words, the American navy was excluded from the Japan Sea. 
Japan who based her own military security on the alliance with the 
United States could by no means accept this provision. This
article had already been contained in the Soviet proposals made 
by Gromyko for amendment of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. It 
seemed that the Soviet Union had not changed their views on their 
aim to make the Japan Sea a Communist lake. Moreover, it seemed 
that the Soviets intended to make the U.S. Japanese alliance 
substantially ineffective.
In Article 7, the Soviet Union promised to support Japan's 
admission to the United Rations, and this article was compatible 
with the Japanese position. Both Articles 6 and 9 related to 
economic relations. The former stipulated that the contracting 
countries should start negotiations on a treaty of trade and 
navigation. The latter obliged both countries to enter into 
discussions on conservation of resources of fish and other fauna.
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These were not very much in conflict with the Japanese position, 
either.
Articles -10 and 11 were concerned with post and parcel exchange 
and the establishment of telephone-telegraph and radio links, and 
related to the development of cultural ties between the two 
countries. The final article defines the procedure of
ratification. These three were unlikely to be controversial
matters during the negotiations.1*4
Matsumoto declined to comment on the draft of the treaty. He 
intended to avoid getting involved in discussion on each article 
of the Soviet draft, since he had to keep insisting that the
repatriation of detainees be a precondition for any negotiations 
on the normalization or a peace treaty. He only promised,
therefore, to present the Japanese views on the draft afterwards,
and took up instead the repatriation issues. Again, he emphasised 
that the Soviets should repatriate Japanese detainees in the 
U.S.S.R. prior to the start of substantial discussion on the other 
issues. Malik replied to Matsumoto that 1,016 ex-soldiers of the 
former Japanese Imperial Army and 357 civilians were detained in 
the U.S.S.R. and that they were all war criminals and were now 
serving their sentences. He added that the repatriation issues 
would be settled in Japan’s favour as soon as a peace treaty was 
signed. Matsumoto considered that Malik did not intend to concede 
to Japan on the repatriation issue, but he resolutely requested
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the Soviets to reconsider the possibility of immediate 
repatriation.1S
After these exchanges of views over three meetings, Japan was 
led to conclude that the Soviet Union was taking a very firm and 
rigid position. It was impossible for Japan to accept Articles 2, 
5, and 6, and the Soviets refused to accept the Japanese request 
for the immediate repatriation of all detainees. Facing these 
attitudes of the U.S.S.R., the Japanese government decided to 
continue the negotiations patiently and firmly. On io June, 
Shigemitsu explained the development of the negotiations at the 
Standing Committee of the House of Representatives. He stated 
that the Soviet attitude towards Japan was not at all different 
from the proposals made by Gromyko in 1951, and that it seemed 
that the Soviets had never changed their opinion since then. He 
declared, however, that the Japanese Government would continue to 
insist on their own positions and that, at the same time, they 
would make efforts to realise normalization.1e
As the result of the third meeting, Matsumoto reconsidered how 
to manage the future negotiations. Because their drafts showed a 
wide gap between the two sides on such important issues as 
repatriation and the territorial problem and the irrelevance of 
the U. S.-Japanese alliance, he also had to expect great 
difficulty in proceeding with the negotiations. But he did not 
consider that the draft treaty indicated the ultimate position of 
the Soviet Union and decided to adopt a very flexible negotiating
79?
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strategy in order to grasp what the Russians really wanted to 
gain, and to achieve Japan's purposes.
The strategy consisted of the following four factors. First of 
all, the discussion about the Soviet draft treaty should be 
avoided in the negotiations, and the repatriation of Japanese 
detainees prior to the conclusion of a peace treaty should be 
repeatedly demanded. Secondly, the Japanese should gradually 
transfer the focus of the discussions towards the territorial 
questions and political problems such as the issue of treatment 
of the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty. While doing so, the 
Japanese should demonstrate their firm resolution that unless the 
U.S.S.R. indicated their sincerity with respect to questions of 
territories, of U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty, and the 
repatriation of detainees, they would not begin the discussion 
on other questions Thirdly, by doing this, the Japanese should 
find out what the Soviets really wanted to gain. Finally, the 
presentation of a Japanese draft should be postponed, since, if 
this had been submitted, it would have meant that Japan agreed to 
begin the talks for normalization without insisting on the 
fulfilment of their request for immediate repatriation of 
detainees.1'7
Indeed, Matsumoto intended not to get involved in substantial 
discussion for normalization by avoiding presenting a Japanese 
draft. But he now clearly deviated from the negotiating tactics 
which was embodied in Instruction Ho. 16. The Instruction
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provided that the Japanese delegation should negotiate important 
issues such as the territorial question and repatriation question, 
when the Soviet confirmed that they would recognize the S.F.P.T. 
and the U.S.-Japanese alliance. Besides this, the Japanese were
instructed to obtain a Soviet promise not to undertake any 
subversive activities. But Matsumoto now discussed the territorial 
and the repatriation questions without obtaining such a promise 
from the Russians. Actually, the Russian draft was designed to 
prohibit the U.S. naval fleets from navigating through the three 
straits. More importantly, the Russians attempted to prohibit the 
Japanese from entering into any military alliance which was aimed 
at any countries which had fought against Japan in V.V.II. As 
far as Instruction No.16 was concerned, the Soviet attitudes were 
not conciliatory enough for the Japanese to move to the 
substantial discussions. Nevertheless, Matsumoto decided at that 
stage to start to discuss the territorial and repatriation issues. 
He seemed to speed up the negotiations for achieving immediate 
normalization.
In Tokyo, Shigemitsu seems to have been anxious as to how 
Matsumoto would deal with the Soviet draft. Shigemitsu had 
stated in the Diet, the Government intended to continue to cope 
with the Soviets by keeping the resolute position against their 
draft treaty. He was, however, probably afraid that Matsumoto 
would gradually withdraw from the original position of the 
government. On 18 June, the Foreign Ministry instructed him 
to follow the original policy line of the government and
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to require the repatriation as a prerequisite condition for starting 
<$jj the normalization talks.,e
Both plenipotentiaries were exchanging opening gambits by 
demonstrating their own fundamental positions at the first stage 
of the negotiations, especially at the second and the third 
meeting. After this stage, the negotiations would go into 
detailed discussions over the most important problems between the 
two countries: the territorial and the repatriation questions.
REPATRIATION AND TERRITORIAL QUESTIONS
The fourth meeting was held at the Japanese Embassy on 21 June. 
At this meeting both plenipotentiaries discussed the repatriation 
issues. Matsumoto started by emphasising the importance which the 
Japanese government attached to the immediate repatriation of 
internees. He explained to Malik that the government regarded a 
settlement of the repatriation problems as imperative to create 
a favourable atmosphere for the negotiations. Malik replied that 
the Soviet government regarded the normalization of relations as 
the first and most important matter to be settled and any attempt 
by the Japanese delegation to impose prior conditions would not 
help in creating the favourable atmosphere. He added that
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the Soviet government would be ready to deal with the 
repatriation problem favourably at the same time as the 
normalization of relations was taking p l a c e . B o t h  
plenipotentiaries showed a sharp difference over the timing of 
the repatriation of detainees.
Matsumoto emphasized again that the question of timing was
most crucial for the Japanese government because the Japanese 
people were calling for immediate repatriation. He asked Malik 
to collect the names of Japanese detainees, 1,016 ex-soldiers and 
357 civilians. Malik answered that it would take much time to 
make a list of detainees because they were scattered all over 
Russia, and he warned that any attempt to settle this question 
first would only delay the main negotiations.20 This meeting 
resulted in nothing but the mutual confirmation that they had
conflicting ideas about the timing of repatriation.
On 24 June, the territorial problem were for the first time 
discussed between the two plenipotentiaries at the fifth 
meeting. At the opening of the meeting, taking up the
territorial issue, Matsumoto argued that the Habomais and 
Shikotan were historically and geographically inalienable
Japanese territories, and that, when ex-Prime Minister Yoshida 
had referred to the same view at the San Francisco Conference, no 
objection had been raised.21 Matsumoto handed to the Soviets a 
document which described the histroical background of legal.status
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of these islands, the definition of the area which had been 
called the Habomais and Shikotan, and haw international treaties 
had been dealing with them.22
According to the records on Matsumoto's argument at the 
meeting, it seems that the discussion was centred on the 
disposition of the Habomais and Shikotan, though Foreign 
Ministry's original policy intended to submit the hardest demand 
to the Russians: reversion of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. 
It cannot be denied that the Russians may have obtained an 
impression from Matsumoto's treatment of the territorial question 
that Japan's main concern was with the Habomais and Shikotan, 
not with the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. Matsumoto slightly 
moderated the original governmental stance on the territorial 
issues, so that the Soviet might be able to accept it relatively 
easily.
Malik reacted to Matsumoto's attempt in two ways. First of 
all, he suggested that they should both look at the points on 
which they seemed to agree, and that it seemed that both parties 
were willing to restore relations and exchange ambassadors. He 
tried to demonstrate the basic Soviet position that the Russians 
were very anxious to settle normalization even without solving 
any other area of conflict between the two countries. Secondly, 
he moved into the territorial question, arguing that they had 
already been settled in Russia's favour by various international 
agreements. As examples, Malik listed the Yalta Agreement,
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Clause 8 of the Potsdam Declaration, the Army and Navy General 
Directive Ho.l, and S.C.A.P.I.N. Ho.677. In addition, he 
referred to Yoshida's statement at the San Francisco Conference 
and asserted that the reason why there had not been any objection 
to it was that the U.S. had put pressure on the participating 
countries to refrain from raising objections. After rebutting 
the Japanese views in this way, he concluded his remarks, saying 
'The present Russian proposals were more magnanimous than the San 
Francisco Treaty and imposed no unilateral obligation upon Japan. 
If relations between the two countries could be normalized in 
this generous way, a new era would ,dawn in relations between the 
two countries.'23
The Japanese attempted to refute Malik's argument. Matsumoto 
explained that, in the view of the Japanese government, none of 
the documents referred to by Malik covered the final disposition 
of these islands, and that the S.C.A.P.I.H. Ho.677 distinguished 
the Habomais and Shikotan from the Kuriles and made it clear in 
its contents that it did not define any ultimate status of 
territories. But Malik just repeated his original remark.2"1
At the sixth meeting on 28 June , Matsumoto tenaciously tried 
to persuade the Russians to reconsider the repatriation question 
and requested Malik to inform the Japanese government of the 
names of detainees. Malik avoided answering this request and 
reiterated that, if the Japanese government were anxious to 
settle the repatriation questions as soon as possible, it should
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hasten the normalization of relations.2® At this stage of 
negotiations, it became clear that the Soviets attempted to take 
advantage of the strong Japanese desire for repatriation to 
settle normalization in Russia's favour, just as the Japanese 
were trying to use the Soviet desire for early normalization to 
achieve repatriation.
Since the delegates had not made any progress on the 
repatriation issue, they entered discussion on territorial 
questions. Matsumoto eagerly rebutted Malik's views expressed at 
the previous meeting. First of all, he explained that, according 
to international precedents, territorial changes as a result of 
war had to be covered in a peace treaty. He argued that the 
only international treaty defining the range of Japanese 
territories was the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and that Article 
2 of that treaty did not stipulate the ultimate status of the 
Kuriles and Sakhalin. Secondly, he clarified the Japanese 
interpretation of the validity of the Yalta Agreement. 3ecause 
Japan had neither participated in the Yalta Conference nor 
signed the agreement, the territorial clause in the Yalta secret 
agreement was invalid as far as Japan was concerned. 
Furthermore, regarding S.C.A.P.I.H. No.677 and General Directive 
No. 1, Matsumoto claimed that they were only decisions on 
technical procedures to cope with the Japanese surrender. He 
concluded that the Soviet justification based on the documents 
prior to the San Francisco Peace Treaty was totally wrong and
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strongly emphasised that the territorial question had not yet 
been settled.2e
Responding to this, Malik repeated that the territorial problem 
was in any case all settled, and suggested that, even though the 
San Francisco Peace Treaty did not mention the disposition of the 
Habomais and Shikotan, there was no question but that they 
belonged to the Soviet Union. Added to this, Malik pointed out 
that the real trouble was that in Japan there were many anti­
normalization groups influenced by the U.S. He expressed his 
suspicion that the U.S. had put pressure on the Japanese to make 
the immediate repatriation of detainees, the precondition for 
normalization, and warned the Japanese government against doing 
it.*7
Matsumoto insisted, however, on the immediate repatriation of 
detainees and the solution of the territorial question. After 
that, he responded to Malik's remarks with regard to the 
domestic situation of Japan, suggesting that, although some 
Japanese had not been very willing to hold the present talks, 
there was a general desire among Liberals and Socialists as well 
as Democrats for the restoration of diplomatic relations and that 
everyone in Japan was most anxious that the internees should 
first be repatriated and that the territorial problem should be 
settled. By saying this, he implied that if these two issues were 
settled, the normalization would be supported by all Japanese.*3 
Matsumoto's aim was apparently to use the domestic lack of
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consensus to normalization as a lever to make the Soviets concede 
on the repatriation and territorial, questions. In a sense, this 
was one of the most effective negotiating tools for the Japanese. 
If Japan's domestic concensus remained divided with respect to 
these two problems, it would be very likely that the 
normalization could not be ratified in the Diet, even if it 
should be signed by the plenipotentiaries. It was not very wise 
for the U.S.S.R. to ignore the Japan's domestic situation.
During the first month since the negotiations had started, 
some points had become clear. First of all, the U.S.S.R. and 
Japan had demonstrated a sharp difference between their positions 
with regard to the territorial question. As mentioned above, the 
ultimate territorial demand by Japan was for the return of the 
Habomais and Shikotan, even though Matsumoto expressed Japan's 
view that the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin were the historically 
and geographically inalienable territories of Japan. On the 
other hand, the Soviet Union took the position that the 
territorial question were all settled in Russia's favour in the 
Yalta Agreement, and the other documents made at the end of WII. 
In short, the Soviets refused to accept even the ultimate demand 
of Japan. Secondly, they did not intend to make any concession 
on the repatriation issues, but the Japanese persistently 
attempted to trade Russian acceptance of immediate repatriation 
for their awn acceptance of normalization. To sum up, although 
both countries were willing to restore diplomatic relations with 
each other,the negotiations reached a stalemate.
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Territorial questions and repatriation issues had been dealt 
with as the main items of agenda at the fourth, fifth, and sixth 
meetings. But political problems with regard to U.S.-Japanese 
Security Treaty were not discussed at all, though after the third 
meeting Matsumoto tried gradually to steer the discussions 
towards topics about the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty. Why did 
he stick to territorial problems and repatriation questions?
This was mainly because the Foreign Ministry instructed him 
not to hasten the negotiations. Matsumoto wrote in his memoirs 
that Foreign Minister Shigemitsu, sent an instruction that the 
frequency of meetings should be reduced from twice a week to once 
a week and that no reasons for this were indicated in the 
instruction.^* In addition, he sometimes quoted this instruction 
as evidence which proved Shigemitsu's reluctance to carry out 
the normalization talks. But the truth was that the Foreign 
Ministry sent more detailed instructions. On 30 June, two 
staff of the Japanese Embassy in London, Shigemitsu Akira (the 
first secretary, a nephew of Foreign Minister Shigemitsu) and 
Sunobe Rydzo (the first secretary), called on A.L. Mayall of the 
Foreign Office to report the development of the negotiations. 
They told Mayall that the Japanese government instructed them not 
to push the negotiations along too fast until the Four Power 
Summit Meeting which would be held from 18 July but instead to 
hold meetings only once a week. The Japanese officials explained 
to Mayall that this was why the Japanese delegation were limiting 
the talks to two subjects: the repatriation of Japanese detainees
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and sovereignty over former Japanese nothern territories.30 If 
so, the reason for reducing the pace of the negotiations was 
not Shigemitsu's interruption of progress in the negotiation but 
his attempt to break through by using the outcome of the Summit 
to support Japanese claims. In short, facing the stalemate in 
negotiations, the Japanese government attempted to carry out 
filibuster tactics in order to wait for the world political 
situation to turn in Japan's favour. Shigemitsu's instruction 
mentioned above was an example of it.
The Japanese government paid much attention to the Four Power 
Summit. The prime minister, Hatoyama, sometimes stated in the 
Diet that international politics would be directed towards world 
peace by the Summit Conference, and that there would, therefore, 
be no reason for the Soviet Union to stick to the small problems 
such as the Habomais and Shikotan. Shigemitsu was much cooler 
than Hatoyama in his expectation of drastic change in 
international politics as a result of the Summit, but he also 
recognised that it was likely that the Summit should contribute 
to reduction of tension between East and West.3 ' On 1 June, Sda 
Takio, the minister at the Japanese Embassy to Britain, visited 
Geoff^fy Harrison, Assistant Under-Secretary of State in charge 
of the Western Department at the Foreign Office. The purpose of 
his visit was to obtain information regarding the western 
powers' plans for the Summit Conference, and, specifically, to 
know whether the Conference would discuss Far Eastern matters or 
not. In his conversations with Harrison, Oda expressed his
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anxiety that an unsuccesful result of the Four Power Conference 
would have some harmful effects on the Russo-Japanese 
negotiations. Harrison answered that the western powers did not 
intend to .deal with far eastern matters at the Conference.3:2 But 
the Japanese still expected the Conference to affect the 
negotiations in London.
Apart from its attempt to take advantage of the Four Power 
Conference, the Foreign Ministry approached the British Foreign 
Office with a request to support the Japanese claims to the 
repatriation of detainees on Soviet soil. As already mentioned 
above, on 30 June, Sigemitsu, and Sunobe, called on Mayall. At 
the meeting, Sunobe expressed his hope for an early decision by 
the British government to release Japanese war criminals in its 
hands so that the Japanese could use this as 'an additional 
argument to obtain the repatriation from the Soviet Union of 
those Japanese whom the Russian declared to be war criminals.'33 
They could, however, not obtain any clear answer to their hope 
from the Foreign Office.
The seventh meeting was scheduled to be held on 5 July, but 
the Soviet plenipotentiary suddenly flew back to Moscow three 
days earlier, in order to participate in consultations over the 
coming Four Power Summit Conference. In the meantime, the 
Japanese government took another step to obtain strong supports 
from the western powers for the Japanese position in the 
negotiations, especially with respect to the territorial issue.
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The Japanese government decided to deliver to the U.S., Britain 
and France a questionnaire regarding the legal status of the 
Kuriles and southern Sakhalin.
REACTION OF THE UNITED STATES
It is needless to say Japan was the most important ally to the 
United States government, strategically and politically, in its 
far eastern policy.34 Soviet-Japanese relations was, therefore, 
one of the most sensitive matters for the Americans. Before the 
negotiations started in London, the U.S. had been trying to 
exert influence on the Japanese through statements of the* 
Commander in Chief of the Far Eastern Command or the personal 
message from the secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, to the 
prime minister, Hatoyama. Moreover, the Dulles memorandum of 
January to some extent affected the decision making in the 
Japanese government. But the U.S. did not seem to attempt to 
intervene directly in the negotiations after they had begun. 
In this section, the American reactions to the negotiation in 
London will be dealt with.
Even though the American wished to avoid any direct 
involvement, the Japanese government sent the U.S. government a 
questionnaire on the territorial question, at the end of June or
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the beginning of July. The contents of the questionnaire were as 
follows:
1) Should the Yalta Agreement, which was not known to Japan 
at the time of its acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration 
and which was not referred to in the said Declaration, be 
considered the determination by the Allied Powers as 
envisaged in paragraph 8 of the said Declaration?345
2) Does the American government consider that the Soviet 
Union can singly and unilaterally decide the disposition of 
the sovereignty over the Kuriles and Southern Sakhalin?3*5
In response to the questionnaire, the State Department 
prepared a confidential document entitled 'Territorial Issues: 
Japan-Soviet Negotiations' probably before 5 July. The first 
part dealt with the basic American position with respect to the 
territorial question and, therefore, constituted its reply to the 
questionnaire. Its view consisted of the following six 
arguments:
a> The U.S.S.R. cannot singly and unilaterally make the 
determination referred to in paragraph 8 of the Potsdam 
Declaration since the proclamation clearly leaves the 
question of Japanese territorial determination for 
y  subsequent consideration by the signatory powers to the 
Declaration.
b) The Yalta Agreement was not meant to be a final 
determination of purposes expressed therein. It was a 
statement of common purpose reached by the leaders of the 
U.K., U.S., and U.S.S.R. Japan is not bound by the terms of 
the Agreement since Japan was not a party to it.
c) Shikotan and the Habomais are legally, historically
and geographically an integral part of Hokkaido and are not 
a part of the Kuriles.
d) Neither General Order No.1 nor S.C.A.P.I.N. 877 should 
be construed as the final determination of status of these 
territories.
e) Although Japan renounced all her rights to the Kuriles 
and Southern Sakhalin, the San Francisco Treaty did not 
transfer the title to the islands to another state.
f) As the U.S. Congress confirmed at the time of 
ratification of the Peace Treaty with Japan, the disposition ‘
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of the Kuriles and Southern Sakhalin is 'a matter of future 
international negotiation.’37'
Added to these, the document noted that the Japanese government 
could quote these views as Japanese points of view. In fact, 
this part was sent to the Japanese government as the reply to its 
questionnaire.
Secondly, under the heading of American objectives, the
document indicated that the U.S. wished that Japan could secure
all possible gains in the negotiations, but that she wanted Japan
to support her own cases without any possiblity of shifting the
responsibility for any failure of the negotiations to U.S. 
interference.
Finally, as the position the U.S. government had to take 
towards the public, the fallowing three points were made:
a) In view of U.S. public attitude of lack of immediate 
concern with the negotiations, the U.S. government should 
deal with the development of the negotiations very 
carefully, avoiding any implication of U.S. involvement.
b) The U. S. should repeat that the Habomais and Shikotan 
are Japanese territory.
c) Regarding the Kuriles and Southern Sakhalin, the U.S. 
government should state that their position clarified at 
the time of ratification of the San Francisco Peace Treaty 
had not been changed.30
What can be seen from this document is that the Americans were 
trying to avoid appearing to be interfering in the Japanese
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decision making or in the talks in London. But this did not 
exclude the possibility of U.S. intervention behind the scenes in ^  
the negotiations, and of its announcement of moral support for 
the Japanese stance. The document also included the implication 
that if the American public or their government itself 
recognised their 'immediate concern with the negotiation', they 
would possibly get drawn into the negotiation openly. 
Nevertheless, its basic tone was that the government should avoid 
any possibility that it would have to take the responsibility for 
any Japanese failure in the London talks, Considering the U.S. 
perception of the importance of Japan, she could not worsen U.S.- 
Japanese relations which had been already damaged by the Lucky 
Dragon Incidents in 1954. This may have been one of the most 
important reasons why the State Department tried to avoid the 
appearance of the U.S. intervention in the talks between Japan 
and the U.S.S.R.
The State Department seems to have tried to build up a kind of
united front with Britain in order to collect information about
the negotiations in London and to advise the Japanese. On 2 June,
M.G.L. Joy of the British Embassy in Washington saw Richard B.
Finn of the Japanese Desk at the State Department and discussed
S
Japanese matters. In the conversations, Finn suggested that it 
would be necessary to keep in the closest contact over the 
impending Russo-Japanese negotiations, and implied that the State S' 
Department had asked the U.S. Embassy in London to keep a close 
eye on the development of the negotiations and maintain contact
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with the Foreign Office Far Eastern Department. This meant that 
the U.S. State Department wanted to collaborate with the British 
to cope with the Russo-Japanese normalization. Why did they want 
to do so?
It may be the most important reason that the U.S. officials 
may have recognised that there was a certain difference in views 
over the various problems regarding the talks in London. Finn 
suggested that neither Britain nor the U.S. should offer the 
Japanese any advice without coordinating their policies with each 
other. 'Otherwise there was a danger that our counsels would be 
contradictory,' he said.39 In fact, there had been divergent 
views between the U.S. and Britain on the status of the Kuriles 
and Southern Sakhalin when they were making the draft peace 
treaty with Japan in 1950-1. At the stage of drafting, the 
British government expressed the view that the Kuriles and 
southern Sakhalin should be handed over to the Soviet Union and 
that the peace treaty should stipulate it clearly. On the other 
hand, the Americans insisted that the peace treaty should 
stipulate only the renunciation by Japan of all rights to those 
territories. It was not wise for both of the two countries to 
widen the gap between themselves which had already been caused by 
sharp frictions with regard to the 'Yoshida Letter'AO and the 
Geneva Conference for the Indochina War in 1954. Paradoxically, 
the more salient became reduction of tensions between East and 
West, the more eagerly the leader of each bloc sought the 
consolidation of their own camp. Under these circumstances, the
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United States had to avoid disagreeing openly with the other 
major allies in the western bloc. That was why the U.S. sought 
collaboration with Britain to cope with the Russo-Japanese 
normalization.
There was another reason. Referring to Anglo-Japanese
relations, Finn suggested as follows:
The United Kingdom is in many matters better piaceAthan the ^  
United States to influence the Japanese: historically,
because of their constitution, and for other reasons, the 
Japanese find themselves more in sympathy with the United 
Kingdom than the United States. I think the G.A.T.T. 
problems with the Japanese are comparatively unimportant.
If this remark had any significance, it can be argued that the 
United States, at least the Japanese Desk of the State 
Department, considered the role of Britain to cope with Japan as 
a very important one.
This consideration may have been based on American perception 
of prevailing anti-American sentiment in Japan in the middle of 
1950s. The U.S. government, therefore, must have felt some 
difficulty in dealing with the Japanese. On the other hand, it 
seemed to the Americans that Anglo-Japanese relations were 
better than U.S.-Japanese relations at that time, despite the 
G.A.T.T. problems in the farmer. Thus, they may have considered 
that it would be more effective to exert indirect influence on
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the Japanese through the channels of Anglo-Japanese relations 
than to do it directly. They tried, therefore, to cooperate 
closely with the 3ritish in coping with Japan.
Added to this, it cannot be denied that the U.S. government 
intended to share the responsibility for dealing with the 
Japanese with the other important western allies. The Japanese 
government sent to Britain and France the same questionnaire on 
the territorial question as they sent to the Americans. There is 
evidence proving that the U.S. government suggested to the 
Japanese to do so. The British Ambassador to Japan, Dening 
reported that he obtained from the staff of the Foreign Ministry 
an information that, after discussion with the American 
government the Japanese seemed to have decided to send the same 
questionnaire to Britain and France.'42 The American attempt can 
be interpreted as efforts to involve the two countries in the 
Russo-Japanese territorial problem. The U.S. government 
may have tried to mate it ambiguous, who would have to take the 
responsibility, by involving them in the matter.
BRITISH VIEWS AMD REACT IOM
The British position regarding the normalization talks in London 
waa a kind of non-committal policy. From an early stage in the
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Russo-Japanese talks, the British government occasionally made it 
clear that it would not take any initiative in the negotiations, 
though it welcomed the fact that London had been accepted as the 
site for negotiations in late April. On 26 April, The Times , for 
instance, reported that, if the talks were held in London it 
would not mean that Britain was sponsoring them or that she would 
take any part in them. In addition, shortly before the opening 
of the talks, The Times reported that the British government had 
expressed its willingness for the talks to be held in London, but 
that it was taking no part in them.*3
It was in the British reply to the Japanese questionnaire on 
the territorial issues sent to the Foreign Office on 5 July that 
the British government more clearly showed their reluctance to 
get involved in the normalization talks. As the questionnaire 
sent to the United States government, it consisted of the 
following the two questions as to: 1) Whether the British
government considers that Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration 
refers to the Yalta Agreement; 2) whether the British government 
considers that the Soviet Union can singly and unilaterally 
decide the disposition of sovereignty over the Kuriles and 
Southern Sakhalin.
On 11 July, the British government sent back its reply 
containing its informal views. According to the Matsumoto 
Memoirs, the British reply was as follows:
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1) It is irrelevant to consider that Article 8 of the 
Potsdam Declaration refers to the Yalta Agreement.
2) The Soviet Union cannot singly decide that the Kuriles 
and Southern Sakhalin are Soviet territories.44
As for the contents of the British answers we have so far had 
to rely on the Matsumoto Memoirs. But thanks to the recent 
release of American and British documents, it now becomes 
possible to use official primary sources with regard to this 
issue. Relying on some British and American documents, it must 
be pointed out that Matsumoto’s accounts with regard to the 
British answers to the Japanese questionnaire were not entirely 
true.
Regarding the British answer to the first Japanese question, itjtfftS 
revealed by a British document of 1956:
Ve have no doubt that the Yalta Agreement should not be 
considered as the determination by the Allied Powers
foreshadowed in paragraph 8 of Fotsdam Declaration.
This line was substantially the same as Matsumoto's description. 
But as to the British answer to the second question, his 
description seems to be incompatible with other evidence relating 
to this issue. According to various American and British 
documents, it seems that the British government actually sent 
the Japanese an answer which was unfavourable to them.
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On 18 August, about a month after the Foreign Office had 
handed over its answers to Japan, Sir Esler Dening in Tokyo 
commented on the second British answer, saying:
.... the second opinion which seems to me to amount to 
possession being nine points of the law, hardly finds favour 
with the Japanese; indeed Hogen, the new head of the Russian 
Section in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told 
Ledward last week that the Ministry did not agree with it. 
The Russians, on the other hand, if they got to know of our 
opinion, would no doubt be very pleased with it 4S
In addition, in July 1956, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu asked the 
British government to permit him to quote the British answers in 
his negotiations with the Soviets in Moscow. Interestingly, 
Shigemitsu only desired to use the answer to the first Japanese 
question. Vith regard to his request, the Foreign Office 
commented as follows. William D. Ai len, the assistant under­
secretary in charge of the Far Eastern Department, suggested that 
the British second answer was 'of course of less help to the 
Japanese'.47 C.T. Crowe of the Far Eastern Department also said:
Question two is of course a very different matter and might 
lead us into controversy from which we shall do well to stay 
clear. But fortunately the Japanese have not asked 
permission to use the second answer, and in any event, it 
would not help their case.4®
Both of them indicated that the British second answer was 
unfavourable to the Japanese. If the British had really responded 
to the questionnaire as Matsumoto described in his memoirs, the
Japanese would have desired to quote the second answer as well. ^ 
But they did not.
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There is another clearer evidence suggesting that the British 
government in fact answered that those islands could be legally 
possessed by the Russians without any confirmation: such as a 
peace treaty. In September 1956, the American government had a 
plan to establish an international cooperation with Britain for 
supporting Japan's claims to the southern Kuriles. This plan 
could not, however, obtain a consent from the American ambassadors 
to Japan. Ambassador Allison expressed one of the reasons for 
his opposition as follows:
U.K.[sic] even suggested U.S.S.R.[sic] would acquire
preemptive rights by de /actopossession in course of time.*-”
The British answers had actually been communicated to the 
American government in the summer of 1955. Hence, Allison’s 
account must have been based on the real contents of the second 
British answer. If so, it now becomes understandable why the ^  
Japanese did not want to quote the second British answer. 
Although it is still dangerous to rely on Allison's accounts 
entirely, it seems reasonable to conclude tentatively that the 
British government sent the Japanese the answer unfavourable to 
them. In fact, the Foreign Office held the views that the
Russian claim to southern Sakhalin was incontestable and that the 
Soviet Union had acquired sovereignty de facto and probably also 
de jure over the Kuriles.so The second British answer must have 
been based on these official legal views.
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As mentioned above, tie British government adopted a sort of 
non-committal policy over the normalization issue. Hence, the 
Foreign Office transmitted the answers as unofficial 
communication and as an oral statement. In Tokyo, Dening had a 
very strong suspicion about the Japanese motivation behind their 
demand on reversion of their former islands which were occupied 
by the Russians. He considered that the Japanese were taking 
advantage of their negotiations with the U.S.S.R. 'to try to re­
open the whole question of their territorial cessions under
Article 2 of the San Francisco Treaty of Peace. ' He even 
considered that the Foreign Office should not have given any
answer to the Japanese questionnaire.®1 Why did it give a reply 
to the Japanese? London was not able to refuse to give any 
answer because the Japanese had put similar questions to the 
Americans and the French, who gave them a reply.1®2
Perhaps, the British could have sent a reply such as Katsumoto 
described in his memoirs, despite its legal position which was 
not in favour of the Japanese. At that time, as shown in the 
previous chapter, the British government was faced with the 
necessity of improving Anglo-Japanese relations. Nevertheless, 
why did it send such a reply which could irritate the Japanese 
government? Because of lack of documents, it is hardly passible 
to give a definite answer to this question. But at least the
following two points can be argued. Firstly, the British may
have recognized that keeping good relations with Russia was 
significant to their national interests. For example, the
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British took the initiative in convening the Four Power Summit at
secretary, and Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov had cooperated in 
settling the Indochina war at the Geneva Conference. Perhaps, 
the British government had no intention to worsen its relations 
with Moscow in order to keep good relations with the Japanese 
even by distorting its legal interpretation of the status of the 
Kuriles and southern Sakhalin.
Secondly, the British tended to maintain and recognize the 
status quo in the far east established after the Pacific war. 
This tendency could be seen in their attitude towards the issue o f ^  
the disposition of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin during the 
peace making with Japan in 1951. The British had asserted that 
the Yalta Secret Agreement should be implemented by the S.F.P.T.
In 1954, they also showed this tendency in the Geneva Conference. 
They seemed to settle the Indochina war by respecting the 
situations which were produced by the war and by confirming and 
freezing those situations as the status quo. The British held 
the view that local stability in Asia should and could be 
maintained by confirming the status quo by establishing some 
arrangements to maintain the status quo. In the Southeast Asia,
S.E.A.T.O. had an aspect of being a device to maintain the status ^  
quo. Perhaps, they took a similar attitude towards Soviet- 
Japanese relations. The territorial dispute between the U.S.S.R. 
and Japan was a source of local conflict in the far east. 
Settling this kind of dispute in a peaceful way was in accordance
Geneva. In 1954, Anthony Eden, the then British foreign
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with British national interests. The British government may have 
held the view that expressing its official legal interpretation 
of the disposition of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin would 
restrain -the Americans and the Japanese from taking 
unrealistically tough attitude towards the Russians.
It is not at all clear how the British answers affected the 
Japanese government. But it is not difficult to imagine that it 
must have been disappointed by the second British answer. At 
least, it must have realized that Japan could not and perhaps 
would not obtain any strong British support for her claims to 
the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin.
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CHAPTER 5 
THE LOHSTrXDJST TALKS : PHASE XX
SOVIET COECESSIOWS
Soviet Plenipotentiary Yakob Malik, who had returned to Moscow at 
the beginning of July, arrived back in London on 14 July. The 
main purpose of his journey to Moscow is assumed to have been to 
assist the preparations in the Kremlin for the Four Power Summit 
Conference in Geneva.1 But the negotiation which was held after 
his return from Moscow suggested that Malik came back to London 
with some new instructions for concessions to the Japanese. 
On 15 July, at the seventh meeting, the main items on the agenda 
were again the territorial and the repatriation issues. Malik 
and Matsumoto repeated their previous contentions and did not 
reach any agreement on those questions. It should not be 
ignored, however, that the Soviet plenipotentiary gave a subtle 
indication of Soviet preparedness to compromise on the issue of 
a military alliance, which was expressed in article 2 in the 
Soviet draft treaty. During the meeting, Malik asked whether the 
phrase 'the obligations which Japan has in the treaties with the 
United States', contained in the memorandum submitted by 
Matsumoto at the beginning of the negotiations, included 
obligations directed against some third countries.2 He may have 
tried to obtain a guarantee from Matsumoto that the U.S.-Japanese 
Security Pact was not an anti-Soviet alliance. This was the
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first step towards a concession on the Soviet side. Perhaps the 
Soviet Union needed that guarantee in order to justify her 
concession. It is not clear how Matsumoto reacted to the 
question posed by Malik. According to his memoirs, Mastumoto 
seems not to have replied to Malik's enquiry.After the meeting 
described above, Malik left London again for Geneva to attend the 
Summit Conference.
On 26 July, the eighth meeting was held after Malik had come 
back from Geneva. At this meeting, he,for the first time, clearly 
indicated Soviet willingness to remove Article 2 of their draft 
treaty, stipulating that Japan should not participate in any 
military alliance against the countries which had fought against 
her during W. V. II. Matsumoto took up this issue, saying that the 
U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty was a measure undertaken purely for 
purposes of self-defence in the form of a collective agreement, 
and that it was, therefore, not directed against any third 
power. The Soviet plenipotentiary replied that, concerning the 
second paragraph of Article 2 the Soviet Union had no intention 
to ask Japan to renounce her existing treaties with other 
powers.3 This implied that the Russians would adopt a flexible 
stance on the issue of Japan's military alliance. On the 
repatriation issue, the Soviets also make a favourable gesture: 
Malik expressed Russian readiness to repatriate 16 of the war 
criminals who had already completed their sentences and 
promised to supply the names of all the Japanese detainees as 
soon as possible. But he still held on to the view that the
22?
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detainees would be returned to Japan when diplomatic relations 
between the two countries were restored.A
It seems that these conciliatory Russian gestures were 
influenced by the Four Powers Summit Conference in Geneva. 
Indeed Soviet concessions were first noticed after Malik had 
come back from the Summit Meeting. But no direct influence could 
be seen. In fact, no items relating to the Soviet-Japanese 
negotiations were dealt with in Geneva. The Japanese Foreign 
Ministry was reported to hold that there was no reason to believe 
that the Soviet attitude towards Japan would change as a result 
of the Geneva Conference.® Rather the general atmosphere of 
'thaw* generated by the Conference created a favourable 
psychological condition and the Soviets may have taken advantage 
of this. Although those present at the Geneva Conference could 
not reach any remarkable specific agreements, it was widely felt 
that international tensions between East and Vest blocs had been 
considerably reduced. The public image of the Soviet Union in 
the western cowries improved. In this situation, Soviet
concessions could be more effective than before, because western 
public opinion tended to regard such concessions as a genuine 
indication of peaceful attitude of the Soviet Union. In the 
intensified atmosphere of 'thaw', if the Japanese refused to 
accept Soviet concessions, the Soviets could accuse western 
countries of not wanting to reduce international tension.
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At the ninth meeting on 2 August, Matsumoto for the first time 
commented on the Soviet draft. His comments covered its 
articles except Article 2 (prohibition of Japan’s miitary 
alliance), Article 5 (the territorial issue) and Article 6 (the 
straits issue). Commenting the draft, he made clear that 
despite minor differences, both parties could reach agreement 
without great difficulty on most articles, except the three 
above.
In order to settle those three difficult issues, Matsumoto 
managed to keep up the pace of the negotiations by holding 
informal meetings with Malik. According to his memoirs, he 
considered that it would be useful to change the atmosphere by 
such informal conversations and decided to invite the Soviet 
diplomatic corps to luncheon.G Matsumoto intended to take 
advantage of the 'thaw* created by the Geneva Conference and to 
pursue the talks in a more friendly spirit. On 4 August, the 
first informal meeting was held by the Japanese delegation and 
the Soviet negotiators were invited. During the meeting, Malik 
asked what was Japan's ultimate territorial demand. The Japanese 
plenipotentiary replied that the Habomais and Shikotan were 
regarded as a part of Hokkaido and that the Kuriles and 
southern Sakhalin could not be renounced because of the 
historical background of those islands. This reply may have been 
intended to imply to the Soviets that Japan's minimum territorial 
demand was to restore the Habomais and Shikotan. Matsumoto 
clearly Implied that the Japanese had a stranger desire for the
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Habomais and Shikotan by indicating that these were a part of 
Hokkaido, namely undoubtedly an integral part of Japan. Malik 
seemed to understand Matsumoto’s subtle signal. He replied that 
the Japanese had already renounced their claims to the Kuriles 
and southern Sakhalin in the S.F.P.T.r
A clear result of this informal conversation quickly came 
out. On 5 August, when Matsumoto invited the Soviet
plenipotentiary to a tea party, Malik suggested that the Soviet 
Union would make concessions on the territorial issue and the 
treatment of Japan's right to participate in a military alliance. 
Despite its length, Malik's statement as recorded by Matsumoto is 
worth quoting here.
On 5 August, while we were having tea, Mr. Malik all of a 
sudden and vaguely said, 'If all of the other questions are 
settled, we could hand over the small Kuriles (= Russian 
terminology indicating the Habomais and Shikotan) in 
accordance with the Japanese request. As regards the clause 
prohibiting a military alliance, if the U.S.-Japanese 
Security Pact is genuinely defensive as you previously 
mentioned, we can withdraw this clause when the other 
problems are settled. ' At first I did not believe what I 
had heard, but was very pleased, assuming that Malik 
had received some new instructions from his seniors such as 
Bulganin and Khrushchev... . and that he would propose some 
new lines.8CMy brackets]
Matsumoto's assumption was correct. At the next formal 
meeting, the Soviets confirmed the informal statement of the 
concessions. On 9 August, Malik officially announced Soviet 
willingness to return the Habomais and Shikotan and to drop the 
clause prohibiting Japan's participation in any military
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alliance. According to Matsumoto's memoirs, which is the only 
available account of the Soviet proposal, Malik related:
With regard to Article 2(2)(=prohibition of a military 
alliance), Plenipotentiary Matsumoto gave assurances that 
none of the treaties which Japan had concluded including the 
U.S.-Japanese Security Pact are directed against any specific 
third countries. Given this assurance by the Japanese 
government, we consider that this problem will be settled 
when both sides reach agreements on the other questions.
As for the small Kuriles, I would like to state as follows: 
On the Soviet part, we would think that both parties of the 
negotiations can work out an agreement on this problem, by 
not separating the issue of the Habomais and Shikotan from 
the other territorial problems, but linking up with them, 
and together with a satisfactory settlement of the problems 
above.9CMy bracket]
Malik suggested that the return of the Habomais and Shikotan 
should be dependent on whether a peace treaty was concluded or 
not and on how the disposal of the rest of the territories in 
question was dealt with. This implied that the Russian
government would concede those islands on condition that Japan 
should recognize Soviet sovereignty over the Kuriles and southern 
Sakhalin. Though there is no evidence Malik's suggestion 
exposing Soviet intentions, the fact that the Russian draft
treaty clearly indicated their desire to secure Japan's 
recognition of Soviet possession of the Kuriles and Sakhalin 
supported the above speculation. In addition, Malik also seemed 
to link the reversion of the small Kuriles with a settlement of 
the straits question. The Soviet Union had not yet shown their 
willingness to make a concession on this issue. The Soviets must 
have held this as a bargaining card.
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It is now necessary to examine why the Soviet Union made the 
territorial concession over the Habomais and Shikotan and why 
they did so at this time. First of all, the Soviets must have 
come to realize that the territorial issue was so crucial for 
the Japanese that they would not agree to restore diplomatic 
relations without gaining some reasonable territorial concessions 
from the U.S.S.R. Because the Soviet Union strongly desired 
immediate normalization, they intended to settle this key problem 
as soon as possible by indicating their willingness to hand some 
of the territories back to the Japanese. In fact, through 
examining the past attitudes of the Japanese government and the 
Japanese negotiators, the Soviets could easily have formed an 
impression that Japan's minimum territorial demand was for the 
restoration of the Habomais and Shikotan. It must be remembered 
that since the conclusion of the S.F.P.T., the Japanese 
government had been continuously asserting that the return of the 
Habomais and Shikotan was a condition prerequisite to 
negotiating the restoration of diplomatic relations with the 
Soviet Union. Moreover, Hatoyama had stated before the start 
of the London talks that the Japanese government could request 
those islands to be returned.
The Soviets also may have taken into account the fact that 
Dulles had stated at the San Francisco Peace Conference that 
the U.S. recognized that the Habomais and Shikotan were Japanese 
territories and the fact that he did not make any reference to 
other territories at the conference. It can be assumed that the
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Soviets knew that the Japanese would not be able to obtain 
positive support from the U.S. for their demand for more than the 
Habomais and Shikotan. Matsumoto's implication on 5 August was 
the most important indication
that the minimum territorial concession required by the Japanese 
was the restitution of the Habomais and Shikotan.
The Soviet assessment of U.S.-Japanese relations must have 
been another important factor. It must be assumed that the 
Soviets had been regarding U.S. pressure on the Japanese as the 
main obstacle to the normalization. In order to achieve the 
normalization as soon as possible and also for more general 
political purposes, the Soviets aimed to weaken U.S.-Japanese 
ties. The concession over the Habomais and Shikotan was made 
partly for this purpose. Generally, U.S.-Japanese relations 
seemed less smooth than before, in particular than they had been 
in the Yoshida era. For example, the Japanese government's 
plan to send Shlgemitsu to Vashington had been refused by Dulles 
in early April. Under these circumstances, a Soviet Indication 
of the reversion of those islands could Induce the Japanese 
public to pro-Soviet feelings or anti-American sentiments. 
Moreover, the Japanese government had a plan to despatch the 
foreign minister to Vashington again and the visit was scheduled 
for late August.
After the Geneva Conference, the atmosphere of 'peaceful 
coexistence' spread and the image of Russia was considerably
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improved around the world. If the Japanese were to be prevented 
from repairing their relations with the United States, this was 
the best timing for the Soviets to propose the return of the 
Habomais and Shikotan. Any suggestion for the reversion of those 
islands could be expected to provoke in Japanese public opinion 
arguments for an immediate normalization. The public pressure on 
the Japanese goverment for immediate normalization would place 
it in a dilemma between public opinion and the U.S., which would 
be particularly awkward shortly before the coming U.S.-Japanese 
negotiations which was scheduled to be held at the end of August. 
This being the case, it can be argued that the Soviets attempted 
to utilize the disturbing effect of the territorial concessions 
on U.S.-Japanese relations.
JAPAMESE REACTIOES TO SOVIET COECESSIOMS: REV TERRITORIAL
PROPOSALS
Given the suggestion by Malik on 5 August, the Japanese 
plenipotentiary immediately sent a top-secret telegram to Tokyo 
to convey the information about the Soviet concessions. He also 
attached to this telegram, his view that the government should 
carefully examine the Soviet concessions by taking into account 
possible reactions from the U.S., Britain, and France, and also 
possible repercussions on Japanese public opinion.10
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The plenipotentiary seemed to intend to settle the 
normalization talks in line with the new developments created by 
the Soviet concessions. Because of limited access to primary 
documents bn the Japanese side, it is still hardly possible to 
clarify what Matsumoto had in mind at that time. But members of 
the embassy staff in London revealed that, given the sign of 
Soviet concessions, Matsumoto formulated the following plan as 
the next step in the negotiations. First of all, Japan should 
receive back the Habomais and Shikotan. Secondly, with regard to 
the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin, Matsumoto had in mind these 
two options: to make no reference to the territorial question in
a peace treaty with the Russians, and to stipulate in the peace 
treaty that the Soviet Union should take note that Japan had 
renounced her sovereignty over southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles 
in the San Francisco Peace Treaty.11 Although the Soviets argued 
that Japan should recognize their possession of the Kuriles and 
southern Sakhalin in order to regain the Habomais and Shikotan, 
Matsumoto tried to avoid giving any positive recognition of that 
kind. Nevertheless, it seems that he intended to reach an 
agreement with the Russians that the Soviet Union should return 
the Habomais and Shikotan in exchange for Japan's Implicit 
recognition, whether temporary or not, of the present situation 
of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin.
The telegram conveying the information about the Soviet 
concessions presumably arrived at Tokyo on 10 August. Tokyo's 
reaction was complicated. It has been suggested by some
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preceding works, however, that the Ministry and Shigemitsu kept 
the information about the Soviet concessions secret from Hatoyama 
and almost unilaterally made a decision on how to react 
officially to the Soviet offers.12 Given the tendency of the 
prime minister to mention in public even crucial and confidential 
information in public, it is natural to assume that the foreign 
minister attempted not to circulate this information to Hatoyama. 
Also, the Foreign Ministry must have been concerned about the 
possibility that Hatoyama would utilize this information in order 
to strengthen his policy of an immediate normalization. At any 
rate, the prime minister seems to have been effectively excluded 
from a most important aspect of policy making on the Soviet 
territorial concession.13
It seems to have been 18 August that the final decision was 
made in the Foreign Ministry on official Japanese reaction to the 
Soviet concessions.1"* The decision was embodied in an additional 
instruction which was sent to London on 27 August. Its contents 
were as follows:
(1) The delegates should secure a Soviet commitment to 
complete repatriation of the Japanese detainees prior to 
signing a peace treaty.
(2) As regards the territorial question;
<a> The delegates ought to make the utmost effort to 
obtain the restoration of the Habomais and Shikotan 
unconditionally and should attempt to regain Kunashiri 
and Etorofu.
(b) The delegates should contrive to reach an agreement 
to convene an international conference to discuss the 
territorial disposal of the northern Kuriles and 
southern Sakhalin.'16
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This new formulation of territorial demands was an indication 
of Japan's willingness to make a minor concession in response to 
the Soviet concessions. The previous Japanese position
expressed in Instruction No. 16 had been that all the Kuriles and
should be returned to Japan 
southern SakhalinA. This position had been based on Japan's
contention that in S.F.P.T. Japan had never renounced those
islands in her relations with the Soviet Union. But the new
instruction implied that the Japanese government accepted the
fact that those islands had been actually renounced in the
S.F.P.T. even in relations with the Soviet Union. In other
words, the Japanese accepted the theoretical possibility that the
Soviet possession of those islands would be confirmed at an
international conference. The new demand for Kunashiri and
Etorofu should also be understood in this context. The Japanese
government reduced its maximum demand to one for the two
islands. In this sense, the territorial demands in this
instruction contained an element of a minor concession.
Why did the Foreign Ministry not decide to retreat to the 
position which Matsumoto seemed to have in mind in London? Vhy 
did the Foreign Ministry and Shigemitsu not intend to work out an 
agreement by positively accepting the Soviet concessions? In 
order to answer this question, it is necessary to examine 
several significant factors which influenced the policy-making 
of the Foreign Ministry. At least the following three factors 
should be dealt with: first, their considerations of negotiating 
tactics; second, their concern about the U.S.-Japanese relations;
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and finally, the inner struggles of Japanese politics, bath 
within and outside the cabinet.
The evidence of concessions stated by Malik was ambiguous To 
be sure, Malik enunciated the Soviet intention to concede the 
Habomais and Shikotan. But this Soviet territorial concession 
could be understood to be part of a package deal. Malik stated 
that the question of the Habomais and Shikotan should not be 
separated from the other territorial questions. This may have 
been understood by the Japanese to imply that the return of the 
Habomais and Shikotan would depend on Japan's recognition of the 
Soviet possession of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. Malik 
also indicated that the territorial question should be settled in 
connexion with some other issue. These characteristics of the 
Soviet concessions were received with caution by the Japanese. 
In fact, the Foreign Ministry seemed to be concerned about the 
price Japan would havetapay for the Soviet concessions and to 
expect the Soviets to demand Japan's concession on the straits 
issue.16
The Foreign Ministry was not at all prepared to accept this 
package deal, at least, at that moment. Its main focus of
attention was the impact of Soviet concessions on U.S.-Japanese 
relations. The Japanese government could not make any concession 
over the straits question. If they agreed with the Soviet 
position on this issue, it would seriously damage the U.S.- 
Japanese defence system, the breakdown of which would be fatal
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for Japanese security. If the Japanese had to recognize the 
Soviet possession of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin, it would 
be regarded by the American Congress as damaging U. S. national 
interest and as a sign of Japan's lack of loyalty to the United 
States. Moreover, the American government had occasionally 
suggested that Japan should not make too many concessions to the 
Soviets. In particular, U.S.-Japanese negotiations were to be 
convened from 29 August. Shigemitsu, who was particularly 
sensitive to Japanese-American relations, may have thought that 
Japan should not do anything which could damage this 
relationship. If she decided to settle the Russo-Japanese 
normalization by accepting only the reversion of the Habomais and 
Shikotan and by making concessions over the issues of disposition 
of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin and the straits issue, 
U.S.-Japanese negotiations might be put in jeopardy. In order to 
improve the relationship and to show Japan's loyalty to her most 
important western ally, Shgemitsu may have considered that she 
had to take firm stance against the Soviet concessions.
It is still not clear whether the Americans exerted any direct 
influence on policy-making with regard to this issue. Among the 
newly declassified American documents, we cannot find any 
evidence proving the existence of direct American involvement. 
But it is still impossible to deny the possibility that the U.S. 
government indirectly imposed some influence on the foreign 
minister. In fact, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu met American 
Ambassador Allison on 17 A u g u s t , t h e  day before the Foreign
Ml
CHAPTER 5
Ministry made the decision on the additional instruction which 
was to be sent to London on 27 August. Though Shigemitsu wrote 
nothing specific with regard to the meeting, Allison may have 
given Shigemitsu a confidential suggestion.
Domestic political situation also restrained Shigemitsu from 
being satisfied with Soviet concessions over the Habomais and 
Shikotan. Moves towards the conservative merger developed 
further in the summer of 1955. Despite internal oppositions both 
among the Liberals and the Democrats, the party leaders agreed
by the middle of June to proceed with preparations for the
union. On 30 June, four party leaders, two of whom from each 
party, agreed to endeavour to work out a policy agreement in 
order to establish a common policy for the merger. 1Q
Nevertheless, one of the questions obstructing progress towards 
the union was how to deal with the Soviet-Japanese
normalization. The Liberals were not keen on early 
normalization and opposed conceding Kunashlrl and Etorofu to 
Russia. Particularly, the Yoshlda faction was a spearhead of 
that opposition and linked its disagreement to the territorial 
concession and to an immediate settlement, with its firmly 
unfavourable attitude towards the conservative m e r g e r . U n d e r  
these circumstances, the kind of policy towards normalization 
that was adopted by the Democrat government affected future 
development of the unification of the conservatives to a great 
extent. The government had to indicate its willingness to adopt
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a policy which did not differ very much from that of the 
Liberals.
Shigemitsu seems to have been well aware of this domestic
necessity. Interestingly, on 15 September, he said to Ashida 
Hitoshi, who was well known for being a leading figure in the 
anti-normalization faction, 'Let's do our best to achieve the 
merger of the conservatives through cordinating our foreign 
policy.120 Shigemitsu considered that the conservatives
should consolidate themselves in order to fight against the 
progressives or the left wing. Though this conversation was held 
almost a month after the making of the new instruction, it still 
cannot be denied that Shigemitsu partly attempted to manoeuvre 
the normalization policy in order to facilitate, or at least not 
to obstruct, the conservative merger based on his concept of 
domestic politics: the conservatives versus the progressives.
Hot only Shigemitsu, but also Hatoyama's closest political
allies took a similar stance. On 11 August Kono Ichiro, the then 
agriculture and forestry minister, was sent to London by the 
prime minister to inform Matsumoto of domestic political
developments. But the fact was that the purpose of Kono's
visit was to restrain Matsumoto. According to Matsumoto, first 
of all, he said to Kono that the negotiations had been going 
very well, and were promising because the Soviets had begun to 
imply that they intended to return the Habomais and Shikotan. In 
reply to this, Kono suggested that Matsumoto should not proceed
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with the talks too fast before his visit to the U.S.21 Given 
these political developments in Japan and the coming U.S.- 
Japanese negotiations, even Kono could not insist on immediate 
normalization. Hatoyama may have been very dissatisfied with 
this development. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that he 
strongly opposed the new instruction prepared by the Foreign 
Ministry. When Tani Masayuki told Hatoyama of the new 
instructions on 28 August, the prime minister was easily 
persuaded by Tani to accept it.22
It must be remembered that the Foreign Ministry had constructed 
its long-term three-stage negotiating strategy in respect to the 
territorial question. The Foreign Ministry staff and the foreign 
minister seemed to try to follow this negotiating strategy. 
According to this strategy, Japan should at the first stage of 
negotiations request the restoration of the Kuriles, southern 
Sakhalin, the Habomais, and Shikotan, and if the Soviet Union 
made concessions, Japan should at the second stage request the 
southern Kuriles, the Habomais, and Shikotan. At the final 
stage, she would only insist on the reversion of the Habomais and 
Shikotan. After the Soviets had indicated their willingness to 
concede the Habomais and Shikotan, Shigemitsu may have recognized 
that it was the time that they should move on to the second stage 
of their strategy. In this sense, they basically followed their 
long-term strategy which had been drawn up shortly before the 
beginning of the negotiations in June.
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The legal basis of the new Japanese demands should be examined. 
According to Matsumoto's Memoirs, it is clear that the Japanese 
government held the view that Kunashiri and Etorofu were not part 
of the Kuriles but Japan's inalienable territories because they 
had never belonged to any foreign countries before. In support 
of this, the government referred to the St. Petersburg Treaty 
concluded in 1875 by which Japan had obtained 18 islands located 
north of Etorofu and approved Russian possession of Sakhalin. 
The government also argued that the fact that the agreement had 
been called 'the Treaty of the Kuriles-Sakhalin Exchange' was 
unequivocal evidence to prove that only those 18 islands could 
be defined as 'the Kuriles'.23 Hence, Kunashiri and Etorofu had 
been excluded from 'the Kuriles' in 1875. We must remember 
that this argument is the same that used by Yoshida in his 
address at the San Francisco Peace Conference. Despite his 
assertion, the Yoshida government had decided not to insist on 
Japan's claims to Kunashiri and Etorofu. According to Yoshida, 
the reason for dropping the claims had been that otherwise the 
ratification of the S.F.P.T. would have been delayed.2* Now that 
the Japanese had become an independent country since the 
ratification of the peace treaty, the Foreign Ministry picked up 
again this argument earlier abandoned in 1951, in order to 
support its new territorial demands in 1955.25
As mentioned above, Hatoyama did not show any strong opposition 
to the new instructions prepared by the Foreign Ministry. He 
must, however, have become very concerned over the possibility
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that the normalization talks would reach deadlock and break up 
because of the firm line adopted by the Foreign Ministry. He
seems to have attempted to prepare for that possibility.
According to Hatoyama's memoirs, the prime minister and his
advisers, Sugihara and Matsumoto, had already, before the start
of the London talks, constructed a policy whereby the Japanese 
government could reach some understanding with Russia by shelving 
the territorial question. The prime minister may have considered 
that he would have had to establish a political foundation on 
which his policy would be able to obtain public and political 
support. For this purpose, he met Suzuki Mosaburo, the chairman 
of the Leftist Socialist Party, at Karuizawa at the end of August 
or the beginning of September. Hatoyama recalled as follows. :
  I frankly said, ' Ve must settle the Soviet-Japanese
talks by putting aside questions and must achieve early 
repatriation of Japanese detainees and Japan's entry into 
the U.M. I strongly intend to follow this line. I desire 
that the Socialist Party would indirectly assist me.' After 
all, the negotiations have been settled as Suzuki and I 
expected. I still think that I met Suzuki at a very good 
time.526
Hatoyama intended to cultivate all the support he could get, 
even if it came from an opposition leader rather than his own 
party.
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DEADLOCK
After the Soviets had proposed territorial concessions, it took 
more than two weeks for Matsumoto to obtain the new instructions 
from Tokyo. The negotiations were carried on during this period. 
Faced with this delayed reaction from Tokyo, Matsumoto decided to 
play for time by discussing a Japanese draft of the peace treaty 
which had been prepared on 16 June. On 16 August, at the 
eleventh meeting, the Japanese plenipotentiary brought the 
Japanese draft to the negotiating table. The draft consisted of 
twelve articles. Significant points are covered in the following 
paragraphs.
Article 1 provided for the termination of the state of war. 
But there was no mention about the restoration of diplomatic 
relations. The second article provided that the Soviet Union 
should unconditionally support Japan's application for membership 
of the United Nations. The third article was the provision that 
both Japan and the Soviet Union should observe Article 2 of the 
U.N. Charter which obliged the member states of the United 
Nations to settle international disputes in peaceful ways. In 
addition, the Japanese draft also affirmed the right
of both contracting parties to take measures of self-defence in 
accordance with U.N Charter Article 51. This article was 
undoubtedly intended to counter the Soviet assertion that Japan 
should not participate in any military alliances with any former
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belligerent countries against Japan. The fourth article was an 
article of non-interference in each other's domestic affairs.
The territorial issue was dealt with in Article 5, which 
consisted of two sub-clauses. The first one stipulated that 
complete Japanese sovereignty should be resumed over 'those 
Japanese territories which were occupied by the Soviet Union as 
the result of the war.' The second one provided that Soviet 
troops and officials in those territories should return to their 
own country no later than 90 days thereafter. This article did 
not specifically define which territories were included in 
'those Japanese territories which were occupied by the Soviet 
Union'. Indeed the article implied that it meant the Kuriles and 
southern Sakhalin, including the Habomais and Shikotan. But 
this article may have been designed to make the Japanese position 
rather ambiguous in order to play for time, until new instructions 
came from Tokyo.
Article 6 and 7 respectively provided for Soviet renunciation 
of reparations and Japan's renunciation of claims to anything 
resulting from the war. The eighth article stipulated the 
continuation of the effects of the agreements and treaties 
between both parties concluded before the war. Article 9 and 10 
respectively were agreements to begin fishery and trade 
negotiations. The eleventh article obliged both parties to rely 
on the International Court of Justice in order to settle the 
problems which might possibly be raised over interpretation of
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this peace treaty. The final clause referred to the necessity of 
this treaty being ratified.
Matusmoto explained the purpose and meaning of each article and 
commented on differences between the Soviet draft and the 
Japanese draft. Then, he refuted Soviet assertions on the 
straits issue.27 He made it clear that the fact that the draft 
Included no mention about the straits issue meant that Japan 
objected to the Soviet position on the issue.2®
At the twelfth meeting on 23 August Maiit made several 
enquiries, the most significant question being over the 
territorial clause of the Japanese draft (Article 5). Malik 
objected to this clause, saying that 'he could see no reason for 
the insertion of this article' and that 'The disposal of these 
territories had been settled by Potsdam and the San Francisco 
Treaty and there was nothing to discuss.'2® Then, he went on 
that Article 5 could not serve as a basis for negotiations.30
The new instructions from Tokyo arrived at London on 27 August. 
Three days later, at the thirteenth meeting, Matsumoto presented 
the new territorial proposals to the Soviets, He offered the 
following article, which was prepared in accordance with the 
instruction from Tokyo, as an amended version of Article 5:
1. Among the Japanese territories that the Soviet Union 
occupied as a result of the war,
(a) Japan's sovereignty over Etorofu, Kunashiri, 
Shikotan, and the Habomais should be restored on the day 
when the treaty comes into effect.
CHAPTER 5
(b) With respect to southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles, 
the disposition should be defined through negotiations 
between Japan and the ex-Allied Powers including the 
Soviet Union.31
2. Troops and governmental officials of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics presently stationed in the territories 
described in the preceding paragraph shall depart as soon as 
possible following the effective date of this treaty and in 
any case no later than within 90 days thereafter.'32
This revised article irritated Malik. He retorted that he 
could not help but conclude that Japan was not at all sincere 
about the normalization talks. Matsumoto replied that the 
Japanese were as eager to achieve the normalization as before, 
and then proposed to have a frank discussion on the territorial 
issue. During the discussion, Malik made clear the following 
three points.
1) The Soviet Union agreed on unconditional reversion of and 
withdrawal of troops from the Habomais and Shikotan.
2) The Soviet Union could not accept the Japanese proposal 
in 1 (b) for holding an international conference to discuss 
territorial problems.
3> The Soviet Union would never give up the idea that 
Kunashiri and Etorofu were definitely a part of the Kuriles 
and that they were undoubtedly Soviet territories.33
The first point was not very clear, and, in particular, what 
'unconditional reversion* meant was very ambiguous. The second 
and third points were predictable ones. The Russians had all 
along asserted that the disposal of the Kuriles and southern 
Sakhalin had already been determined by the Yalta Agreement, the 
Potsdam Declaration, and other occupation orders. Accepting any
2S0
CHAPTER 5
international forum to discuss the territorial issue over those 
islands would immediately have meant renunciation of that 
assertion. At the same time, it was obvious to the Russians that 
the international forum would be used by the western allies for 
propaganda purposes. As for Kunashiri and Etorofu, the Russians 
could not concede them mainly because of their military 
significance. According to some American military information, 
the Habomais and Shikotan were relatively less significant 
because the Soviets only installed early warning system on these 
islands. But Kunashiri and Etorofu had not only early warning 
systems but also air bases for fighters.3*
The straits issue also seems to have been closely connected 
with the issue of Kunashiri and Etorofu. In terms of Soviet
naval strategy, securing access to the Pacific Ocean must have 
been still of enormous significance. It can be argued that the 
strategic significance in possessing Kunashiri and Etorofu was 
great, because, if they could secure those islands without
suffering from U.S.-Japanese blockade of the three straits, La
|the Soviet Union I could obtain safe outlets to the Pacific Ocean 
Perousa(Soya), Sangarski (Tsugaru), and Tsushima straits^. This
being the case, the Soviets could never concede Kuanshiri and
Etorofu, and it seems that the Soviets may have use the straits
issue as a bargaining card in order to make the Japanese give up
these islands.
The Soviet attitude became tougher an 6 September at the 
fourteenth meeting. This meeting exclusively dealt with the
s s y
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territorial issue.3S Malik developed Soviet comments on the new 
Japanese proposal. First, he firmly asserted that the new 
Japanese demands were totally unacceptable and that the islands 
to which the Japanese referred as their inalienable territories 
'incontestably' belonged to the U.S.S.R. Then, he related that 
the Habomais and Shikotan would be returned to Japan on condition 
that those islands should be neither fortified nor militarized 
after their reversion. In this, the Soviets were adding a new 
condition to their previous position of the 'unconditional 
return* of the Habomais and Shikotan. There is no doubt that the 
Russians were attempting to counteract against the new Japanese 
demands.
It is an interesting fact that the Soviets seemed to regard 
the new Japanese territorial proposals not as an indication of 
concession on the Japanese part, but as a demand additional to 
the previous one. It must be remembered that on 4 August when 
asked by Malik what the minimum territorial demand of the 
Japanese was, Matsumoto implicitily indicated that it was the 
reversion of the Habomais and Shikotan. But the new Japanese 
instructions contained a request for Kunashiri and Etorofu. 
This request actually signified that the Japanese government 
retreated from its previous tougher line. But it is not 
difficult to imagine that Malik felt betrayed. The Japanese 
demands may have appeared to become all the tougher because of 
the demand for Kunashiri and Etorofu. In this sense, discrepancy
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in intentions between Matsumoto and Tokyo partly provoked the 
hostile Soviet reaction to the new Japanese territorial request.
Moreover, what the Soviet Union desired to get from the 
Japanese was their recognition of Soviet sovereignty over the 
Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. The Japanese did not, however, 
show any intention to satisfy the Soviet desire. Row the Soviets 
decided to' adopt a harder line towards the new Japanese proposals 
in order to derive more concessions from the Japanese. That 
was why Malik attached the condition of non-fortification and 
non-militarization to the return of the Habomais and Shikotan.
The Soviet adoption of a tougher stance may have been related 
to the on-going U.S.-Japanese negotiations in Washington at the 
end of August. The Russains seemed to seek to prevent the 
negotiations from resulting in strengthening U.S.-Japanese ties. 
Sir William Hayter, the then British ambassador to Moscow, 
reported to the Foreign Office that the Soviet press reacted to 
Shigemitsu's visit to the U.S. without delay, saying that the 
Japanese were at the moment faced with a choice of independence 
from or dependence on, the United States.36 For instance, Pravda 
of 3 September issued an article by E. Zhukov entitled 'What can 
promote the strengthening of Japan's international positions?* 
The article argued that the Japanese were still under American 
occupation and emphasised the necessity to Improve Sino-Japanese 
relations.37
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On 30 August, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru made a 
statement before the Rational Press Club in Washington that the 
Japanese government did not intend to establish a friendly 
relationship with the Soviet Union.36 This statement certainly 
irritated the Russians. On 13 September, Malik accused the 
Japanese government of a lack of sincerity, pointing to the 
Shigemitsu statement. In these situations, the Russians tried to 
show that Japan's attempt to strengthen U.S.-Japanese ties would 
affect the Russo-Japanese negotiations unfavourably for Japanese 
interests. It must be noted that it was a week after the 
statement of Shigemitsu at the National Press Club that Malik 
withdrew the proposal for 'unconditional' concession of the 
Habomais and Shikotan and made a proposal for conditional 
concession at the fourteenth meeting on 6 September.
At the fifteeth meeting on 13 September, the Soviets still 
refused immediate repatriation before normalization, and there 
was no sign that the Soviets would make any more concessions. It 
became clear that the negotiations had reached a deadlock. At 
the end of meeting, Malik announced that he had to leave London 
for New York, in order to attend disarmament negotiations at the 
U.N. General Assembly and that he did not know how long he would 
be away. Malik was also supposed to attend the Foreign 
Minister's Conference in Geneva which was due to be held in the 
end of October.33 On 15 September, the Japanese government 
instructed Matsumoto to assure the Soviets that the government
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agreed to resume the negotiations as soon as the Russians were 
ready. The government also ordered him to return to Tokyo.*0
Although the negotiations had reached deadlock, both parties 
recognized that this suspension of the negotiations was only an 
interlude. Even during this, the Soviets tried to strengthen 
their position by exerting indirect influence on the Japanese 
government and public opinion. On 21 September, Khrushchev had 
an interview with a Japanese parliamentary delegation visiting 
Moscow. There Khrushchev attempted to impress them with Soviet 
sincerity. He stated that the most crucial
goal of the London talks was to end the state of war and that the 
Soviets intended to offer a package deal whereby the repatriation 
issue, fishing problems and the termination of the state of war 
would be settled altogether. Then he accused the Japanese 
government of intentionally delaying normalization without being 
satisfied with Soviet territorial and other concessions.
The most important fact is that Khrushchev hinted that the
Soviet Union was determined to refuse the new Japanese
tViflit
territorial demand. He asserted^the territorial problem had 
already been solved with the Yalta Agreement, but that the Soviet 
government was willing to concede the Habomais and Shikotan, as 
an indication of Soviet good-will to the Japanese and because of 
the closeness of those islands to Japanese territory.*1
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This statement seemed to be intended to influence the future 
course of negotiations. Khrushchev aimed to tell the Japanese 
that the Soviet Union could wait. Faced with the new Japanese 
territorial proposals, the Soviet negotiators must have 
recognised that the Japanese had been employing delaying tactics. 
One of the closest observers of the Soviet attitudes, British 
Ambassador Sir William Hayter in Moscow reported:
The object of this interview seems to have been to make 
clear the Soviet government's position with respect to the 
negotiations in London and by a mixture of blandishments and 
of the same truculent 'we can wait' attitude as they adopted 
during the talks with Dr. Ademnauer to induce a change of 
attitude in the Japanese government.*2
This tactical alteration on the Soviet part presented the 
Japanese with a serious problem. Khrushchev's '“we can wait" 
attitude' immediately meant that the Japanese detainees would 
not be able to return to their own country in the very near 
future. Prime Minister Hatoyama frequently mentioned that the 
government was making many efforts to achieve the repatriation 
before the coming winter. The groups of relatives of the 
detainees had a certain political influence, in particular, on 
public opinion. In these circumstances, the government was under 
considerable pressure to arrange for early normalization. In
other words, the Soviet Union adopted a policy whereby she could 
use those detainees as hostages.
The Khrushchev statement may also have been designed to 
Influence Japanese public opinion, in particularly over the
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territorial question. In fact, the Japanese public had not been 
clearly informed of the reality of the Soviet concessions on the 
Habomais and Shikotan. Professor Vada suggests that the Foreign 
Ministry manipulation of information through a series of 
intentional leakages succeeded in leaving the public with an 
impression that the Soviet Union had made her territorial 
concessions because the Japanese had made a concession over 
their territorial d e m a n d s . T h i s  manipulation of information 
gave the Japanese public the wrong impression that the Soviet 
Union had continuously been tough and harsh in the negotiations. 
The Foreign Ministry had to hide the information that the Soviet 
Union took the initiative in making the territorial concessions 
because it did not want public opinion to be seduced by any 
indication of Soviet 'good-will1. Through his statement to
the Japanese parliamentarians, Khrushchev exposed the reality to 
the Japanese public by emphasizing that, though the Russians had 
already made generous concessions, the Japanese were unwilling 
to make any concessions in return. The Khrushchev statement, in 
this sense, was partly made to counter the Foreign Ministry's 
manipulation of Japan's public opinion.
JAP AM'S QUEST FOR IMTERMA TIOFAL SUPPORT FOR HER TERRITORIAL 
CLAIMS
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After the London talks had reached stalemate over territorial 
matters, the Japanese government was faced with the task of re­
examining strategy for future negotiations. In order to 
strengthen its negotiating position, the Japanese government had 
to make sure that Japanese territorial claims would be supported 
by its western allies. Then, it decided to send them another 
questionnaires over the territorial issue. On 12 October, 
Shigemitsu handed Ambassador Allison a note explaining the 
Japanese government's claim to Kunashiri and Etorofu as not being 
a part of the Kuriles.44 The Japanese questionnaire must have 
been handed to Allison at that time.
The Japanese government asked the U.S. government the 
following two questions:
(1) Whether the leaders of the Allied Powers participating 
in the Yalta Conference recognized the following historical 
facts when they adopted the word 'the Kuriles' in the Yalta 
Agreement: that Kunashiri and Etorofu which are directly 
adjacent to Hokkaido were inalienable Japanese territories 
where Japanese people had lived in large numbers, that 
those islands had never belonged to any foreign countries, 
and that in the St. Petersburg Treaty of 1875 'the Kuriles' 
were defined as only 18 islands located northward from 
Etorofu.
(2) Whether the United States government who played the main 
role in drafting the S.F.P.T. understood that 'the Kuriles* 
in Article 2 (c) did not include Kunashiri and Etorofu.45
The Department of State's reply to this questionnaire was 
conveyed to Tani by Allison on 21 October45 and the contents 
were as follows:
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(1) No definition was made at the Yalta Conference with 
regard to the range of the Kuriles. No discussion was held 
about the history of the Kuriles. The Yalta Agreement was 
neither intended to transfer territorial sovereignty nor 
valid for that purpose. There are no any records at all 
indicating that the signatories to the Yalta Agreement had 
the intention to transfer the sovereign right to 
territories which were not Russian territories.
(2) Neither the S.F.P.T. nor the records of the San 
Francisco Peace Conference contain any definition of the 
range of the Kuriles. Our view is that any conflict with 
regard to 'the Kuriles' can be submitted to the 
International Court of Justice in accordance with Article 22 
of the Peace Treaty.
(3) The disposition of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin 
should be subject to 'a future international decision', 
since any conflicts over the territories categorised under 
those geographic names are to be settled by the I.C.J. It 
is impossible at this moment to expect such a settlement to 
be materialized.
As an alternative, the U.S. government has no objection to 
Japan's efforts to persuade the Russians to return Kunashiri 
and Etorofu on the ground that those islands are not part of 
the Kuriles. Considering the Soviet position which has so 
far been announced, however, it is unlikely that the 
Japanese demands would be successful. In case of failure , 
it is advisable for the Japanese government to assert that 
the questions about 'the Kuriles' should be submitted to the 
I.C.J. by both the interested countries. As another 
alternative, the U.S. government has no objection to the 
Japanese and the Soviets reaching agreement that the Soviet 
Union would return those two islands to Japan in exchange 
for the latter's confirmation in a Soviet-Japanese peace 
treaty that she renounced the Kuriles and southern 
Sakhalin.*T
What did the U. S. government intend to convey in this reply? 
Among newly declassified documents, we can unfortunately 
discover no direct evidence with regard to this question. But, 
it is still possible to give an impression of American 
background attitudes by relying on a related document. The 
Department of State prepared a position paper on 22 August for
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the forthcoming U.S.-Japanese negotiations between Dulles and 
Shigemitsu, which dealt with the territorial questions between 
the U.S.S.R. and Japan. According to the position paper, the 
Department predicted that the Japanese would make the following 
requests at the negotiating table. First, the position paper 
expected them to ask for U.S. endorsement for their claims to the 
Habomais and Shikotan and request the American government to 
proclaim its view that the Soviet Union had never obtained 
sovereignty over the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. Secondly, 
the Japanese were expected to request the Americans to support 
their territorial right to the southern Kuriles. Finally, the 
paper assumed that the Japanese would propose to convene an 
international conference in order to determine the territorial 
status of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. A significant 
fact is that the Department feared that Japan would also argue 
for the return of another territory she had lost as a result of 
the war, that is, Formosa.'4®
Based on those predictions, the position paper expressed the 
general satisfaction of the U.S. government with Japan's 
cautious handling of the Russo-Japanese rapprochement. As a 
whole, however, the response by the Department was unfavourable 
to the Japanese territorial demands. Although it agreed to 
endorse Japan's claims to the Habomais and Shikotan and to deny 
Soviet sovereignty over the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin, it 
concluded that any public announcement of those official 
attitudes was undesirable. It seems that the State Department
26 0
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still followed the basic policy of avoiding direct involvement. 
As for Kunashiri and Etorofu, it admitted that because of the 
lack of information and investigation the U.S. could not take any 
clear position. Finally, the paper also expressed her reluctance 
to support the plan to convene an international conference for 
determining the status of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin, by 
reasoning that, without Soviet concurrence, any attempt to revise 
the previous agreements on Japan’s territorial issues would be 
meaningless and that such an attempt would be interpreted by the 
other signatories to the S.F.P.T. as evidence of Japan's ambition 
for overall alteration of the peace treaty.4®
The views contained in this policy paper were reflected in the 
American reply to Japan's questionnaire. Regarding the issue
of Kunashiri and Etorofu, the attitude expressed in the reply was 
very ambiguous, considering that this issue was the most 
significant one for the Japanese. The U.S. government did not 
give any clear endorsement to the Japanese claims to those 
islands. Instead, it only mentioned that neither the Yalta 
Agreement nor the S.F.P.T. had defined the range of 'the 
Kuriles'. Moreover, it recommended the Japanese to submit the 
disputes over definition of the Kuriles to the International 
Court of Justice.
These statements suggested that the American government did not 
positively endorse the Japanese claims to the southern Kuriles. 
To be sure, it made clear that it had no abjection to Japan's
-26/
CHAPTER 5
attempt to ask the Soviet Union for the return of those
islands. Nonetheless, it stated in its answer that it was very
unlikely that Japan's demand would be accepted by the Russians.
The negative attitude towards the idea of convening an
international conference to determine the status of the Kuriles
1
and southern Sakhalin was Cleary expressed in the reply to the 
Japanese government. The U.S. government never used the word 
'international conference* in it. Rather, the third paragraph 
of the reply suggests that 'a future international decision' 
means a decision by the I.C.J. Thus, the American reply 
contained answers which were substantially unfavourable to the 
Japanese.
Behind this American reply, we can see American reluctance to 
get deeply involved in the Soviet-Japanese negotiations. The 
basic U.S. position embodied in it was that Soviet-Japanese 
normalization was fundamentally a bilateral issue between the two 
countries. In fact, the U.S. government still tried not to exert 
any direct or explicit influence on the Japanese in the summer of 
1955. During Shigemitsu's visit to Washington at the end of 
August, Shigemitsu-Dulles conversations over the normalization 
talks clearly indicated this American tendency.
It was on 29 August when the Soviet-Japanese normalization 
talks were discussed. To start with, the Japanese foreign
minister read a statement describing the general posture of 
Japan's foreign policy under the Hatoyama administration.
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Because the American sources contain no documents read by 
Shigemitsu, what he explained to the American representatives is 
not clear. Since one of the main purposes of this U. S.-Japanese 
meeting for the Japanese was to sweep away misunderstandings 
caused by recent developments in Soviet-Japanese relations, it is 
relevant to assume that Shigemitsu certainly referred to 
Japanese policy towards Russia.eo
Dulles replied to Shigemitsu's rather lengthy statement. 
First, the U.S. secretary of state began his comments with 
a lecture about recent developments in international affairs. 
Dulles emphasized that the recent cordial tendencies of Soviet 
foreign policy was a product of Soviet weakness and that 
Communist China was still a great threat towards the free world. 
He said that 'he believed some progress was being made but that 
progress requires the free nations to stand firm and solid and to 
make it clear to the Communist nations that they must change 
their policies.'®1 Clearly he attempted to persuade the Japanese 
to continue to carry out tough Soviet policy. Then, Dulles moved 
on to specific issues.
As for the Russo-Japanese normalization talks, the U.S. 
Secretary of State made clear the following four points. First, 
he pointed out that, according to Article 25 of the S.F.P.T., the 
Soviet Union could not obtain any territorial benefits. 
Secondly, he indicated his satisfaction by saying that 'Japan is 
handling the talks very well.' But, thirdly, he warned that
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•very little could be achieved by making concessions to the 
Soviets on small points.' Finally, he argued that he thought the 
Soviets were making serious efforts for normalization.62 Dulles' 
message to the Japanese was clear. Dulles implied with his 
comments that the Japanese government should carry on tough 
negotiations and that only through this policy would Japan 
be able to obtain Soviet concessions, since the Soviets were 
eager for normalization.
Interestingly, Dulles did not refer to specific territorial 
questions, namely the Soviet return of the Habomais and Shikotan. 
But his mention of Article 25 of the S.F.P.T. and his warning 
against the Japanese making concessions to the Soviet Union 
amounted to implicit pressure on the Japanese government. From 
Shigemitsu's point of view, the suggestions made by Dulles 
confirmed that his policy was adequate. In this sense, this 
U.S.-Japanese meeting influenced the Japanese to continue to 
adopt a tough line on the normalization talks. But it must be 
emphasized that the American government did not exert any direct 
influence on Japan's decision making over her new territorial 
demands. Rather Shigemitsu fixed Japan's stance almost entirely 
by himself and took the decision to Washington in order to 
reassure the Americans that Japan could handle relations with 
her communist neighbours without disappointing her most important 
western ally.
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Thus, the American government tried not to put explicit 
pressure on the Japanese. Moreover, it tried not to make any 
direct reference to the territorial question. Perhaps, the 
Americans were really satisfied with Shigemitsu's handling of the 
normalization issue and, therefore, they did not have to 
influence the Japanese in an explicit manner. But, more 
importantly, the U.S. government also tended to adopt non­
committal policy to avoid getting deeply involved with Soviet- 
Japanese negotiations. The American reply to the Japanese 
questionnaire reflected this American tendency.
BRITISH ATTITUDES
Although, according to Matsumoto's memoirs, the Japanese 
government also sent the same questionnaire to the British 
Foreign Office as it sent to the U.S. government, there is no 
evidence among the British documents that the British government 
was asked the questions and answered them. It seems, however, 
reasonable to rely on the description given in the Matsumoto 
memoirs, because there is also no evidence that Matsumoto’s 
description is false.
Matsumoto stated that the British government replied that on 
the territorial issue it held several views different from 
those of the United States government. The British reply
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particularly emphasized that they differed in their 
interpretation of the allies' intentions behind the Yalta 
Agreement.S3 In fact, since the making of the S.F.P.T., the 
British government had been claiming that the Agreement should 
be observed as it stipulated. Unlike the Americans, the
British in their reply indicated that they kept their view 
recognizing the validity of the Yalta Agreement in 1955.
Thus, the British reply was also ambiguous one, and did not at 
all make clear their position with regard to the specific Japanese 
territorial demand. Although the Americans seemed to attempt to 
make their position rather non-committal, the British made even 
greater efforts to be non-committal. The ambiguity of the 
British reply clearly embodied their intentions to avoid any 
possibility that they would be blamed by the Japanese for a 
possible failure of the negotiations. In Tokyo, Dening pointed S  
out that the Japanese governmemnt might attempt to blame the
British in event of the failure of the s e t t l e m e n t . T h e  Foreign 
Office staff also agreed that the British government should not 
be involved in the negotiations.ss They knew from long 
diplomatic experience the danger of becoming the scapegoat for 
failed negotiations.
More importantly, the British tried at that period to restrain 
the Americans from getting deeply involved in and overreacting 
to the Russo-Japanese negotiations. It seems that after 
Shigemitsu's visit to Washington the British government started
166
CHAPTER 5
to become alarmed by the possibility that U.S.-Japanese relations 
would deteriorate because of the U.S. imposing pressure on the 
Japanese over the normalization talks. The Foreign Office knew 
very much about the development of the Shigemitsu-Dulles 
conversations from Robert H. Scott, the minister in the British 
Embassy in Washington. Scott informed London of the following 
four points. Firstly, he observed that, faced with the Soviet 
territorial concessions over the Habomais and Shikotan, the 
Americans now felt that 'the Russians may mean business.' In 
other words, the Americans became alarmed by the possibility that 
the normalization talks would be settled in line with the Soviet 
concessions.
Secondly, Scott suggested that the main fear of the U. S. 
government was that the establishment of Soviet Embassy in Japan 
as a result of Russo-Japanese normalization would encourage the 
Communist movement in Japan. Thirdly, Scott observed that,
Dulles tried to lead the Japanese to take a more 
stiffen attitudes towards the Russians. He knew that Dulles had 
told Shigemitsu that 'There was no sense in making too many 
concessions to the Russians.' Scott conceived that Dulles 
imposed an implied threat on the Japanese. Finally, Scott also 
understood that the Americans 'are clearly uncertain whether they 
really want a Russo-Japanese Peace Treaty, at least on the lines 
of anything which could be obtained today!se To sum up, 
according to Scott's description, the U.S. government could not 
decide its final attitudes towards the Soviet-Japanese
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normalization talks, though they tended to fear some possible 
result of normalization.
Besides these analyses, Scott conveyed the information that the 
United State wanted British comment on the Soviet-Japanese 
normalization.®^ In response to this, the Foreign Office 
started to prepare for the official comment to be offered to the 
Americans. Row the Foreign Office started to estimate a balance 
of merits and demerits in the case of a Russo-Japanese settlement 
on the Soviet terms: concessions of the Habomais and Shikotan to
Japan in exchange for Japan's recognition of Soviet possession of 
the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. Based on this examination, 
the Foreign Office also examined whether American attitudes 
towards Japan over this normalization issue were reasonable.
In the Foreign Office, the dominant view was that the Soviet- 
Japanese normalization on the Soviet terms would be beneficial to 
the Japanese. For example, V.D. Allen listed merits and demerits 
of normalization. Firstly, the main merits of normalization 
could be found in that it would satisfy the Japanese aspiration 
towards greater national independence and provide them with more 
opportunity to expand trade with Russia and the P.R.C. 
According to Allen, the demerits were seen in that it would 
Increase the risk that the Russians had more influence on Japan 
through encouraging the J.C.P.'s activities and increase the 
pressure for a Japanese agreement with China, which would 
embarass the U.S. He argued that the balance sheet seemed to /
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be even balanced, but lie concluded that, considering that Japan 
would be able to regain the Habomais and Shikotan, she would 
obtain a great advantage from normalizing her relations with the 
Soviet Union.ee
There was another significant opinion which also supported the 
positive value of Soviet-Japanese normalization. C.T. Crowe, the 
head of the Far Eastern Department, dicussed that a Russo- 
Japanese agreement or peace treaty would contribute to 'general 
stability' in the far east, and that, therefore, advantages of a 
Russo-Japanese settlement would overweigh its disadvantages. &3Sir 
Esler Dening in Tokyo also suggested that the Ameircan fear for 
the expansion of Soviet espionage activities as a result of 
normalization was a clear example of their oversensitivity and 
overreaction.eo
Moreover, Dening feared that any American attempts to impede 
the Japanese efforts at normalization with Russia would cause 
U.S.-Japanese relations to deteriorate. His anxiety was based on 
his understanding of Japanese nationalism at that period. He 
concluded that 'I regard a deterioration in Japanese-American 
relations as much more dangerous for all of us than what I 
conceive to be only a limited improvement in Russo-Japanese 
relations.'S1 It must be remembered that the Foreign Office had 
in 1954 adopted a principle of policy towards Japan that Britain 
should contribute to keep smooth relationship between Japan and
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the U.S. Dening's argument seems to have still reflected the 
policy principle.
Now it seems that the Foreign Office decided to suggest to the 
Americans that they should not get deeply involved in Soviet- 
Japanese negotiations. The official position which the Foreign 
Office derived from those analyses mentioned above was 
transmitted to Sir Roger Makins, the British ambassador to the 
U.S. in the middle of October. The Foreign Office intended to 
covey British official views to the State Department, as 
follows: Referring to the territorial question, the disposition 
of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin could not be confirmed by 
Japan's recognition of Soviet sovereignty over those territories 
because she had already renounced them in the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty. Although it admitted that such Japanese recognition 
would operate in favour of the Soviet Union, it clearly implied 
that Japan's recognition would not significantly affect the 
disposition of those i s l a n d s . I n  other words, the British 
Foreign Office took the view that the Japanese could reach a 
settlement with Russia on the latter*s term without greatly 
harming the present legal disposition of those islands.
Then, this legal argument about the territorial question was 
followed by the suggestion that the U.S. government tended to 
overestimate the increase of direct Soviet influence in Japan 
which the establishment of the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo would 
cause. This argument was also a warning against American
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attempts to impede the Russo-Japanese settlement. Added to
that, the telegram to Makins argued that a possible increase in 
communist influence after normalization would be limited 'so 
long as a government of conservative complexion is in power in 
Japan.' The Foreign Office also contended that trade between the 
U.S.S.R. and Japan would not develop to such an extent that 
Japan would depend on the communist economy. Here again, the 
Foreign Office clearly critisized the oversensitiveness of 
American reactions to Soviet-Japanese normalization.63
The telegram moved, then, to the argument supporting the 
restoration of Soviet-Japanese diplomatic relations. First, it 
said that 'a treaty with the Soviet Union might remove from 
Japanese minds the irritation which they feel at being so closely 
dependent on the United States.' It also suggested that a Russo- 
Japanese settlement would lead to a more realistic understanding 
in Japan of the value of Soviet friendship. Secondly, such 
concessions as the Japanese were likely to obtain from the 
settlement, namely the small territorial gains, the Habomais and 
Shikotan, the repatriation of Japanese prisoners of war and 
increased self-respect, would overwhelm 'any consequent increase 
of Soviet influence in Japan.' Thus, the Foreign Office argued 
that normalization was beneficial to Japan and that, hence, it 
should not be obstructed. Finally, the telegram concluded: 'The 
decisive argument appears to be that any attempt to prevent Japan 
from restoring normal and correct diplomatic relations with so
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powerful a neighbour as the Soviet Union risks doing permanent 
harm to Japan's relations with the Vest.'6-4
What kind of influence the British attitude exerted on the 
American handling of the normalization talks is not yet clear. 
The Foreign Office telegram to Makins arrived at Washington 
before the U.S. State Department sent its reply to the Japanese 
questions to Tokyo. But there is no evidence that the Americans 
had received the information from the Foreign Office before they 
had prepared their reply to the Japanese. Hence, it is uncertain 
that the U.S. Department of State even referred to the British 
arguments before it issued a reply to the Japanese 
questionnaire. Even if the British position was taken into 
consideration, the State Department may have regarded the British 
view as basically similar to its position in that it also 
tried to avoid any commitment which would let the Japanese blame 
the U.S. government for failure in the normalization. It can be, 
therefore, argued that the British warning against the U.S. 
being deeply involved in the Soviet-Japanese negotiations did 
not affect the U.S. reply to the Japanese questionnaire very 
much.
CONSERVATIVE MERGES AMD IT S  EFFECT OM JAPAN'S NORMAL IZA TIOM 
POLICY
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The movement for conservative merger which had been intensified 
during the summer proceeded to its last stage in October and 
November. Since early summer, the Liberal and the Democratic 
parties had been making joint efforts to search for common policy 
formulas on which a new conservative party could base its 
platform. It seems that their efforts to coordinate foreign 
policy, in particular over the normalization, did not take any 
concrete shape until the results of the London talks became 
clear. But, since the London talks had reached stalemate in the 
middle of September, both parties must have been trying to set 
their own policy on normalization.
By the middle of October, the two parties managed to establish 
within each party a firm consensus on the merger. Now, each 
started to assert its own policy formula in order to gain the 
initiative in the policy-making of the new party. It was on 22 
October that the Liberals launched a campaign over foreign 
policy. The chairman of the Research Council for Foreign Affairs
(Gaiko Chosa Kai) of the Liberal Party issued a statement
describing party lines with regard to the normalization. This 
statement reflected the general tendencies in the Liberal Party 
and came out against immediate normalization with Russia. It 
argued that the government must try to regain Etorofu and
Kunashiri as well as the Habomais and Shikotan unconditionally 
and that the disposition of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin 
should be dealt with at an international conference.
Furthermore, the Japanese detainees should be repatriated prior
2U
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to the conclusion of a peace treaty with the Russians.66 This 
statement followed virtually the same lines as the present 
government's policy, which had been mainly led by the Foreign 
Ministry and Shigemitsu. Three days later, Ogata Taketora, the 
president of the Liberal Party, also emphasized that his party 
would endeavour to bring Hatoyama's normalization policy closer 
to the Liberals' one.®6 Hatoyama quickly countered these 
movements by the Liberals. On 25 October, the prime minister 
revealed his personal view that it would be very difficult to 
regain Kunashiri and Etorofu. The next day, Matsumoto Shunichi 
visited Ogata and reported on the progress of the London talks. 
He was reported to have explained to the president of the Liberal 
Party that the Russians would not return Kunashiri and Etorofu.67,
Despite these policy differences over the issue of 
normalization, both parties made steady progress towards 
merger. During late October and early November, most attention 
was devoted to the question about who would to take the 
presidency of the new party. Many of the Democrats asserted that 
Hatoyama should be unconditionally appointed as the president. 
On the other hand, the Liberals insisted that the president 
should be elected by the members of the new party. This 
confrontation was, however, the last obstacle to amalgamation, 
though it was most crucial. A compromise was devised early in 
November. The leaders of both parties who were the driving force 
of the merger, such as Miki Bukichi and Ono Banboku, proposed to 
shelve the presidency issue and to appoint Hatoyama and Ogata as
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commissioners for the time being in place of the president. This 
proposal was accepted by both parties and the last but the most 
controversial problem was successfully solved. On 15 November, 
the Liberal-Democratic Party was born.
In parallel with these general developments, efforts had been 
made to construct policy formulas as the basis for a new platform 
of the merged party. The platform was announced at the 
inauguration assembly on 15 November. The part of the platform 
dealing with foreign policy, declared that the Liberal-Democratic 
Party aimed to restore diplomatic relations between Japan and 
countries with which she had not yet concluded a peace treaty 
with Japan.6® In respect to normalization with the Soviet 
Union, however, more specific policy formulas had been 
established by the bipartisan policy planning committee for the 
conservative merger before the establishment of the L.D.P. The 
formulas, named as 'Rational Coordination of Russo-Japanese 
Negotiations'(Nisso-Kosho No Goriteki Chosei), were announced on 
12 November and contained the following specific policy:
With regard to the negotiations now proceeding between 
Japan and the U.S.S.R., we aim at conclusion of a peace 
treaty and hold on to the following positions, based on 
public support:
(1) The Japanese detainees should be immediately and 
completely repatriated.
(2) As for the territorial questions,
(a) The Habomais, Shikotan, and the southern Kuriles 
should be unconditionally restored.
(b) The disposition of the rest of the territories 
in question should be internationally determined by 
interested countries.
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(3) Ve should eliminate such Russian demands as to limit 
the sovereignty of our country and restrict our 
existing policy.
(4) Mutual non-interference over domestic affairs.
(5) Besides inducing the Russians to endorse Japan's 
entry into the United Nations, various issues emerging 
as a result of the normalization should be settled.
0
Of enormous importance was the impact of this annujicement as 
the policy of the united conservative party. This policy was 
perceived by the Japanese public as a fixed governmental policy. 
Given the strength of party influence on the government, the 
party policy had to be followed by the government, particularly 
until the L.D.P. consolidated itself. In this sense, negotiators 
and the government came to be restrained by the party policy
i
formulas. In fact, the party policy formula on normalization had 
elements which were virtually identical with government 
instructions on new territorial proposals sent to London at the 
end of August. Moreover, this policy formula clearly embodied 
the position of the Liberals which had already been announced on 
22 October. Hatoyama and Matsumoto were placed under 
overwhelming pressure from this party policy to continue to hold 
on to a firm line in the negotiations. Matsumoto regretfully 
recalled:
As a result of the conservative merger, the Soviet-Japanese 
negotiations were remarkably obstructed. Even at the time 
of the Democrats' one party cabinet, Foreign Minister 
Shigemitsu tried to restrain the immediate normalization 
advocated by the prime minister and tended to interfere 
with my negotiations in London. At that time, the Liberals 
were in cooperation with this disturbance from outside. The 
influence of the cautious diplomacy carried out by the 
foriegn minister was not, therefore, very strong. Also I
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could ignore obstruction by the Liberals because that could 
be treated as a matter outside our party., Given the united party 
between the Liberals and the Democrats, however, the 
influence of anti-normalization group, based on the 
combination between Foreign Minister Shigemitsu and former- 
members of the Liberal Party, was undeniablly 
strengthened. 70
As Matsumoto explains in this passage, the Japanese policy for 
normalization lost flexibility under the influence of the 
conservative merger. Foreign Minister Shigemitsu intended to 
carry out the three-stage negotiating tactics over the 
territorial issue which had been formulated in May. In order to 
implement these tactics, the Japanese government should have kept 
the flexibility, because in response to Soviet attitude, the 
Japanese had to make reasonable concessions. Moreover, the 
Japanese government must have known that it could not obtain 
substantially positive supports from its major western allies for 
its territorial claims late in October. It should have been the 
time for the Japanese to reconsider their negotiating policy in 
order to make it a more flexible and milder one. But the 
conservative merger deprived the government's policy of this 
necessary flexibility and of the opportunity for the re­
examination of policy.
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C H A P T E R  
T H E  S E C O N D  L O N D O N  T A T K S
Sz
M O S C O W  F I S H E R Y  N E G O T I A T I O N S  
Soviet-Japanese normalization talks were resumed in London in
n
January 1956. The absence of the Soviet plenipotentiary from 
Britain had been the main reason for the suspension of the first 
London talks. The Japanese government which was now based on the 
united conservative party, the L.D.P., had composed its policy 
for the resumption of the.normalization talks on the basis of the 
new party policy, the 'Rational Coordination of the Soviet- 
Japanese Normalization Talks'. Hence, when it received the 
information that Malik would return from New York to London on 21 
December after the end of the General Assembly of the United 
Nations, the Japanese proposed on 24 December to resume the 
negotiations. The Soviets accepted the proposal and both sides 
agreed to start the second London talks on 17 January.1
THE SECOND LONDON TALKS: January-M arch 1956.
Despite the agreement reached on the normalization policy for the 
new party in November, there was still some divergence in the
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Japanese government. Ashida Hitoshi, the chairman of the
Research Council for Foreign Affairs, attempted to restrain the 
early-normalization faction led by Hatoyama, by strongly 
requesting it to adhere to the already agreed negotiating 
position policy, namely to take a firm stance on the territorial 
issues.2 Foreign Minister Shigemitsu also made it clear that the 
government would continue to follow this firm policy and went as 
far as he stated that the Japanese people would not support the 
government even if it would achieve the normalization by shelving 
the territorial questions in order to settle the repatriation 
issue as soon as possible.3
There had not been a salient development in the Soviet position 
since the Khrushchev statement in September 1955. It could be 
easily expected that the Soviet Union would not easily change her 
previous rigid position on the territorial issues. Despite the 
lack of clear development of the Soviet position, the Russian 
government seemed to rely on encouraging various domestic 
circles in Japan to lead their government to an early settlement. 
On 31 December, the leaders of the National Congress for Soviet- 
Japanese and Sino-Japanese Normalization sent a telegram to 
Molotov. A reply from the Soviet foreign minister arrived on 3 
January, which praised the activities of the National Congress.A 
This kind of attempt was to take a more intensive form later. 
Faced with the rigid attitudes of the Japanese government, the 
Russians may have realized that it might be effective to exert 
indirect influence on the Japanese negotiation through non-
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governmental organizations which were in favour of an early 
settlement.
The negotiations were reopened on 17 January. Both sides 
basically tended to indicate conciliatory attitudes towards most 
of the issues, except the following: the territorial issues, the 
repatriation of the Japanese detainees, and the straits issue. 
It was clear that both plenipotentiaries attempted to get 
agreement on the issues which seemed to be relatively easy to 
settle. At the second meeting on 24 January, Malik commented on 
the Japanese draft treaty which had been submitted on 16 August 
in the previous year and expressed the Soviet willingness to 
agree on the preamble, Article 1, and Article 3 of the draft. In 
particular the Soviet acceptance of Article 3 was of great 
significance. The article included the sub-clause permitting 
Japan to join collective defence systems based on U.N. Charter 
Article 51. By accepting this article, the Russians meant that 
they confirmed the concession which had been stated by Malik on 9 
August. In fact, at the negotiating table on 24 January, Malik 
clearly maintained that the Soviet Union would drop Article 2 (2) 
of the Soviet draft treaty banning Japan from entering into any 
military alliances which were against any of the countries which 
had fought against Japan during W I I . S
The items in the Japanese draft remaining to be settled were 
the draft provisions concerning 1) unconditional Soviet support 
for Japan's admission to the United Nations (Article 2 of the
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Japanese draft); 2) non-interference in domestic affairs (Article 
4); 3) the territorial issues (Article 5); 4) commercial
agreements (Article 9); 5) fishing problems (Article 10); and
6) the settlement of disputes which might be raised over 
interpretation of the peace treaty (Article 11). Among these, 
the issue of Japan's entry into the U.N. was not discussed during 
the second‘London talks. The issue of the commercial agreement, 
the fishing questions, and the resolution covering the settlement 
of the conflict were dealt with thoroughly during the 
negotiations, and both parties reached agreement on them.
As results of the second London talks, both sides had reached 
agreements over the following nine items: Preamble; termination
of the state of war; Observation of the U.N. Charter; Soviet 
waiver of war claims and reparations, 5) Japanese waiver of war 
claims; treatment of pre-war treaties; settlement of disputes; 
fishing, and final clause. These accords were to a great extent 
a result of compromises on the Soviet side. This is clearly 
indicated by the fact that the Soviet representatives based their 
negotiations on the Japanese draft prepared in the previous year. 
But on what were from Japan's point of view more vital issues, 
such as the issue of unconditional Soviet support for Japan's 
admission to the United Rations, the territorial issues, the 
repatriation question, and the straits issue, the Russian had 
shown conciliatory attitudes during the negotiations.
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As for the repatriation issue, the negotiations did not get 
anywhere. Bascially, neither party showed any alteration in its 
position. The Japanese government again requested immediate 
repatriation of the Japanese detainees. But the Soviets 
persistently insisted that they would be returned after
concluding the peace treaty. At the beginning of March, a story 
came out about resistance movements by the Japanese detained 
at the Khabarovsk internees camp. In December 1955, the Japanese 
detainees had started refusing forced labour in order to protest 
against Soviet maltreatment. This story was reported to the
Foreign Ministry by some detainees repatriated on 6 March.® 
Matsumoto took up this incident at the meeting with Malik on 20 
March in order to press the Soviets for immediate repatriation. 
His attempt was, however, in vain.
The issue of Soviet support for Japan's admission to the U.K. 
does not seeme) to have been dealt with during the second London 
talks. At least, there is no evidence proving the existence of 
any conversations between the Japanese and Soviet
plenipotentiaries over this question. Perhaps the Russians may 
have regarded this as one of their most useful bargaining cards 
and to be kept until the later stage of the negotiations.
Among those issues which were not settled, the territorial 
questions were, needless to say, the most intractable one. The 
Soviet attitudes which had become firmer and more rigid after 
Japan's submission of new territorial demand in August 1955. The
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Japanese government Had also decided prior to the second London 
talks to continue to take a firm position over the territoiral 
issues by adhering to its previous policy. Under the 
circumstances, both negotiators could not discover during the 
second London talks an easy way out of this deadlock. On 7 
February, Malik indicated that the Soviet Union had not altered 
her previous position, holding that the questions over the 
Kuriles and southern Sakhalin had been already settled and 
therefore should not be part of the agenda for these 
negotiations. 'But', Malik went on, 'the Soviet Union are ready 
to discuss the transfer of the small Kuriles (=the Habomais and 
Shikotan).'7CMy brackets]In reply, Matsumoto also repeated the 
previous Japanese position and emphasized that the new Japanese 
demand submitted at the end of August was the ultimate demand of 
the Japanese government.®
A slight change was shown at the next meeting on 10 February. 
The Soviets brought to the negotiating table a new draft of 
a territorial clause.
1. The Soviet Union shall transfer the small Kuriles (the 
Habomais and Shikotan) to Japan, in response to her desire 
and in view of her interests. The procedure for the 
transfer of those islands mentioned above should be defined 
in a protocol attached to this treaty.
2. The border between the Soviet Union and Japan should 
be the line drawn in the middle between Kunashirsky Strait 
and Izmena Strait, as an attached map.13
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A remarkable point in this new draft provision is that the 
Russians for the first time proposed the return of the Habomais 
and Shikotan in the form of a written document. But obviously 
they did not intend to make any further concessions. Malik 
added that, although the small Kuriles had definitely been 
Soviet territories and the Soviet Union was not obliged to hand 
them aver to any foreign country, she would transfer those 
islands as an indication of her . . generosity and that ^
the new draft provision was her final position.
This Soviet attitude was predictable from Matsumoto's point of 
view. He already knew that the Soviet concession of the 
Habomais and Shikotan had been their final offer.10 Shackled by 
a policy formula moulded at the time of the conservative merger, 
however, Matsumoto could not accept the Soviet assertion. Faced 
with this dilemma, he decided to propose a compromise plan which 
he had brought with him from Tokyo to London at this time, which 
is now called the 'Matsumoto plan' (Matsumoto Shian). At an 
informal meeting with Malik, the Japanese plenipotentiary 
indicated his plan:
Japanese sovereignty should be restored over Kunashiri and 
Etorofu on condition that both islands should be entrusted 
to a peaceful administration for former residents and that 
Soviet military ships and commercial fleets should be 
allowed to navigate freely through the straits adjacent to 
those islands.11CMy italics]
Matsumoto asked Malik to take into account this proposal. Then, 
Malik promised to convey the Matsumoto plan to the Soviet
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government when He went back to Moscow for attendance to tke 20tk 
Party Congress.
It is still unclear wkat Matsumoto intended to do with tke new 
plan. Tkere are no primary sources available to us wkick 
describe kis intentions and tke meaning of kis plan. In fact, 
tke Matsumoto plan is too ambiguous to grasp its definite 
meaning. In particular, tke specific meaning of tke pkrase, 'a 
peaceful administration for former residents't was not at all 
clear. Taking into account tke ratker strange use of 'peaceful' 
in tke pkrase, it seems tkat tke pkrase implies in a very subtle 
way non-militarization or non-fort i f i cat i on of Kunashiri and 
Etorofu. Matsumoto probably realized that one of the main 
reasons far tke Soviet refusal to return those islands was a 
strategic one. Because these islands were significant Soviet 
bases, they could become a dangerous strategic outpost and 
threat against tke Soviet Union if they were transferred to the 
Japanese. In fact, Malik stated tkat tke Russians had in the 
past suffered from strategic disadvantages because of Japanese 
possession of tke Kunashiri and Etorofu and that the Soviets 
kad, therefore no intention to return them to Japan.1 * Hence, 
Matsumoto attempted to wipe away tkis kind of Soviet anxiety. At 
tke same time, Matsumoto seemed to be aware tkat tkere was a 
close linkage between the territorial issues and tke straits 
issues. Tke straits between Hokkaido and Kunashiri and between 
Kunashifi and Etorofu kad a very crucial strategic significance 
for tke Soviet far eastern fleet. Matsumoto may have assumed
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that, if the Soviet Union could retain their right to free 
navigation through those straits they would not have any reason 
to refuse to return those islands. A promise of non­
militarization must have been intended to be a double guarantee 
for free and innocent passage by the Soviet vessels.
On 12 February, Malik left London for Moscow in order to attend 
the Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 
It was 5 March when he came back to London. Although the 20th 
Party Congress was a landmark on the way to de-Stalinization of 
the Soviet Union and although many analysts consider that the 
Party Congress constituted a watershed for alteration of Soviet 
foreign policy, this was not the case in terms of her foreign 
policy towards Japan. On the day following Malik's return, both 
the plenipotentiaries had an informal meeting. Malik reported 
the results of his consultation with senior leaders in the 
Kremlin over the Matsumoto Plan and told Matsumoto apologetically 
that he could not obtain any favourable reaction.13
After all, no constructive agreements were reached over the 
territorial issue during the second London talks. After the 
Soviet refusal of the Matsumoto Plan, the Japanese delegation did 
not make any new move on this issue but insisted on the reversion 
of the southern Kuriles. On 12 March, Matsumoto sent Shigemitsu a 
personal telegram to suggest that the government should modify 
its negotiation policy.141 But Tokyo instructed him three days 
later that he should come back in case he found there would be no
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breakthrough over the territorial question.13 There were several 
significant facts which seemed to cause this rigidity on the part 
of the government in Tokyo. On 18 March Dulles visited Japan and 
had a meeting with Japanese governmental leaders, including 
Hatoyama, Shigemitsu and Kikl Buklchi. Although he only stayed 
in Tokyo for 26 hours, he gave them a long lecture emphasizing 
the threat of communism and communist countries.1® It must have
seemed impossible for the Japanese government to change its firm 
stance to milder one. Moreover, since the date for the election 
for the Upper House was approaching the Hatoyama administration 
did not want to cause any serious contention in the cabinet 
altering its previous negotiating policy.17
The Soviets also stood on the same stance they had taken on 10 
February. On 20 March at the last meeting of the second London 
talks, Malik suggested that, if the Japanese government accepted 
the Soviet position, it would be made considerably easier to 
settle the straits issue. Now the Soviet delegation for the
first time exposed so clearly their intention to link the
territorial issues with the straits question. In fact, the
Soviets did not intend to press hard on the straits issue. 
According to Winthrop V. Aldrich, the American ambassador to 
Britain, a Soviet spokesman told him that the statement for the 
promotion of free passage rights in the high seas made by 
Molotov at the Four Powers Foreign Ministers' Conference in 
Geneva, inevitably affected the Russo-Japanese normalization 
talks in London.10 Nevertheless, it was also clear that the
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Soviets would not make any more concessions on the territorial 
question. For the Soviets now tried to make Japan give up their 
territorial claims, by threatening to raise the straits issue 
unless she renounced the claims.19
FISHERY WEGOTIATIOJfS IW  MDSCOV: A p ril-M ay, 1956
Immediately after the London talks had reached a stalemate at 
the end of March, the Soviet Union took a step to drag the 
Japanese back to the negotiating table. On 21 March, the Soviet
Council of Ministers announced that the Soviet Union would impose
a restriction on fishing activities by the Japanese in the north 
western Pacific area adjacent to Soviet territorial waters. 
Firstly, the Japanese fishermen had to obtain a special 
permission from the Soviet government to catch salmons in a
restricted area. Secondly, the Soviets intended to
impose a quota on the Japanese catch of salmons in the area.20
The Japanese government was now faced with the necessity to 
open negotiations over this fishery dispute as soon as possible. 
Japanese fishing interests seemed to have certain influence on 
the Hatoyama administration. Kdno Ichiro, the minister of 
agriculture and forestry, had a specially strong connexion with 
them. He had once been the president of the leading fishing
company, Nichiro Gyogyo, in 1947. It was commonly acknowledged
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that one of the important power bases of Kona was the fishing 
industry group.21 At the beginning of April, Hiratsuka Tsunejird, 
the chairman of Dal Nihon Suisankai (the Association of Japanese 
Fishing Industries), visited Kdno and pressured him to start 
fishing negotiations as soon as possible.22 Moreover, Hiratsuka 
and his association established a special committee for Soviet- 
Japanese fishing negotiations and made a resolution that the 
government should commence the negotiations over this issue as 
soon as possible, even through the Soviet Mission in Tokyo.23 
Under these pressures, the Hatoyama government proposed to start 
fishing negotiations and this proposal was conveyed to Malik 
through Mishi Haruhiko, the Japanese ambassador to Britain.
Political pressure for the opening of fishing negotiations with 
the Soviet Union was, though less directly, imposed on the 
government by other domestic organizations. Organizations for 
relatives of the Japanese detainees, which had been totally 
disappointed by the failure of the second London talks, became 
more desperate in demanding resumption of normalization talks. 
The exposure of the story of the protest movements at the 
Khabarovsk detainees camp must have intensified their feelings 
of desperation. On 30 March, members of those organizations 
decided to begin a sit-in as a demonstration of their strong 
desire for the early settlement of the normalization talks.2A 
Furthermore, the Upper House of the Diet on the same day passed 
a resolution in favour of the repatriation of detainees?5 In 
these circumstances, the government could not refuse to begin the
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fishery negotiations, refusal of which could have irritate those 
organizations.
The Japanese government requested the Soviets to answer its 
proposal for fishery talks on 3 April. On 9 April, Malik 
replied that the Soviet government agreed to start the 
negotiations. The Soviet reply consisted of the following three 
points. Firstly, the Soviets had no objection to negotiating the 
fishery question separately from the normalization talks. 
Secondly, as to the venue for the negotiations, Moscow or Tokyo 
was preferable. Finally, the Russians stated that they were 
ready to discuss the various problems laid between the two 
countries when the fishery negotiations reached an agreement.2S0n 
10 April, the Japanese government instructed Ambassador Nishi to 
reply to Malik that the government wished to convene fishery 
negotiations in Moscow as soon as possible.27
One of the central question in Tokyo was who should be 
appointed as the representative. Despite his reluctance, Kona
i
Ichiro, the then minister of agriculture and forestry was 
appointed on 11 April. Shigemitsu and the Foreign Ministry, 
however, had asserted that Ambassador Hishi should be 
appointed.2® The reason was that Shigemitsu wanted to prevent 
Kono from taking advantage of this oppotunity to promote an early 
normalization through some understanding with the Soviet leaders 
in Moscow. Unlike Kono, Mishi was known for being a hard liner 
on the normalization issue. He had persistently argued that, if
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Japan continued to insist on her terrtiorial demand over 
Kunashiri and Etorofu, the Soviet Union would finally return 
them.23 Moreover, it is assumed that Hishi had played an 
important role the previous year in decision-making on the 
revised territorial demand of 27 August.30 It is natural that 
Shigemitsu considered Hishi to be a suitable choice. The decision 
by the government and the leading party, however, turned out to 
be opposite to Shigemitsu's ideas.
The group within the government and the L.D.P. opposed to 
normalization attempted to restrain Kono from negotiating more 
than the fishery issue, before he left for Moscow. On 12 April, 
the executive board of the L.D.P. warned Kono against dealing 
with any issues other than the fishery questions.31 On the other 
hand, Hatoyama rather encouraged Kono to do something to promote 
an early normalization in Moscow. On 14 April, he suggested: 'a 
settlement of the fishery problem would certainly contribute to 
promotion of peaceful relations between Japan and the Soviet 
Union.132 Hatoyama could not help voicing his desire to break 
through the stalemate of normalization talks through Kdno's 
mission.
On 27 April, Kono arrived at Moscow. The negotiations began 
the next day. Taking into consideration the fact that the 
beginning of the fishing season was at the latest the end of May, 
Kono intended to settle the fishery issue by 10 May. But the 
negotiations did not go along smoothly. At the beginning of May,
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A. Ishkov, the minister of fishery of the Soviet Union, and Kono 
reached a basic understanding that prevention of overcatch was 
desirable and that an agreement on sea rescue was necessary. 
They could not, however, narrow the gap over the range of the 
fishing restriction zone and the kind of sea products whose catch 
should be restricted. ' Faced with rigid Soviet attitudes, Kono 
seemed to be convinced that it was impossible to settle the 
fishery dispute in a form of a fishery agreement. He decided to 
attempt to conclude a provisional agreement which would enable 
the Japanese fishing industries to carry out less restricted 
activities.33 On 8 May, Kono proposed to discuss a provisional 
fishery agreement which would be applicable only for fishing in 
1956. Ishkov did not accept the Japanese proposal. He suggested 
that a permanent fishery agreement should be concluded to settle 
the fishery issue between the two countries and that the fishery 
agreement could come into force only when the Soviet Union and 
Japan restored their diplomatic relations.3* The Soviets now 
clearly showed their intention to link the fishery issue with the 
normalization issue. This suggestion could not be accepted by 
the Japanese. The fishery concerns interested in fishing in the 
northern waters could not wait for normalization. Kono tried 
to break this stalemate by holding an informal conversation with 
Premier Bulganin.
On 9 May, Kono met the Soviet premier at the Kremlin. Kona 
did not bring any other members of his delegation, even an 
interpreter. According to various secondary sources, what
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Bulganin during the meeting asserted, covered the following 
points. Firstly, he argued that the fisheries agreement could 
come into force only when the normal diplomatic relations were 
restored. Secondly, the Soviet premier strongly insisted that 
Kunashlri and Etorofu, Japan's demand for which had been a great 
obstacle to normalization, were Soviet territories. Thirdly, 
Japan should contribute to early normalization whether she would 
adopt the so-called 'Adenauer formula' or a conclusion of a peace 
treaty.3S The 'Adenauer formula' is the method which Vest German 
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer had adopted to establish diplomatic 
relations with the Soviet Union in September 1955. He had 
normalized Soviet-Vest German relations without concluding a 
peace treaty. Instead, the two countries had only agreed to 
terminate the state of the war, to exchange ambassadors, and to 
repatriate German detainees in the Soviet Union. In the case 
of Soviet-Japanese relations, the people who were in favour of 
early normalization assumed that the two countries would be able 
to re-establish their diplomatic relations without concluding a 
peace treaty. In other words, they argued that Japan should be 
content with normalization which was achieved by shelving the 
most intractable question: the territorial issue. According to 
the Kono memoirs, though Bulanin indicated the two options, he 
seemed to have emphasized the Adenauer formula.3*5
In fact, the major political objective of the Soviet 
government of the fishery negotiations may have been to lead the 
Japanese to tend to adopt the Adenauer-type normalization. In
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fact, the unrecognized Soviet Mission in Tokyo had been operating 
to set up domestic support for this formula in Japan. 
Domnitsky, the ex-representative of Soviet Mission in Tokyo, had 
attempted to contact the leaders of Japanese fishing industries 
for the same purpose since the end of January. On 28 January, 
Domnitsky met the president of Hokuyo Suisan (Northern Water 
Fishing Company), and suggested that Japan could achieve 
normalization with the Soviet Union by adapting the Adenauer 
formula.37 The same suggestion was brought to Miki Bukichi. 
According to Asahi, Miki received the impression that Russia 
would unilaterally declare the termination of the state of war 
and repatriate the detainees and that then both countries would 
exchange ambassadors. It also said that the territorial 
questions would be discussed by the ambassadors.30 In response 
to the press reports with regard to this development, the 
Japanese government denied the possibility that it would accept 
this Soviet suggestion.39 Thus, Domnitsky had tried to utilize 
his unofficial connexions with Japanese fishing interests in 
order to build support for an early settlement.
Moreover, Prime Minister Hatoyama had still at times spoken out 
his pet policy: immediate normalization by shelving the
territorial questions. On 26 January, he stated at a press 
conference that he prefered an immediate settlment. This was a 
clear indication that the prime minister was ready to adopt the 
Adenauer formula. The Soviets could not ignore this kind of 
development inside Japan. They certainly knew the close
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relationship between Kono and Hatoyama and also the close ties 
between Kono and fishing industries. It can be assumed that the 
Soviets might have planned to use these connexions to promote 
influence of a group in the Japanese cabinet in favour of 
adopting the Adenauer formula. Perhaps, Bulganin's emphasis 
placed on the formula may have linked with the above operations 
conducted by Domnitsky and Soviet perception of tendencies shown 
by Hatoyama.
According to the Kono memoirs, his reply to Bulganin covered 
the following points. Firstly, he asserted that in order to 
achieve world peace which the Soviet Union seemed to aim at, she 
should make a concession which was within her power.
Secondly, Kono implied that Japan's domestic differences on the 
normalization issue, even within the cabinet, were so sharp that 
it was very difficult for the Hatoyama administration to restore 
diplomatic relations as soon as the Soviets expected. Thirdly, 
in connexion with the second point, Kono went on to say that, in 
order to improve Japanese public sentiments towards the Soviet 
Union and to contribute to establishing a Japanese national 
consensus in favour of normalization, a concession on the fishery 
issue on the Soviet part was necessary. It should be only a 
trivial matter for the Soviet Union. Finally, he threatened the 
Soviet premier to return to Tokyo.AQ Kono said in his memoirs 
that Bulganin seemed to agree with him and that the Soviet 
premier immediately decided to approve of the provisional 
agreement.41
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Bulganin did not accept Kono's proposal for the provisional 
agreement without obtaining any practical gains from the 
Japanese. Kono had to be subjected to Soviet insistence on an 
early settlement of Soviet-Japanese normalization talks. He 
finally agreed to resume the negotiations for normalization by 
the end of July. Although it seems that the Soviet premier 
asserted that Soviet-Japanese diplomatic relations should be 
restored by the end of July, Kono refused to do so on the ground 
that the Japanese domestic political situations were not 
favourable for such early normalization.A2 But he accepted the 
Soviet assertion that the fishery agreement should come into 
effect after normalization.
which
The secrecy withAK6no had met Bulganin provoked among groups 
which were not in favour of early normalization in Japan a 
suspicion that he might have made a secret understanding with the 
Soviets. Kono's political enemies suspected that Kono might 
have promised to withdraw Japan's claims to Kunashiri and 
Etorofu. Although there is no definite evidence proving this 
allegation, it can be said that Kono may have made some statement 
which could be interpeted as that Japan would not pursue her 
claims to those islands any longer. First of all, Kono had not 
expressed any objection to Bulganin's strong suggestion of the 
Adenauer-type normalization. On the contrary, he had implied 
that he intended to induce his government to adopt the Adenauer 
formula.A3
3 02
CHAPTER 6
Moreover, on 15 May, on the verge of his departure from Moscow, 
he asked Ishkov whether the Soviet Union would recognize the 
fishery agreement and would take a favourable attitude towards 
Japan's application for membership of the United Rations even 
when normalization was achieved without concluding a peace 
treaty.4** Adopting the Adenauer formula meant that Japan would 
agree to "normalize her relations with the U.S.S.R. without 
settling the territorial disputes between the two countries. In 
other words, even if the Japanese would interpret the Adenauer 
type settlement as a temporary shelving of the territorial issue, 
the Soviet Union could understand this to be Japan's withdrawal 
from her strong claims to the southern Kuriles and to be an 
opportunity to make an impression that the Soviet occupation of 
those islands was tacitly recognized by the Japanese. In this 
sense, Kono's favourable attitude towards the Adenauer formula 
had an important meaning for both the Soviet Union and the 
Japanese.
Secondly, Kono seems to have made a careless statement, whether 
intentional or not, during his meeting with Bulganin. According 
to a press account, Bulganin had at the beginning of the meeting 
complained of the Japanese attitude towards normalization and 
remarked that the southern Kuriles had already become the Soviet 
territories. In reply to this, Kono was reported to have said: 
'All of your views are understandable. The only point with which 
I do not agree is with regard to the Japanese detainees who are 
still kept in your country.'46 More importantly, a similar but
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much clearer bit of evidence came out in August during a 
Shigemitsu-Shepilov conversation in London. Shepilov is
reported to have stated as follows.
Although I have not got the memorandum of the Kono- 
Bulganin meeting with me now, it is possible for me to tell 
you the contents of the meeting as they were. Premier 
Bulganin stated as fallows. "Although the Habomais and 
Shikotan are essentially Soviet territories, we decided to 
concede and hand them over to Japan for the sake of the re- 
establishiment of Soviet-Japanese relations in London. 
Nevertheless, the Japanese government has begun to claim 
Kunashiri and Etorofu in addition to the aforementioned 
islands and, therefore, the London talks reached 
stalemate. Soviet possession of Kunashiri and Etorofu has 
already been confirmed and we can never alter this 
principle." Mr. Kono replied: 'This proposal of Premier
Bulganin is both understandable and practical. I appreciate 
that it is acceptable to the Japanese.' 4S
Perhaps, this part of conversation overlaps with the 
abovementioned press account.
There is another significant evidence about this matter. On 28 
October 1956, Tsutsumi Yasujird, who was one of the most 
influential supporters of Shigemitsu in the L.D.P., wrote a 
letter to Shitemitsu. In this letter, Tsutsumi referred to the 
Bulgain-Kono conversation. According to his letter, his collegue 
named 'Kitazawa' had read official records of the above 
Shepilov-Shigemmitsu conversation. 'Kitazawa' seems to be 
Kitazawa Naokichi, who was an ex-diplomat and a member of L.D.P. 
Tsutsumi revealed in his letter the story which he obtain from 
Kitazawa. The contents of the story were substantially the same 
as Kubota's description showed above.47 Thus, it is highly
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likely that Kono gave an impression to the Soviet Union that the 
Japanese were ready to accept the Soviet contention over the 
territorial issue. But it is still uncertain whether he
promised it or not. Even so, it can be argued that Bulganin had 
accepted Kono's proposal for the provisional agreement partly 
because of his implication of Japanese readiness to take the 
Adenauer formula.
After his meeting with Bulganin, Kono carried on the fishery 
negotiations with Ishkov. During these conversations, Kono 
proposed that negotiations for normalization should be resumed 
at the latest by 31 July.*® Ishkov at first suggested an earlier 
date. But he accepted Kono's statement that an earlier 
resumption was impossible because of Japanese domestic situations 
that Diet was in session and the election for the House of 
Councillors was approaching.A'3
The Soviets attempted, however, to press the Japanese hard 
again to acquiesce in the Adenauer formula. On 12 May, the 
Soviets asserted that for the fishery agreement and the sea 
rescue agreement to come into effect, diplomatic relations 
should be re-established by 10 August. Otherwise, they 
concluded, the provisional agreement would not be recognized.®0 
Surprised at this proposal, Kono furiously insisted that Bulganin 
had already assured him that the provisional agreement would be 
carried out 5 before normalization was achieved. Then, the 
Soviets compromised and withdrew the proposal. On 15 May, Kono
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and Ishkov finally signed all the agreements worked out during 
the negotiations and issued a joint statement, which provided 
that the normalization talks would be resumed by 31 July.
Looking through the fishery negotiations at Moscow, one cannot 
help but conclude that the negotiations resulted in a Soviet 
diplomatic triumph. First, they finally succeeded in dragging 
the Japanese to the negotiation table for normalization. Second, 
under heavy pressure from the Soviet Union, Kono indicated, 
though subtly, that it would be possible for the Japanese 
government to adopt the Adenauer formula. Looking at the balance 
sheet of the Japanese side, judgement should be divided in terms 
of factional differences. The group in favour of early 
normalization must have regarded the result of the fishery 
negotiations as a positive instrument for their cause. 
Particularly, Prime Minister Hatoyama must have been quite 
satisfied with it. On the other hand, for the Foreign Ministry 
and Shigemitsu, the result of the Moscow fishery talks was a 
disappointment. The initiative of diplomacy was taken up by Kono 
and from their viewpoint Kono intruded in the field of the 
Foreign Ministry. Moreover, his promise to re-start the 
normalization talks was totally against the thinking of the 
Foreign Ministry.
CHAPTER 6
CHANGES IN  JAPAN'S POLICY BEFORE THE NORMALIZATION TALKS IN  
MOSCOW
After the fishery negotiations at Moscow had ended, the Japanese 
government was faced with the necessity to modify its 
normalization policy. As a result of the Kono-Bulganin meeting, 
it had been made clear that the Soviet Union would never return 
the southern Kuriles. At the same time, Bulganin's strong 
suggestion of the Adenauer type normalization and Kono's subtle 
affirmation of adopting the Adenauer formula brought the 
possibility of earlier normalization through the formula to a 
more concrete and practical stage of policy-making. It also 
excited more public interest. For instance, Asahi reported that, 
within the L.D.P., the majority of the party supported an early- 
normal izat ion whether it would take the form of the Adenauer type 
or not.51 Under these circumstances, the Hatoyama administration 
began to search for a suitable policy for the forthcoming 
negotiations.
It seemed that the government tended to put aside the Adenauer 
formula as a policy for the normalization. On 29 May, even 
Hatoyama declared at the Diet that the government would continue 
efforts to conclude a peace treaty.52 Two days later, both 
Hatoyama and Shigemitsu explained to the Diet that it would be 
very difficult for the government to demand the Habomais and 
Shikotan while shelving the issue of the other islands. At
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that time, though the prime minister did not refer to the 
Adenauer formula, Shigemitsu clearly pointed out the defects of/  
the formula. He argued that if the government adopted the 
Adenauer plan, it would have to shelve the question of the 
reversion of the Habomais and Shikotan. On 5 June, a cabinet 
meeting was convened and the government leaders were reported to 
have reached a conclusion that the forthcoming normalization 
talks should be treated as the continuation of the second London 
talks and that the previous policy should be carried on.®3
Although the press reported that the cabinet had concluded that 
it would continue to pursue its previous policy goals, the 
Hatoyama administration, in fact, began to deviate from the 
previous line. In the middle of June, during his conversation 
with George Morgan, the counsellor of American Embassy, Secretary- 
General of the L.D.P. Kishi Nobusuke clarified the following two 
points, with respect to the cabinet decision of 5 June. First, 
the government had decided to carry on the previous policy but it 
had recognized the necessity to modify its policy afterwards in 
order to reach a settlement with the Soviet Union. Second, with 
regard to the southern Kuriles, the government intended to take a 
firm position for the time being and to become finally content 
with the existing situation on the basis of mutual understanding 
that the status of those islands should finally be decided 
through an international conference.®* The Japanese government 
had been endeavouring to re-gain the southern Kuriles since the 
end of August 1955. The L.D.P. had in November formulated its
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platform which stipulated that Japan should achieve unconditional 
return of those islands. But if Kishi's above description is 
reliable, the cabinet now became determined to realize a Soviet- 
Japanese settlement even by giving up unconditional reversion of 
the southern Kuriles.
Behind this alteration of the government's policy, there seems 
to have been change in attitude on the part of Shigemitsu and the 
Foreign Ministry. The Foreign Ministry had started to re­
examine its policy on the territorial issues immediately after
the end of Kono's Moscow talks. As a result of the fishing
negotiations, the Foreign Ministry seemed to realize at least the 
following two points. Firstly, it was unlikely that the Soviet 
Union would return the southern Kuriles. In Moscow, Bulganin 
had strongly asserted the futility of further Japanese attempts 
to restore those islands and suggested the Adenauer formula as a 
suitable method for settlement. These facts suggested that the
Soviets would not return those islands. Secondly, now the
Soviets gained an upper hand against the Japanese, because they
had suceeded to make the Japanese agree that the fishing
agreement would came into effect only after the normalization was 
materialized. The Foreign Ministry and Shigemitsu could not fail
to realize that an early settlement was imperative.
In these situations, it was reported that the Foreign Ministry 
had almost established the consensus that Japan ought to give up 
restoring the southern Kuriles and to normalize her relations
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with the U.S.S.R. as soon as possible by accepting the Soviet 
terms,ss Of a great importantce was the Ministry's determination 
to exclude the Adenauer type normalization from the policy 
options. Asahi reported that the Ministry held the view that the 
normalization should be achieved by concluding a peace treaty.se 
Thus, the Foreign Ministry opposed the Adenauer formula. The 
reason for the opposition was exposed by Shigemitsu at the 
National Diet on 31 May. Shigemitsu discussed that if his 
government adopted the Adenauer formula, Japan might have to 
shelve the questions over the Habamais and Shikotan.&’7 He 
implied that adopting the Adenauer formula would lead to the 
possibility that Japan could not restore even the Habamais and 
Shikotan. This being the case, Shigemitsu could not agree with 
the Adenauer formula. Perhaps, the Foreign Ministry may have had 
to soften its previous line in order to prevent the Hatoyama 
group from adopting the Adenauer formula. It seems reasonable to 
assume that the Foreign Ministry chose an option whereby Japan at 
least could obtain the Habomais and Shikotan, even if they had to 
admit that Japan might have to be content with the existing 
Soviet occupation of the southern Kuriles.
It must be remembered that the Foreign Ministry had drawn up a 
three-stage negotiating strategy at the end of May in 1955. 
After the Soviet concessions of the beginning of August, the 
negotiations proceeded to the second stage of the strategy, where 
the Japanese government should demand the return of the southern 
Kuriles, the Habomais and Shikotan. Now faced with the repeated
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Soviet refusal, the Foreign Ministry may have realized that it 
should move on to the third stage: Japan should concentrate on 
the restoration of the Habomais and Shikotan. If so, the 
normalization talks were still being run along the original long­
term negotiating strategy of the Ministry.
It is undeniable that the softening of the Foreign Ministry 
may have been affected by Shigemitsu's consideration over the 
maintenance of his position in the cabinet. Since the end of 
May, there had been a plan for reshuffling the Hatoyama cabinet. 
This plan was to consolidate the power basis of Prime Minister 
Hatoyama by changing even the cabinet ministers who had been 
occupying their post since the birth of the Hatoyama government. 
Shigemitsu was reported to be the first target of this 
reshuffling plan.ss It was speculated by his junior colleague 
that Shigemitsu had been urged to retreat from his original 
tough policy in order to escape from the reshuffle.33
Mow that the general line of government policy was decided, it 
was necessary to decide on the plenipotentiary for the 
negotiations. The government which was determined to settle the 
negotiations held the view that, besides Matsumoto, some more 
prominent politician should join, and preside over, the 
delegation. Moreover, the Japanese had certainly learned the 
lesson from Kono's negotiations at Moscow that meeting senior 
Soviet political leaders was one of the most effective methods to 
extract compromises or concessions from the Soviets. The
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government decision to choose another plenipotentiary may have 
been based on this consideration. The selection of the 
plenipotentiary was complicated by factional struggles. As a 
result of the complication, Kishi Nobusuke unexpectedly 
recommended Shigemitsu as plenipotentiary, and he also 
unexpectedly accepted this recommendation on 13 July.®0
Shigemitsu*s acceptance of his appointment was regarded as not 
understandable in some quarters. The most interesting account 
was that by Sir Esler Dening, the then British ambassador. 
Dening understood that Shigemitsu was caught in the middle of an 
intractable dilemma. In a situation where most of mainstream 
tended to desire early normalizaton, Shigemitsu was obliged to 
take on the normalization talks in order to avoid his own 
political downfall. On the other hand, if he were to succeed in 
the Soviet-Japanese settlement, he would have to alter his 
original tough line. That alteration might cause him a lot of 
trouble in his relations with anti-normalization factions. 
Dening had difficulty in finding out why Shigemitsu should have 
allowed himself to be selected. But he speculated:
.... it may just be that Shigemitsu is that kind of chap. 
He accepted the Foreign Ministry and the journey to the 
"Missouri" for Japan's surrender when most other Japaense 
would have refused the job and his attitude towards his 
trial and sentence as an "A" class war criminal was much the 
same. It is partly perhaps fatalism and partly the Japanese
characteristic of self-immolation And it is an attitude
which Japanese are capable of admiring upon reflection, so 
that if Shigemitsu does fall over this Russian business, it 
is conceivable that in the long run he may gain more in the 
eyes of his fellow-countrymen than any of his present 
political colleagues.®1
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It may be true that Shigemitsu*s decision came from his 
sentimentality. Furthermore, as several memoirs suggest, he 
decided to accept the, appointment considering that, if he 
succeeded in carrying through the Japanese territorial demands 
in some form, his political prospect for being the next prime 
minister would improve.®2 But his consideration over the 
normalization itself should not be ignored. When he accepted the 
appointment as plenipotentiary, the situation was that, if he had 
refused, someone closely connected with Hatoyama and Kono would 
have been selected. From Shigemitsu's viewpoint, this possibility 
should be avoided, because the initiative in diplomacy would be 
taken from the Foreign Ministry to the Hatoyama group including 
Kono and because it was very likely that they would try to lead 
the negotiations to be based on the Adenauer formula. Perhaps 
this consideration may have greatly influenced Shiegmitsu's 
acceptance of the appointment.
As for the venue for the negotiations, Moscow was chosen by the 
Japanese government after Shigemitsu had been selected as the 
plenipotentiary. The foreign minister had suggested that London 
was preferable®3 but the cabinet decision turned out to be 
against him. Because the foreign minister was appointed as 
chief negotiator, it was unreasonable to choose a third country 
as the venue for the negotiations.e* Another possible and 
secondary reason for avoiding London may have been the 
attitudes taken by the British since the start of the 
normalization talks. The British government had kept a non-
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committal attitude^ towards the Soviet-Japanese normalization.
Moreover, it had even expressed a view on the territorial issue 
which had-been unfavourable for the Japanese. The Japanese
government had already known that the British would not be very
j S  helpful to Japan over the territorial issue. If so, there was 
no point of sticking to London as the venue.
On 18 July Tokyo instructed Ambassador Mishi in London to
inform the Soviets that the Japanese government were ready to
open the negotiations at Moscow. Three days later, the Soviet 
government communicated to Tokyo that it accepted the Japanese
proposal and that it appointed Foreign Minister Shepilov as the 
plenipotentiary.ss The negotiations was due to be resumed on 31 
July.
What kind of negotiating policy did Shigemitsu have in his 
mind? Despite the lack of documents describing his policy, it is 
possible to picture its outline by relying on some indirect
evidence. He seemed to intend at first to take a firm attitude 
over the territorial issue. On 19 July, during a meeting with 
American Ambassador Allison, he said that 'he would follow
pattern "we (=the Americans) knew very well" on territorial 
issues.' e<3[ My brackets] Japanese Minister Shima in Washington 
also confirmed that Shigemitsu would take a hard line but that 
he did not intend to bring the negotiations to a break-down.67 
This was also in accordance with the cabinet decision made on 5 
June.
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Secondly, Shigemitsu was determined to achieve a settlement 
after taking such a tough line. Hanyu Sanshichi, a Socialist 
member of -the Diet, had a private conversation with Shigemitsu 
several days before his departure for Moscow. During the 
conversation, Shigemitsu seriously said to him, 'this time I am 
absolutely determined to settle the negotiations.'" Hanyu was 
astonished since I could never believe that such a crucial 
determination was privately stated by the foreign minister. When 
he met Shigemitsu again three days before his departure for
Moscow, the foreign minister re-assured that he seriously
intended to settle the negotiations.ea
When Shigemitsu again met Allison on 24 July, he asked if the 
U.S. government would oppose if the Japanese government reached 
an agreement with the Soviet Union on the territorial issue on 
terms which the Japanese considered favourable. Allison did not 
give him any official affirmation. But he replied that in his 
opinion, neither the United States nor ex-Allied powers would
have any objection if both the Soviet Union and Japan would be
satisfied with their agreement.G3 It seems that Shigemitsu tried 
to secure the American guarantee that the U.S. government would 
not interfere with Japanese efforts to reach an agreement on the 
territorial question even by making some territorial concessions 
to the Russians. Thus, Shigemitsu intended to preempt any 
possible future accusations from the United States. As
mentioned above, the Foreign Ministry and he considered that the 
Adenauer formula was so risky that the Japanese might be forced
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to agree to postpone the settlement of the reversion of the 
Habomais and Shikotan. Perhaps in order to avoid a situation 
where the - Japanese government was urged to adopt the Adenauer 
formula, Shigemitsu may have been determined to bring the 
negotiations to a settlement even by making some territorial 
concessions to the Russians.
Thus, Shigemitsu*s negotiating strategy was basically in 
accordance with the cabinet decision of 5 June, which was 
described by Kishi Nobusuke. But there seemed to be no concrete 
and specific understandings between Hatoyama and Shigemitsu on an 
important question: to what extent and when the Japanese
government should accept the Soviet terms. It is reported that 
the prime minister and foreign minister only exchanged greetings 
before the latter left Japan for Moscow. The former only said to 
Shigemitsu that he hoped that the foreign minister would carry 
out his job well.ro
As for the question whether there were any specific 
instructions given to Shigemitsu, there is another interesting 
story. On 20 July, Kono had a meeting with the American
ambassador. During his conversations, Kono stated that 
Shigemitsu was going to Moscow with instructions with which the 
cabinet had agreed. It was on 17 July when a cabinet meeting had 
been held and finally selected Moscow as the venue for the 
negotiations. If Kono's remark is reliable, it may have been at 
the cabinet where the instructions had been drawn up. More
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importantly, Kono said that the instructions contained a 
condition that Shigemitsu 'should insist as minimum on Soviet 
recognition of Japan's residual sovereignty in Southern 
Kuriles.'71 Moreover, even Shigemitsu referred to the residual 
sovereignty, though it was in September after the Moscow talks 
were over. He stated that the Soviet Union would not recognize 
Japan's residual sovereignty.72
The proposal for restoring residual sovereignty over the 
southern Kuriles was in favour of the Japanese. By proposing 
this to the Soviet Union, the Japanese could have indicated that 
they were willing to retreat from their previous tough demands 
for complete sovereignty over these islands. Moreover, in a 
situation where Japan was only entitled to residual sovereignty 
over Okinawa by the U.S., the Soviet Union would have become 
unable to rely on the contention that the Japan's territorial 
claims to the southern Kuriles were in contradiction with her 
recognition of U.S. occupation of Okinawa. If Russia had 
accepted it, the Japanese government could have satisfied 
Japanese public opinion and the opposite within the government 
which had been demanding the reversion of the southern Kuriles. 
Besides that, Kono may have considered that the Americans would 
be content with Japan's restoration of residual sovereignty over 
the islands on the ground that it would be possible for Japan to 
re-gain complete sovereignty in future.
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Perhaps, Kono may also have assumed that if the Soviets
accepted this proposal, it would become a great pressure on the 
Americans to return to Japan the administrative rights over 
Okinawa and the Bonins. It could be expected that the U.S. 
government would try to neutralize the effect of the Soviet
acceptance of the 'residual sovereignty* proposal by adopting 
some policy favourable to the Japanese on the Okinawa issue. It 
seems that Kono and Shigemitsu clashed on this matter at the 
cabinet meeting which was held on 3 July. Shigemitsu wrote in 
his diary: 'A cabinet meeting, at 10:00. Had a heated discussion 
with Minister Kono mainly on the issues of Okinawa and Soviet- 
Japanese normalization. '7,3 Probably, Shigemitsu, who desired not to 
complicate the Okinawa question,opposed Kono's suggestion on 
the ground that such a proposal would damage U. S.-Japanese 
relations. At any rate, it is highly likely that the 'residual
sovereignty' proposal was discussed in the cabinet meeting. It
is still unclear whether the 'residual sovereignty' proposal 
mentioned by Kono to Allison reflected any government 
instructions. But it seems that Kona's remak about the proposal 
may have indicated that he and possibly Hatoyama may have 
considered that Shigemitsu would be allowed to settle the 
negotiations on condition that the Soviet Union returned the 
Habomais and Shikotan and residual sovereignty over the southern 
Kuriles.
Outside the government, the trend of domestic opinion was 
rather complicated. The opposition party, the J.S.P., asserted ^
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early normalization. It argued that the government should request 
the southern Kuriles but that if Russia did not accept it, it 
should adopt the Adenauer formula.75 The Socialists took a very 
similar position to Prime Minister Hatoyama. On the other hand, 
the Yoshida faction still remained a formidable opposition group 
against early normalization. Although the Yoshida faction was 
not very big within the L.D.P., the influence of the former prime 
minister in diplomatic field could not be ignored. Moreover, he 
had his supporters within the circle of old experienced ex- 
diplomtas, such as Ashida Hitoshi, and Nomura Kichisaburo, who 
had been the Japanese ambassador to the United States when the 
Pacific war had broken out. On 22 July, Yoshida sent/^
Shigemitsu an open letter, which was made public by Sankei Jiji 
Newspaper. In this letter Yoshida condemned the Soviet 
possession of the Kuriles and Sakhalin, and holding Japanese 
detainees. The letter was coloured by strong anti-Soviet 
sentiments. It must have been intended to promote hard line 
sentiments among the Japanese over the normalization talks before 
Shigemitsu's departure.75 Thus, when Shigemitsu left Tokyo for 
Mosocw, there was not a national consensus over the normalization 
issue, particularly the territorial question.
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CHAPTER nr 
THE EIRST MOSCOW TALKS
MIWOR COMCESSIOES BY JAP AM AMD SOVIET REACT I  QMS
The Japanese delegation headed by Foreign Minister Shigemitsu 
arrived at Moscow on 29 July. At the Vnukovo Airport, Shigemitsu 
issued a brief statement. In this statement, he declared that 
' The aim of my present negotiations is to put an end quickly to 
the unnatural "state of war" which has continued to exist for more 
than ten years since the end of the war, and to find ways of 
normalizing Soviet-Japaense relations.' Then, he emphasized that 
'a solution must be found which will satisfy bath sides and at the 
same time leave no evil roots for future relations.'1 This 
statement reflected Shigemitsu's determination to reach a 
settlement whereby all problems between the U.S.S.R. and Japan 
would be solved. In other words, he clarified that Japan's goal 
was to conclude a peace treaty with Russia.
The first plenary meeting was held on 31 July. The meeting 
started with a statement made by Soviet Foreign Minister Dmytri 
Shepilov. Shepilov referred to the following three points. 
Firstly, he pointed to the fact that the Soviets had already made 
various concessions including the reversion of the Habomais and 
Shikotan. Secondly, he suggested that all the negotiators ought
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to do this time was to decide the form of expressions for the 
territorial and the straits issues. Thirdly, he made it clear that 
the concession over the Habomais and Shikotan was the maximum 
concession that the Soviet Union could make.2 The Russian 
position on the territorial issue which had been made clear 
during the Kdno-Bulganin conversations had not at all changed. 
Russia seemed to be firmly determined not to return the southern 
Kuriles.
In reply, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu made rather a lengthy 
statement. It was published by the Foreign Ministry of Japan 
shortly after the first meeting. In it, Shigemitsu offered minor 
concessions. He offered to submit a new draft provision on the 
commercial issue which reflected the Soviet position expressed at 
the second London talks. He also suggested that Japan desired to 
insert a provision for resumption of diplomtic and consular 
relations into the clause ending the state of war.
Then, Shigemitsu moved on to the main agenda: the territorial 
question. He explained the Japanese position by developing 
detailed legal arguments. Firstly, Shigemitsu argued that, because 
the U.S.S.R. had not signed the S.F.P.T., the issue of the Kuriles 
and southern Sakhalin 'remained undecided between Japan and the 
Soviet Union.' Shigemitsu implied that those islands had not been 
renounced in Japan's relations with the Soviets. But he now 
continued:
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Under the San Francisco Treaty, Japan has given up South 
Sakhalin and the Kuriles to the Allied Powers. Ve will have 
no objection to confirming this stipulation of the San 
Francisco Treaty to the Soviet Union if Japan's position is 
recognized relative to the two islands of Etorofu 
Kunashiri.3
How he clarified that Japan would give up her claims to the 
Kuriles and southern Sakhalin in exchange for Soviet reversion of 
the southern Kuriles. He argued that Kunashiri and Etoforu were 
Japan's 'inherent territory', and by quoting the Atlantic Charter 
and the Cairo Declaration, he justified Japan's claims to these 
two islands. According to Shigemitsu, the Atlantic Charter and 
the Cairo Declaration were based on the 'highest principle not to 
seek territorial aggrandizement.'4 He went on that the southern 
Kuriles could not be possessed by the Soviets because the Soviet 
annexation of these inherent islands of Japan would undoubtedly be 
inconsistent with the principle.
Then, Shigemitsu proposed a new draft provision.
Japanese sovereignty over the Habomais, Shikotan, Etorofu 
and Kunashiri, which were occupied by the Union of the 
Soviet Socialist Republics as a result of the war, should 
completely be restored on the day when the peace treaty 
comes into effect. Japan should renounce all rights to the 
Kuriles and a part of Sakhalin over which Japan obtained her 
sovereignty as a result of the Portsmouth Treaty of 5 
September 1905. The forces of the Union of the Soviet 
Socialist Republics should be withdrawn from the 
abovementioned Japanese territories within 90 days after the 
peace treaty comes into force.'5
The Shigemitsu statement clearly contained a newly modified 
Japanese line on the territorial issue. Until then, the Japanese
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government had asserted that Japan had never renounced the Kuriles 
and southern Sakhalin in her relations with the Soviet Union. 
But it was now suggested that she would renounce all of the right 
to those islands in exchange for Soviet recognition of Japanese 
sovereignty over Kunashiri and Etorofu. Also, Shigemitsu no 
longer proposed to convene an international conference for 
deciding the disposal of the Kuriles and the southern Sakhalin. 
These alterations must have been intended to indicate that the 
Japanese were willing to make some minor concessions an the 
territorial issue. It must, however, be noted that this gesture 
could not be interpreted by the Soviets as a concession. With 
only Japan's recognition of her renunciation of those islands, 
there was still the possibility that Japan would later assert that 
the final disposition of those islands should be decided through 
some international arrangement. In fact, the Japanese government 
did not mean to drop the previous position with regard to holding 
the international conference. On 3 August, it issued a statement 
to the effect that if the government was reported to have dropped 
the proposal of an international conference, it was a 
misunderstanding.® Shepilov certainly refused to regard the 
Shigemitsu statement as a concession on the Japanese part. He 
replied that it seemed that the Japanese position adpoted during 
the London talks had not developed at all.
The second plenary session was convened on 3 August, when 
Shepilov refuted the statement previously read by Shigemitsu on 31 
July. Firstly, Shepilov argued that Japan attempted to alter the
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situation which had already been fixed by international 
arrangements, and that the Soviet Union could not accept the 
Japanese unrealistic demands. Secondly, Japan had lost the right 
to invoice the treaties with regard to the status of the Kuriles, 
which had been concluded in 1855 and 1875, on the ground that she 
had started an aggressive war in 1904. Thirdly, Shepilov 
continued that the territorial questions had finally been settled 
by Article 2 of the S.F.P.T. He also went on to assert that 
Kunashiri and Etorofu were part of the Kuriles, which the United 
States, Britain, and the U.S.S.R. had agreed in the Yalta 
Agreement to transfer to the Soviet Union. Finally, he concluded 
that the Soviet Union would concede the Habomais and Shiicotan in 
response to Japan’s desire and an the basis of the peaceful 
approach of the Soviet Union.7 Added to this, he declared that 
there was no point in discussing the issue which had already been 
settled. In addition, the Russians poured cold water on the 
Japanese v.hopes by submitting a Soviet version, which was the
same as had been submitted by Malik at the second London talks.0
Shigemitsu seemed to be irritated by the Soviet contentions. In 
particular, Shepilov's statement dealing with the Russo-Japanese 
war annoyed him. His bitter feeling was expressed in his diary.® 
He started a counterargument by saying that the Soviet contention 
that the Russo-Japanese war was started by Japan's aggression was 
a dogma of the triumphant countries of World War II. Then, he 
repeated that because the Soviets had not signed the S.F.P.T., the 
territorial questions still remained to be settled between the
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U.S.S.R. and Japan. He added that the Yalta Agreement meant 
nothing to Japan because she did not participate in the 
Agreement.1°
At the third plenary meeting on 6 August, Shigemitsu again 
counterargued against the Russian contention by referring to over 
ten points. His argument was virtually a mere repetition of his 
previous contentions.11 Shepilov also did not show any indication 
of altering his position. The Japanese foreign minister now 
decided to hold an informal conversation with the Soviet 
plenipotentiary, hoping for a break-through. On 7 August, the 
informal meeting was held at the Soviet Foreign Ministry. But no 
break-through was achieved. On 8 August, the plenary
meeting was held but there was no development of the negotiations 
on the territorial issue, either. Rather it seemed that Soviet 
attitudes became harder. Shepilov threatened to withdraw the 
Soviet concessions which had been made during the previous 
negotiations.
....if Japan refuses, by sticking to her present policy, to 
settle the problems on the Soviet terms, the Soviet 
concessions which had been made would come to nothing. The 
Hab’omais and Shikotan should be returned on condition that a ^  
peace treaty shall be concluded on the Soviet terms. They s' 
will not be transfered on any other conditions.12
In conclusion, Shepilov stated that the Soviet Union would not 
have any objection to suspending the negotiations.13
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SHIGEMITSU'S DECISIOM TO ACCEPT . SOVIET TEEMS
Shigemitsu was now made to realize the limitation of his hard­
line tactics. Being determined to avoid a break-up of the 
negotiations, Shigemitsu decided to solve this stalemate through 
meeting with the top leaders of the Kremlin. The next day, he 
proposed the meeting and the Soviet foreign minister accepted the 
proposal and the meeting was planned to be held on 10 August. 
Late on the night of 9 August, Shigemitsu assembled the press 
accompanying him from Japan. In front of them, he remarked that 
he had already done everything possible to secure more concessions 
from the Soviet Union and that he realized that she never would 
make any more territorial concessions.
I have found that the U.S.S.R. will by no means alter her
present position. I have been searching for a solution,
but there is no way. How I feel that I have gone to the
limit of my strength. I shall do my best tomorrow at the
meeting with Bulganin and Khrushchev. Then, I shall 
thoroughly examine the question and make my final decision.
Prime Minister Hatoyama will be informed of my decision but
I do not intend to ask for his instructions. Taking into 
full account domestic and international situations, I will 
sort everything out on my own responsibility. Even if 
someone will throw a bomb at me at Haneda Airport, I will 
make up my mind for the future of Japan. I believe that 
Japan will reach the stage to restore the spirit of the 
nation as she did at the time of signing the Instructions of 
Surrender on the Missouri.14
This statement was intended to convey to the Japanese that 
everything had been done to fulfil Japan's territorial demands but 
that it had been in vain. He may have considered that the
Japanese people would be content with this result because even he,
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who had been pursuing the hardest line so far, had to accept the 
Soviet assertions. In this sense, the above statement of
Shigemitsu was an indication that he decided to make some major 
concessions on the territorial issue.
On 10 August, Shigemitsu visited the Kremlin with his private 
secretary and an interpreter. At the meeting, Premier Bulganin 
explained that the Soviet position presented by Shepilov was a 
conclusion supported unanimously by the Soviet government and that 
therefore it was impossible to alter it. Khrushchev also 
emphasized that Russia would not change her position and condemned 
Japanese aggressiveness by quoting her past invasions. 
Shigemitsu tried to re-assert the Japanese territorial claims but 
the Soviet leaders did not compromise.15 Then, Shigemitsu seems to 
have retreated from the hard line policy. He proposed to devise a 
wording for the territorial clause based on mutual understanding 
of each other's standpoint.15
Finally, the Soviet leaders compromised and made it clear that 
they were ready to cooperate in searching for a mutually agreeable 
wording for the territorial clause on condition that the Japanese 
recognized the Soviet principle that the disposition of the 
southern Kuriles had already been settled. According to Kubota, 
who was at that time in Moscow as a member of the press, it was 
Khrushchev who suggested this compromise. He reports that 
Khrushchev said, ' If the Japanese agree with the Soviet position 
that the questions over the southern Kuriles had already been
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settled, I would like you to discuss with Shepilov the details as 
far as they do not substantially damage each other's interests.'17 
It seems that Shigemitsu was greatly satisfied with the result of 
this conversation.10
On 11 August, the Soviet and the Japanese plenipotentiary had 
their third informal meeting. Shigemitsu's intention to work out 
a compromise was clear, as he based the discussion on the previous 
Soviet draft which had been submitted to the negotiating table on 
3 August. The draft provision stipulated:
1. Desirous of meeting the request of Japan and considering 
the interest of the latter, the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics transfers to Japan Little-Kurile archipelago 
(Habomai Islands and Shikotan Island). Order of transfer of 
the Island referred to in this paragraph will be provided 
for in the protocol annexed to the present treaty.
2. Frontiers between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
and Japan will run on the centre of the straits of Kunashiri 
(Nemuro) and Ismena (Notsuke) as shown on the map annexed 
hereto.19
The Japanese foreign minister proposed to amend this provision. 
He requested to delete a part of the first sentence of paragraph 
1: 'Desirous of meeting the request of Japan and considering the 
interest of the latter'.20 This part seems to have been intended 
by the Russian to emphasize that though the Habomais and Shikotan 
had been recognized as Soviet territories, they would return them 
as an indication of Soviet goodwill and generosity. The Japanese 
could not accept this argument. From the Japanese viewpoint, those 
islands were definitely Japanese territories on the ground that 
they were not part of the Kuriles and had illegally been occupied
<133
CHAPTER 7
by the Soviet Union. Besides that, Shigemitsu asked to remove the 
whole of the second paragraph, which was obviously intended to 
fix the frontier in order that the southern Kuriles were included 
in Soviet territory.21 The Japanese foreign minister attempted 
to alter the territorial clause to contain no reference to the 
disposal of Kunashiri and Etorofu. The deletion of the second 
paragraph was intended to keep the question of the disposition of 
those islands unclear by not referring to it in the peace 
treaty. In other words, Shigemitsu endeavoured to shelve the 
question in substance.
In fact, the proposed amendment by Shigemitsu was a great 
concession from the Japanese viewpoint. For the Soviet Union 
could interpret the amended provision as Japan's tacit 
recognition of the territorial status quo of the Kuriles and the 
southern Sakhalin. But it was true that this provision was 
devised in order to leave the possibility of Japan's future re­
submission of territorial claims to those islands. Shigemitsu 
must have planned to arrange his amendment for this purpose. In 
response to this new Japanese line, Shepilov did not alter his 
previous tough attitude, explaining that the Soviet government 
intended to settle the territorial problems by transferring the 
Habomais and Shikotan to Japan. The second paragraph was, he 
continued, necessary in order to leave no source of future trouble 
between the two countries. He also opposed the first part of 
Shigemitsu's amendment by maintaining that its deletion was
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equivalent to ignoring the fundamental standpoint of the Soviet 
Union on the territorial issue.22
Faced with Shepilov's rigid attitude, Shigemitsu made another 
proposal which included further concession on the Japanese part. 
He proposed to replace the second paragraph with the same 
provision as the territorial clause of the S.F.P.T. By this new 
provision, Japan was to renounce all claims to the Kuriles and 
southern Sakhalin in relations with the Soviet Union. But this 
Japanese concession did not affect Shepilov's rigid attitude. He 
merely repeated that the Soviet position would never change and 
insisted that there was no other way for the Japanese than to 
accept the Soviet draft as it was.23
Shigemitsu's second proposal also had dual characteristics. It
implicitly indicated that Japan was willing to be content with an
existing situation of the Kuriles, southern Sakhalin: Soviet
occupation of those islands. For inserting Article 2 of the
■withdraw her
S.F.P.T. meant that Japan was ready toAclaim? to’, sovereignty 
over those islands and the right to demand the reversion of them 
from Russia. Regarding the southern Kuriles, Shigemitsu's 
proposal had no reference to their disposition. This implied that 
Japan did not intend to demand immediate return of them. Thus, 
the proposal had an aspect of an indication of concessions on the 
Japanese part.
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On the other hand, Shigemitsu elaborated his proposal in order 
to maintain the possibility that Japan would be able to re-gain 
those territories in the future. It must be remembered that 
Article 2 of the S.F.P.T. was interpreted particularly by the 
Americans as that the final disposition of the Kuriles and 
southern Sakhalin should be decided by some international 
arrangement. Perhaps, Shigemitsu intended to rely on this legal 
interpretation and cling to a slight hope for future reversion of 
those islands. Regarding Kunashiri and Etorofu, Shigemitsu also 
maintained a chance to restore them. By making no reference to 
those two islands, he seems to have tried to leave the possibility 
that the territorial issue over those islands was interpreted as 
unsettled. To be sure, he may have intended to leave even the 
slightest chance to regain those islands in the future. But it 
cannot be denied that he may also have assumed that his proposal 
could be accepted by the opposite political groups in Japan and by 
Japanese public opinion because the proposal did not entirely 
exclude the possibility of restoring those islands. Thus,
Shigemitsu's proposal seems to have been designed to satisfy both 
the Russians and the Japanese.
Despite Khrushchev's suggestion at his informal meeting with 
Shigemitsu, Shepilov did not accept . Shigemitsu's second
proposal. Instead, the Soviet foreign minister attempted to 
compel Shigemitsu to accept the Soviet terms without amending
them. Because of the lack of access to Soviet materials, it is
hardly possible to know Shepilov*s motivations behind his rigid
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attitudes exactly. But it is possible to speculate as follows. 
Although Khrushchev had shown an understanding attitude towards 
Shigemitsu on 10 August, the Soviet government may probably have 
been determined not to cede the Habomais and Shikotan unless the 
Japanese recognized Soviet sovereignty over the Kuriles, including 
the southern Kuriles, and southern Sakhalin. If so, Shigemitsu's 
proposal was far from satisfying the Soviets. Moreover, the
Soviets may have recognized that Shigemitsu's proposals were
designed to leave the chance for Japan to re-gain those islands in 
the future. If the Japanese would not recognize Soviet sovereignty 
over those islands, it would be more beneficial for the Soviets 
to normalize their relations with Japan on the basis of the so- 
called 'Adenauer formula', because they would not have to return 
even the Habomais and Shikotan under that formula. Hence, the 
Soviet Union was not at all urged to make more concessions in
response to Shigemitsu's indication of territorial concessions on 
the Japanese part.
Faced with the rigid Soviet attitude, Shigemitsu seemed to
conclude that he ought to accept the Soviet terms. On 12 August,
Shigemitsu made it clear to his delegation members that he 
intended to settle the normalization talks on the Soviet terms. 
According to the Matsumoto Memoirs, Shigemitsu stated in his 
telegram to Tokyo on that day that he was afraid that the 
Soviets would withdraw their concessions over the Habomais and 
Shikotan, unless the Japanese government accepted the Soviet 
terms.2"1 Shigemitsu may have come to this idea because Shepilov
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Had on 8 August suggested that the Soviet government would 
withdraw its offer to return the Habomais and Shikotan in the case 
of Japanese refusal of accepting the Soviet conditions. Moreover, 
Shigemitsu may have considered as follows: If a peace treaty was 
not concluded at this time in Moscow, the last resort for 
normaization that the Japanese could rely on would be the 
Adenauer formula. From his viewpoint, if Japan adopted the 
formula, the Soviets would insist on shelving the issue of the
Habomais and Shikotan and, as a result of this, Japan would
substantially lose those islands. The only option that Shigemitsu 
could adopt to prevent this was to accept the Soviet terms and to 
be content with only the return of the Habomais and Shikotan.
At first Shigemitsu thought that all members of his delegation 
agreed with his view.2S But Matsumoto disagreed with him because 
of the political climate in Japan. Because of Shigemitsu's firm 
attitude over the territorial issue at the early stage of the
Moscow talks, Japanese public opinion was encouraged to hold a
stronger desire to regain the southern Kuriles.2eThe government 
and the party leaders in Tokyo were affected by this trend of 
public opinion and tended to oppose a settlement on Soviet terms. 
At the same time, the political situation in Tokyo was confused 
over the issue of the successor to Hatoyama who had expressed a 
wish to retire after the achievement of Soviet-Japanese 
normalization.
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Under these circumstances, Tokyo could not accept Shigemitsu's 
decision which might cause more disruption in the political arena 
because the decision was completely against the party platform of 
the L.D.P. Matsumoto considered that this domestic situation 
could hardly be ignored. Moreover, he seems to have had personal 
resentment towards Shigemitsu. In fact, in the summer of 1955, 
Matsumoto had already reached the same conclusion as Shigemitsu. 
But it was the foreign minister who had prevented the settlement 
proposed by Matsumoto. He could not now accept Shigemitsu's 
decision.ae Matsumoto tried to persuade Shigemitsu to change his 
mind.
Shigemitsu was so adamant that he insisted on signing a peace 
treaty including the territorial clause embodying the Soviet 
terms. He asserted that he was fully authorized by the government 
to make a decision without consulting Tokyo.29 On 13 August, 
however, the prime minister finally sent the instructions to 
Moscow to the effect that the cabinet opposed the settlement along 
Shigemitsu's idea. It seems that there were several exchanges of 
views between Shigemitsu and Tokyo. But it is still very 
uncertain what kind of views were exchanged, despite some 
description by Matsumoto. In fact, the descriptions in 
Matsumoto's memoirs were in contradiction with the contents of the 
Shigemitsu Diary in several important points.30 At any rate, Tokyo 
decided not to approve the settlement on the Soviet terms and 
Shigemitsu informed Shepilov that because he would attend the 
international conference of the Suez User's Union scheduled to be
CHAPTER 7
held from 16 August in London, the negotiations should be 
suspended temporarily. The Soviets accepted this proposal.31
The main reasons for the cabinet decision to refuse Shigemitsu's 
suggestion were closely connected with the domestic political 
situation. It seems that Shigemitsu realized this constraint 
imposed on him by domestic politics. He did not hide his 
resentment in his diary: '
13 August, Monday.
Last night, a special cabinet meeting must have been held. 
Although I have never ashed Tokyo for any instructions, they 
are making such a fuss there. I have tried to settle the 
negotiations and I am ready to take all blame for it. But 
Tokyo obstructed my efforts.
At the time of the Chankufeng Incidents, they had pushed 
the opposite side, now they are pushing their own side. 
Tokyo is filled up with the selfish.32
Thus, political struggels within the L.D.P. and the government 
undoubtedly affected the government decision. The death of Miki 
Bukichi in early July meant a great loss of a balancer in the 
party power struggles. Although Hatoyama was the president of the 
L.D.P., he had acquired the post because of the sudden death of 
Ogata Taketora, ex-president of the Liberal Party. In the L.D.P. 
there was still a strong anti-Hatoyama faction based on the 
former Liberal party members. Moreover, members of the Yoshida 
faction were still spearheads of opposition to normalization 
itself. The existence of this strong anti-Hatoyama group 
complicated and disrupted the government's management of 
diplomacy. Under these circumstances, the prime minister on 10
3#o
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August expressed a wish to retire when the settlement of the 
normalization talks was achieved. In the middle of this
political complication, Shigemitsu's suggestion to accept the 
Soviet terms arrived at Tokyo. The suggestion by the foreign 
minister could be another source of political confusion, because 
his suggestion was not at all consistent with the party platform 
drawn up in Hovember 1955. If the government had accepted 
Shigemitsu's recommendation, the unity of party could have been 
greatly disrupted.
As the instructions from Hatoyama on 13 August had indicated, 
another reason for the cabinet decision was the influence of 
public opinion.33 Public opinion became very firm and tough 
over normalization, particularly the territorial issues. In the 
press, Asahi, Main!chi, and Sankei Jiji had been taking a firm 
position over the reversion of the southern Kuriles.3A Hence, it 
can be argued that the Hatoyama administration was affected by the 
influence of the tough press attitudes. But what is interesting 
is that the opinion poll held at the end of August by Asahi rather 
showed a trend opposite to the government assumption. The 
Mainichi opinion poll held in the middle of June had shown that 
61% of the Japanese people were for the government demanding the 
southern Kuriles. The Asahi opinion poll indicated, however, that 
only 50% showed affirmative attitude towards normalization on the 
basis of the restoration of the southern Kuriles.3S This shows 
that the Japanese public did not particularly intensify its demand 
for the southern Kuriles during the Shigemitsu Moscow talks. In
3#/
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this sense, it can be argued that the government decision did not 
entirely reflect the trend of Japanese public opinion.
Finally, should the Shigemitsu recommendation be accepted by the 
cabinet, it could not be certain if a peace treaty based on the 
Soviet terms could be ratified. The divisions within the L.D.P. 
and the J.S.P.'s rigidity on the territorial question may have 
been expected to obstruct normalization on the basis of 
Shigemitsu* s suggestion.3,3 It would, therefore, be very 
difficult, if not impossible, for the government to secure enough 
support for the ratification of-tfiepeace treaty on the proposed 
basis.
Thus, Shigemitsu's Moscow talks resulted in failure. Now the 
Japanese government was faced with the necessity to search for the 
next step. But before they reached a conclusion, external 
pressure started to exert a great influence on the policy-making 
of the government.
SHIGEM1TSO-DULLES COWVERSATIOMS
On 19 August, Shigemitsu held a meeting with the U.S. secretary of 
state in London. Dulles was also attending the international 
conference over the Suez Canal problems in London. It was 
Shigemitsu who proposed the meeting.37 One of the main purposes
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was to inform Dulles of the development of the Moscow talks.
But it seems that Shigemitsu also intended to ask for American 
support for his new normalization policy, which he seemed to have 
drawn up after the Moscow talks. During the meeting, the Japanese 
foreign minister reported the development of Soviet-Japanese talks f  
in Moscow and explained that he understood that because the 
Soviets would not return the southern Kuriles, there would be no 
way other than for Japan to accept the Soviet terms.3S Then, 
Shigemitsu asked Dulles as to what the U.S. thought about 
convening an international conference over the disposition of the 
Kuriles and the southern Sakhalin.33 It seems that Shigemitsu's 
new policy was composed of the following two factors. First, 
Japan basically has to accept the Soviet terms on the territorial 
issue: Japanese recognition of Soviet sovereignty over the
southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles including Kunashiri and Etorofu. 
Second, the final disposal of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin 
should be decided through an international conference of the 
powers involved. Perhaps, his new line may have been based on the 
consideration that even if Japan recognized the Soviet possession 
of the Kuriles and Sakhalin, the final disposition ought to be 
confirmed by an international agreement by the signatories to the
S.F.P.T. Furthermore, this policy may have been intended to 
prevent the Hatoyama faction from becoming dominant in foreign 
policy making as a result of Shigemitsu's failure in Moscow.
Dulles' reactions were very disappointing for Shigemitsu. In 
response to the latter's question with regard to the international
3yj
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conference, Dulles did not show much enthusiasm over this . 
Originally, the Americans had not been positive about the 
international conference proposal since 1955. Instead, Dulles 
made a controversial statement over the southern Kuriles question. 
Dulles made a remark which was later to cause a stormy reactions 
in Japan. According to Matsumoto, Dulles stated to the effect:
The San Francisco Peace Treaty does not stipulate that the 
Kuriles should belong to the Soviet Union. Hence, if Japan 
accepts the Soviet territorial terms, it means that Japan 
offers the Soviets more benefit than is provided in the 
Peace Treaty. In this case, under Article 26 of the treaty, 
the United States is entitled to assert her annexation of 
Okinawa. I consider that the Soviet arguments are totally 
unreasonable.AO
It can be argued that Dulles was warning against Shigemitsu*s 
intention to concede to the Soviet Union over the territorial 
issue.
If the reference to Article 26 was intended as a warning to the 
Japanese, it must be concluded that the U.S. attitudes towards the 
Soviet-Japanese normalization talks had considerably changed. In 
fact, the Americans had begun to show a clear sign of deviation 
from their attitude of a benevolent observer at the end of May. 
Since shortly before the fishing negotiations in Moscow, the U.S. 
government had again been concerned about the possibility that 
the Japanese government would make too many concessions to the 
Soviet Union. The Americans were alarmed particularly because it 
was Kono who was appointed as the Japanese chief negotiator for 
the fishing talks. Even so, Dulles still tried to avoid any
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semblance of direct intervention. On 18 April, Dulles instructed 
that if Kono ashed for any advice, Allison could tell him that 
Japan should not accept Soviet terms without a proper quid-pro- 
quo. But he also instructed him not to give any specific advice 
on the territorial issue.*1 Nevertheless, the American anxiety 
became stronger as the fishing negotiations went on. On 10 Hay, 
at his meeting with Shigemitsu, Ambassador Allison gave a more 
explicit warning, pointing out that if Japan offered Russia 
something without gaining anything from her, the United States 
would have misgivings.42
It was the improvement of relations with China which intensified 
the American anxiety over Soviet-Japanese relations. Since the 
start of the Soviet-Japanese normalization talks in 1955, the 
United States had been sensitive to the possibility that a Soviet- 
Japanese rapprochement might trigger a more dangerous, from the 
American point of view, rapprochement with China. On 15 Hay, it 
was made clear that Chinese Prime Hinister Cheu En-lai had 
suggested that the P.R.C. was willing to welcome a visit by 
Hatoyama and Shigemitsu.*3 Probably, because of this 
development, the U.S. seemed to become alarmed by the possibility 
of Sino-Japanese rapprochement. A week later, Allison held a 
meeting with Shigemitsu and talked about domestic trends towards 
normalization with the P.R.C. As a result of this conversation, 
the American ambassador came to the conclusion that the U.S. 
government should take more positive steps to prevent Sino- 
Japanese rapprochement and recommended that President Eisenhower
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or Dulles send a personal message warning against the Sino- 
Japanese rapprochement.4'* This recommendation eventually did not 
receive the baching of the secretary of state. But the Department 
of State did instruct Allison at his discretion, to inform the 
Japanese that the U.S. government was concerned that 'Japan may 
accede to resumption Cof] diplomatic relations Cwith the U.S.S.R.] 
without obtaining adequate returns.'45[ My brackets] The U.S. 
government eveidently intended to prevent Sino-Japanese 
normalization by indicating its anxiety over Soviet-Japanese 
normalization.
Moreover, in connexion with the Soviet-Japanese fishing 
dispute, an interested Congressman requested the American 
government to take more positive steps with regard to Soviet- 
Japanese normalization talks. From the end of May to the 
beginning of June, Senator William Knowland, who was closely 
connected with American fishery interests engaged in northern 
water fishing, seemed to request the government's deeper 
involvement in Soviet-Japanese normalization. He was concerned 
about the damaging effect on the American fishing industries as a 
result of the Soviet-Japanese fishing dispute.4®
On 1 June, Senator Alexander Smith sent a personal letter to 
Walter Robertson, the assistant secretary, and suggested that the 
U.S. government should more positively commit itself to Soviet- 
Japanese normalization talks. He said,
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It is unnecessary to enlarge upon the consequences to the 
American position in the Far East if the fears of our 
friends in Japan are fulfilled. What dismays these friends 
is that, with all this going on, the United States seems to ^  
be either ignorant of or indifferent to the potentialities 
of the situation. They are even considering sending a group 
to Washington to inform our government of what is 
transpiring and to urge us to manifest our interest in a ^  
situation which might well deprive us of an important 
ally.47
'Our friends' in the above passage meant the anti-Hatoyama faction 
represented by former Prime Minister Yoshida. It must be 
remembered that Smith had been an influential member of the Far 
East Sub-Committee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 
1951-2 and that he had most strongly opposed transfer of the 
Kuriles and the southern Sakhalin to the Soviet Union at the time 
of the peace treaty making in 1951.43 His firm opposition was 
embodied in an attachment to the instrument of ratification of 
the S.F.P.T. which expressed the Senate's objection to the 
government offering any benefit to the Soviet Union over the 
treatment of the Kuriles, southern Sakhalin, the Habomais and 
Shikotan.49 Now in 1956, Smith requested the U.S. government to 
get more deeply involved with the Soviet-Japanese negotiations. 
He must have had a certain influence, though an indirect one, on 
the government's attitude towards the territorial dispute between 
the Soviet Union and Japan. Dulles, who was susceptible to 
congressional influence, may have been affected by these pressures 
from Congress. Moreover, the Eisenhower administration had to 
handle Congress very carefully because the presidential election 
was approaching.
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Finally, it should not be overlooked that the Republic of China 
tried to exert some influence in order to prevent Soviet-Japanese 
normalization. In late June, President Chiang Kaishek asked the 
U.S. to intervene in the normalization talks. Chiang was reported 
to consider that the Soviet-Japanese rapprochement 'may lead to 
"disaster"' and to hope that 'U.S. will do everything in its power 
to render abortive all efforts in that direction.'50 The 
Rationalist government must have been worried about the future 
possibility of Sino-Japanese normalization as a result of Soviet- 
Japanese rapprochement. It is not clear how the U.S. government 
reacted to Chiang's suggestion. Considering the importance of 
smooth relations with the Rationalist China after the Formosa 
crisis in 1955, however, it can be argued that the American 
government must have been aware of the necessity to take into 
consideration the anxieties of Chiang.
Under this considerable pressure from various quarters the 
United States government decided to take a more positive attitude 
towards normalization. Dulles' intentions behind his reference to 
Article 26 may have been to induce the Japanese back to the 
previous tough line after the failure of Shigemitsu who had been 
regarded as a leader of hard-liners on the normalization issue. 
Dulles' reference to Article 26 was leaked by Matsumoto to 
the Japanese press and was exposed to the Japanese public on 23 
August.51 For Matsumoto, Dulles' warning was an effective 
instrument to hamper Shigemitsu's insistence on accepting the 
Soviet territorial terms. It was expected that Dulles' warning
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would sweep away support for early normalization on the basis of 
the Soviet terms. Even so, Matsumoto should have recognized that 
the leakage would also help the anti-normalization factions 
represented by Ashida and Yoshida.
On 24 August, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu and Dulles held their 
second meeting. It seems that Shigemitsu raised at least the
following three points. Firstly, he again proposed the 
international conference over the final status of the Kuriles and 
Sakhalin.62 Secondly, he asked Dulles 'whether the allied powers 
objected if Japan found it necessary to accede to the Soviet 
position.' Shigemitsu stated, finally, that 'in his judgment it 
would serve the peace of the world, and be desirable from the 
standpoint of the community of nations, that the abnormal 
relations between Japan and the Soviet Union be terminated.' 
Then, he asked for Dulles' opinion on this argument.S3 
Shigemimtsu had not changed his position since the previous 
meeting with Dulles. He seems to have still asserted that 
normalization should be realized through a peace treaty on the 
Soviet terms.
Dulles had not basically changed his previous position, either. 
According to a Foreign Office document based an the information 
given by an official of U.S. Embassy in London, Secretary Dulles,
' in a further effort to strengthen the Japanese* tried to insist 
that the Russians needed a Peace Treaty as much, if not more than, 
as the Japanese.......and suggested that the Japanese might argue
J n .
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that the two islands in question were of vital strategic 
importance to them.' In reply, Shigemitsu requested Dulles to let 
him have a statement of Dulles' view on the strategic, legal and 
other aspects of the islands: Kunashiri and Etorofu.s,,t Perhaps, 
Shigemitsu may have considered that such a statement would be an 
effective political instrument to prevent Hatoyama's effort to 
adopt the Adenauer formula. In fact, on 19 August Hatoyama made 
it clear that he wished to visit Moscow for negotiations.
The United States was still reluctant about the international 
conference proposal made by Shigemitsu. Dulles considered that 
there were many drawbacks in the proposal and that there was very 
little possibility that the conference could yield the desired 
results for Japan. But he did not deny that the call for an 
international conference might be worth considering from the 
standpoint of U.S.-Japanese relations.es When Dulles asked 
Allison for a comment on this point, however, Allison entirely 
opposed the international conference. He considered that, the 
Soviet Union would not attend such a conference and that if such 
an international conference was to be convened, the Soviets would 
attempt 'to broaden it to include Taiwan and Ryukyus, and bring in 
Communist China.' Moreover, he suggested that there would be 
pressure from the J.S.P. to include discussion of the full return 
of Okinawa. Allison concluded that, though an international 
conference would never produce any practical result, the United 
States would be the loser on the inevitable propaganda battle 
during the conference.se
JSO;
CHAPTER 7
Allison, then, recommended another method to assist the 
Japanese, in particular Shigemitsu. The American ambassador 
suggested to the secretary of state that the U.S. government could 
no longer keep up its non-committal policy in view of the furore/  
in Tokyo over the reports with regard to Dulles' reference to 
Article 26. Moreover, he was aware that Shigemitsu was involved 
in the political crisis in Tokyo and might possibly be ousted from 
the cabinet. He thought that 'we can probably best serve our 
interests in Japan and at the same time give Shigemitsu some 
support, not by favouring international conference, but along 
following lines.' Then he suggested that urgent consideration 
should be given to 'public statement by the U.S. government and by
as many other San Francisco Treaty Powers as we can round up in
brief time, to effect we support Japan's interpretation of "Kurile 
Islands" in Article 2 of Peace Treaty as excluding Etorofu and 
Kunashiri, that on moral, historical and legal grounds, we believe 
they should be returned promptly to Japan.'57 This recommendation 
by Allison was accepted by Dulles. The Department of State 
started to prepare for the recommended public statement.
The Shigemitsu-Dulles meetings in London constituted a watershed 
in U.S. attitudes with regard to the Soviet-Japanese 
rapprochement. The United States changed her previous 'hands-off*
policy and started to take a more committal position. This change
was triggered by Dulles' reference to Article 26 of the S.F.P.T.
It is likely that Dulles was determined to intervene in the 
normalization talks at this stage. The fact that on 28 August at
<is/
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the press interview he did not deny the existence of his remarks 
on Article 26 supports this assumption.50
BRITAIN'S ATTITUDE
British attitudes since the second London talks were in a sharp 
contrast to the American ones. During the second London talks 
run by Matsumoto, the British Foreign Office seemed to be a mere 
recipient of information from Japan. Even during the period of 
the fishery talks in Moscow, in which the U.S. government had 
shown acute anxiety over the negotiations, Britain had been a 
cool observer.
Even so, the Japanese sometimes tried to obtain some assistance 
from Britain. From 18 to 25 April, Soviet Premier Bulganin and 
First Secretary Khrushchev visited Britain. The Japanese government 
seemed to take advantage of this occasion to break through the 
stalemate of Soviet-Japanese negotiations. On 18 April Japanese 
Ambassador Nishi called at the Foreign Office to see William Allen 
and brought a summary of developments at the second London 
talks. Then, touching on the question of the Japanese prisoners 
still detained in the Soviet Union, the ambassador expressed the 
hope that it might be possible for United Kingdom Ministers to 
make some reference to the question in the course of their 
conversations with the Russian leaders.59
CHAPTER 7
This Japanese request was conveyed to the northern Department 
and British Ambassador William Hayter, who had returned to London 
to deal with the visit by the Soviet leaders. Allen wrote, ' It 
would indeed give considerable pleasure in Japan if it were found 
possible to mention the matter to the Russian leaders.*eo It seems 
that they actually prepared an Aide-Memoire to meet the Japanese 
request. But the Japanese request was too late. At that time, 
there was only one more meeting with the Soviet leaders. The 
Northern Department considered that it would not constitute a very 
suitable occasion for handling the Japaense request and that to 
do so at that stage would give dispropotionate importance to it. 
At last, the Foreign Office decided to drop this issue owing to 
the difficulties of timing.61 It must be noted that though the 
British tried to avoid getting involved with any vital issue of 
the Soviet-Japanese talks, namely the territorial issue, they did 
not refuse to do something over the repatriation problems. 
Rather, the Foreign Office seems to have considered it beneficial 
in terms of Anglo-Japanese relations to indicate its will to help 
the Japanese on the issue.
Regarding the fishery dispute between the U.S.S.R. and Japan, 
the Foreign Office kept a cool attitude. Firstly, because Britain 
did not have crucial interests involved in the dispute, she was 
not very much interested in this problem. Secondly, the Foreign 
Office estimated that Soviet restrictions on Japanese fishing in 
the northern waters would not very much harm the general economic 
situation of Japan.62
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Shortly before the Moscow talks by Shigemitsu, Ambassador 
Dening had for the first time expressed to Shigemitsu his 
opinion as to how to settle the negotiations. Dening met him on 
18 July at the latter*s request. During their conversation, 
firstly Dening suggested that the Russians would not give way over 
the Kuriles, saying * If they did, I should regard it as the most 
startling event since the end of the war.' Then, he referred to 
the possibility of shelving the issue of the Kuriles and other 
territories and criticized the idea of shelving on the ground that 
it would seem normal to define the boundary between the U.S.S.R. 
and Japan. Shigemitsu agreed with these points Dening made.G3 It 
is now easy to figure out what Dening had in mind as to how to 
deal with the normalization. He considered that the Japanese 
would have to settle the negotiations on Soviet terms. In this 
sense, Dening had accurately predicted the future development of 
the negotiations. To be sure, he exposed to Shigemitsu his
opinion over the negotiations. But it was done as his personal
view. It is wrong to assume that the British also started to
make a positive reaction to the normalization talks.
The Japanese Foreign Ministry once sought a minor assistance 
from the British shortly before the foreign minister's departure 
to Moscow. On 20 July, Minister Oda of the Japanese Embassy in 
London called at the Foreign Office, and asked for its permission 
for the Japanese delegation to quote at the negotiations with 
Russia a part of the British answers to the Japanese
questionnaire sent in early July 1 9 5 5 . As already described in
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the previous chapters, the Japanese questionnaire contained two 
questions as to: whether the British regarded the Yalta
Declaration as constituting the final determination of the fate of 
the Kuriles and South Sakhalin foreshadowed in the Potsdam 
Declaration; whether in British opinion the Soviet government had 
the right to make such determination unilaterally. The British 
answer to the first question was negative, which meant that the 
answer was beneficial to the Japanese. But their reply to the 
second question was unfavourable to the Japanese, because the 
Foreign Office suggested to the Japanese in its reply that the 
Soviet Union would acquire preemptive rights by de facto 
possession in the course of time.es Hence, the Japanese did not 
desire to quote the British reply to the second answer. The 
Foreign Office conveyed its permission to Ambassador Sishi on 23 
July.se
During the Moscow talks by Shigemitsu, information with regard 
to the development of the negotiations was not often delivered to 
the Foreign Office by the Japanese. Even in Moscow, the Japanese 
delegation seemed to avoid contacting the British Embassy. 
After the failure in Moscow, Shigemitsu came to London to attend 
the Suez Canal Conference. The Foreign Office expected Shigemitsu 
to pay a courtesy call on British Prime Minister Anthony Eden or 
Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd. For the passible meeting, the 
Office prepared a brief policy papaer. According to this, the 
Foreign Office predicted that Shigemitsu might ask if the British 
would support a Japanese proposal that the future of the Kuriles
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should be referred to an international conference of the powers
concerned. The briefing suggested that the British should not
give any consent to the proposal because Britain should not be
involved in the Soviet-Japanese negotiations. It said: 'we might
/August
find ourselves in trouble with both sides. ,6e On 25. ShigemitsuA
had a conversation with Foreign Secretary Lloyd, but he did not 
raise the issue. He only handed a memorandum pointing out that 
the territorial issue between the Soviet Union and Japan had an 
international character. A member of the Foreign Office staff
wrote,j 'So we are continuing to lie low ..in the hope that
we shall not have to say anything. The more we look at the idea of 
a conference the more we dislike it.'s* The British Foreign 
Office, unlike the Americans,persisted in its non-committal 
attitudes towards the Soviet-Japanese normalization talks.
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CHAPTER 8 \
C H A P T E R  &  
CONCLUSION OR 
SOVIET—J APANESE 
JOINT DECLARATION
DECISION ON HATOYANA'S V IS IT  TO NDSCOV
Since the first Moscow talks had turned out to be a failure, the 
Hatoyama group in Tokyo intensified its efforts for the prime 
minister to visit Moscow and normalize Soviet-Japanese relations 
through the Adenauer formula. On 19 August, Hatoyama made it 
clear that he wished to go to Moscow for normalization talks. But 
there was strong opposition to Hatoyama's decision in Japan. 
Even some leaders of the pro-normalization group, for example the 
Minister of M. I.T.I. Ishibashi Tanzan, disagreed with sending 
Hatoyama on the ground that there was no point of Hatoyama going 
to Moscow, unless there was some prospect for success.1 
Criticism from the anti-normalization group was harsher. The 
Yoshida faction certainly attacked the prime minister’s decision. 
To cope with this political complexity, the Hatoyama group implied 
that the prime minister would retire when diplomatic relations 
with the Soviet Union were restored. Behind this, there must have 
been the consideration that some of the factions of the L.D.P. 
whose leaders desired to be the next prime minister would come to 
support Hatoyama in order to acquire a favourable reward from him
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in terms of selection of his successor. In fact, on 1 September, 
it was reported that Hatoyama intended to appoint his successor in 
order to avoid further confusion within the party.2
On 3 September, Shigemitsu arrived in Tokyo. At the cabinet 
meeting held in the afternoon, he still asserted that Soviet- 
Japanese relations should be restored in the form of a peace 
treaty on Soviet terms.3 Having failed to secure American
support for his international conference plan, however, Shigemitsu 
could not exert as much influence as he had done before the first 
Moscow talks.
Hatoyama and his supporters seems to have attempted to set up a 
c
fait acompll through a series of secret meetings with the Soviet 
Mission in Tokyo. Kono and Takasaki, the director of the
Economic Planning Agency, consulted Sergei Tikhvinsky, the 
representative of the unrecognized Soviet Mission, who had 
succeeded Domnitsky in May, with regard to conditions for
resumption of the normalization talks from 3 to 5 September.-1 The 
Japanese brought a proposal regarding the conditions for the
resumption of the talks, which was constructed by Matsumoto. On 3 
September, coming back to Tokyo with Shigemitsu, Matsumoto exposed 
his plan along the Adenauer formula to Hatoyama and Kono.s It is 
said that Matsumoto had already arranged with Malik the 
proceedings for the next talks.6 Perhaps he had already set up
this plan as the result of his consultation with Malik. His plan 
was to be embodied in the five conditions for the resumptions of
S6Z
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the negotiations expressed by Hatoyama on 5 September. Kono and 
Takasaki must have talked about the Matsumoto plan to Tikhvinsky 
and figured out the conditions based upon it.
After these secret preparation, Hatoyama explained to the 
party leaders those five conditions on 5 September. He explained 
that he intended to go to Moscow on condition that the Soviet 
Union should accept the certain Japanese positions. As the most 
important prerequisite condition, the territorial issues should 
for the time being be shelved for future negotiations. According 
to Hatoyama's explanation, the Soviets should then accept the 
following five conditions: the Soviets should agree to the
termination of the state of war; the exchange of ambassadors; 
the immediate repatriation of Japanese detainees in the Soviet 
Union; the coming into force of the fishery agreement concluded 
in May 1956; and the support for the Japanese application for 
membership of the United Nations.-7 Now Hatoyama decided to 
contact directly the Soviet leaders. Hatoyama sent a letter 
containing the above five conditions to the Soviet premier.. The 
substantive part of the letter is as follows.
With a view to normalization of relations between the Soviet 
Union and Japan I would like to arrange this without a 
treaty, on condition that negotiations on the territorial 
question be continued at a later date, in the following 
manner:
1. Termination of the state of war.
2. Mutual establishment of Embassies.
3. Immediate repatriation of detainees.
4. Implementation of the Fisheries [Agreement].
5. Soviet support for Japanese entry into the UN.
3£3
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From tlie Kono-Tichvinsky talks we gained the impression that 
these five conditions are acceptable to the Soviet 
Government and I would appreciate it if your Excellency 
would confirm this in writing. We are ready to resume 
negotiations in Moscow as soon as we receive you 
confirmation.
In these negotiations I hope those matters agreed upon 
previously by the delegates of the two countries at London 
and Moscow will be adopted to the extent passible.My 
brackets]
Premier Bulganin's reaction came very quickly. On 13 
September, he replied to Hatoyama, as follows:
I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 
September 11 in which you express the readiness of the 
Japanese Government to resume the Japanese-Soviet 
negotiations in Moscow immediately and in which you request ** 
confirmation of the Government of the U.S.S.R. regarding the 
normalization of the relations between the two countries.
I have the honour to confirm the readiness of my 
Government to resume negotiations for the normalization of 
relations without a peace treaty in view of the impasse 
arising from the following matters which have been discussed 
by the two countries. We are ready to proceed in accordance 
with the following several points:
1. Declaration of termination of the state of war.
2. Resumption of diplomatic relations and mutual
establishment of Embassies.
3. Release and repatriation of all Japanese nationals
sentenced in the U.S.S.R.
4. Implementation of the Fisheries Treaty signed [sic]
May 4, 1956.
5. Support of Japan's request to enter the UM.
Moreover, regarding your desire on the points agreed upon 
during the course of negotiations in London and Moscow, I 
consider that both sides shall be able to exchange views on 
these points.9
Bulganin accepted the five conditions, and agreed to re-open 
the normalization talks. But a vital divergence between the two 
letters can be seen. The Japanese intention to obtain Soviet
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confirmation of continuing the territorial negotiations was 
ignored in the Bulganin letter. In Japan, anti-Hatoyama and anti- 
normalization groups did not overlook this. They asserted that it 
was necessary to confirm if the Soviet Union understood that the 
territorial questions still remained unsettled, and they Insisted 
on sending Matsumoto to Moscow for that purpose. On 17 September, 
a top leaders of the government met and they decided to send 
Matsumoto.10 On 13 September, the U.S. Aide-Memoire over the 
disposition of the Kuriles and Sakhalin was publicized. The Aide- 
Memoire clearly expressed the view that the U.S. government 
supported the Japanese claims to the southern Kuriles. Anti- 
Hatoyama groups were encouraged by this and, therefore, Hatoyama 
could not ignore their insistence.
Matsumoto arrived at Moscow on 25 September. That day, 
Matsumoto called at the Soviet Foreign Ministry and met Deputy 
Foreign Minister JT.T. Fedorenko. Prior to this meeting, Matsumoto 
and Takahashi Michitoshi, the vice-directore of the Treaty Bureau 
of the Foreign Ministry, had prepared a draft of official 
memorandum to be exchanged, which was handed the memorandum to 
Fedorenko. This memorandum was designed to state clearly Japan's 
desire that 'even after the restoration of normal relations 
between the two countries, Soviet-Japanese relations will become 
firmer on the basis of a formal peace treaty containing ^  
territorial issues,' and that 'the negotiations for the conclusion 
of the peace treaty including the territorial issue will be 
continued after the restoration of normal diplomatic relations
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between the U.S.S.R. and Japan.'11 This letter was addressed 
through Federenkcjto Andrey Gromyko, the then first deputy foreign 
minister.
Two days later, Fedorenko conveyed the information that the 
Soviet government had no objection to Matsumoto's draft. On 29 
September the letters were exchanged between Matsumoto and 
Gromyko. The letter from Gromyko simply repeated Matsumoto's 
draft and added:
The Soviet government understands the Japanese government's 
aformentioned view, and confirms that it agrees to continue 
the negotiations for the conclusion of a peace treaty 
including the territorial issue after normal diplomatic 
relations is restored between the two countries.12
While the Soviet confirmation was obtained in Moscow, the 
domestic struggle in Tokyo developed to a new stage. In fact, on 
20 September, immediately after Matsumoto's departure, an
emergency assembly of the L.D.P. decided to establish a new 
party policy for normalization. This policy excluded the Adenauer 
formula from acceptable policy options. The main points of the 
new platform were: to request the immediate and unconditional
repatriation of the Japanese detainees; to request the immediate 
reversion of the Habomais and Shikotan; to continue the
negotiations on the disposal of Kunashiri and Etorofu after the
conclusion of a peace treaty; to deal with the other territories
in accordance with the contents of the S.F.P.T.; and to include 
in a peace treaty the clauses with which an agreement was worked
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out during the previous Soviet-Japanese negotiations in London and 
Moscow.13 The hard liners, such as Ashida, did not admit the 
validity of the Matsumoto-Gromyko exchange documents on the 
ground that they were not consistent with the new party platform. 
Faced with this adamant and somewhat intriguing obstruction from 
hostile factions, Hatoyama seemed to decide to adopt an 
unilateral method. On 2 October, Hatoyama held a cabinet meeting 
and made the final decision on his visit to Moscow. By doing so, 
he realized his visit to Moscow, in spite of domestic obstruction 
to it.
U.S. AIDE-MEMOIRE OH THE MQRTHERH TERRITORIES QUESTIOHS AMD 
BRITISH ATTITUDE
In the middle of September, while the Japanese government was 
being confused over the issue of Hatoyama's visit to Moscow, the 
U.S. government attempted to exert more direct influence on the 
Japanese. Ambassador Allison's proposal of 30 August for issuing 
an Aide-Memoire to support Japan's claims to the southern 
Kuriles had been taken into consideration by the Department of 
State. Around 3 September, the Department completed a draft 
Memoire. With several amendments, the completed Memoire was
handed to Tani Masayuki,the Japanese ambassador to the U.S., by 
Secretary Dulles on 7 September. The next day, Ambassador
Allison also handed the same Aide-Memoire to the foreign minister.
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A document called 'Oral Points' was also attached to the 
memoire.1A
The Aide-Memoire, the 'Oral Points', and the Tani-Dulles 
conversation provide significant clues to understand American 
policy at this period towards the normalization talks. The 
Memoire contained at least the following five main points. 
Firstly, it was claimed that the state of war between the U.S.S.R. 
and Japan should formally be terminated. Secondly, it clearly 
denied the legal validity of the Yalta Agreement by simply 
characterizing the agreement as a statement of common purpose, 
not as a final determination. Thirdly, it indicated that the U.S. 
government understood that Japan did not have the right to 
transfer sovereignty over the territories which had been renounced 
by her in the S.F.P.T. Fourthly, the Aide-Memoire said that the 
signatories to the S.F.P.T. would not be bound to accept any 
actions by Japan of the kind like the territorial transference. 
Finally, it clearly enunciated that Kunashiri and Etorofu along 
with the Habomais and Shikotan which were part of Hokkaido had 
always been part of Japan.1® What the U.S. government meant to 
express by this Aide-Memoire is now clear. It tried to stop the 
Japanese from giving away the Kuriles and Sakhalin and to disuade 
them from giving up restoring the southern Kuriles. In addition, 
the first point may have implied that the normalization should 
take a 'formal' form, namely a peace treaty.
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The 'Oral Points' also indicated significant characteristics of 
American policy. The American assertions embodied in the ' Oral 
Points' were as follows. Firstly, it was stated that the United 
States government did not support at this stage the international 
conference plan proposed by Shigemitsu. Secondly, it was assumed 
that the Soviet Union would not return the southern Kuriles 
because Soviet military strategic interests made their reversion 
unlikely; but it added, 'this does not necessarily affect the 
possibility of a treaty formula by which Japan does not purport 
itself to relinquish sovereignty.' Thirdly, the Oral Points
indicated that the U.S. government was not at all keen on the 
Adenauer-type normalization. It suggested that Soviet insistance 
on the Adenauer formula might well be a bargaining device and that 
the Soviet Union which had a record of breaking treaties would 
possibly not implement the promises made under the Adenauer 
formula. Finally, it was suggested that the U.S. was willing, if 
the Japanese desired so, to give her diplomatic support to 
Japanese requests to other nations that they should make 
declarations similar to the American one. Dulles also recommended 
to Tani that Japan take a tougher line an the ground that the 
Soviets were more eager to restore normal relations than the 
Japanese were.16
From those documents and the contents of the conversations, we 
can derive certain conclusions. The U.S. government implicitly 
suggested that from its viewpoint it was desirable for Japan to 
conclude a peace treaty with Russia without transferring or
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giving up any of the former Japanese territories. In other 
words, the Americans, and in particular Dulles, preferred'a peace 
treaty in which the final disposition of southern Sakhalin and 
the Kuriles including the southern Kuriles remained to be settled 
in the future. Furthermore, the U.S. government was willing to 
encourage the Japanese to endeavour to restore the southern 
Kuriles by setting up a common front with the other western allies 
who were the signatories to the S.F.P.T.
The Aide-Memoire was published on 13 September in Japan. 
Although Foreign Minister Shigemitsu seemed to be unhappy about 
its contents,1"' the anti-Hatoyama factions took advantage of it in 
order to justify their opposition to Hatoyama's visit to Moscow. 
In fact, the Yoshida faction had already known the contents of the 
Aide-Memoire before 13 September. On 12 September, Ikeda Hayato, 
who was one of the most influential leaders of the that faction, 
issued a statement to the effect that the Japanese should not give 
up their territorial claims to the Kuriles because the most 
important signatory to the S.F.P.T. finally came to support the 
Japanese claims to those islands. He also criticized the Adenauer 
formula by saying that it would result in substantial transference 
of the southern Kuriles to the Soviet Union.1®
Although the U.S. government was reluctant to support an 
international conference over the disposal of the Kuriles and 
Sakhalin, it was willing to offer Japan good offices to acquire 
some kind of support for her territorial claims to the southern
S?o
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Kuriles. Originally, this idea had been given by Ambassador Tani 
at his meeting with Dulles on 7 September. Since then, the 
Japanese had not requested the U.S. to proceed with this goal. 
Secretary of State Dulles was, however, very positive about 
calling the international support. He seemed to intend to obtain 
Japan’s support over the Suez crisis by helping her in the 
normalization talks. For this purpose, he thought of calling upon 
Nationalist China, Britain and countries which had participated 
in the Potsdam Declaration, to issue their support for Japan's 
territorial claims to the southern Kuriles.19
In the middle of September, the American government attempted 
to acquire British consent to this plan for international 
support. Noel Hemmendinger, the acting director of the Office of 
Northeastern Asian Affairs, who was the author of the Aide- 
Memoire, met A.J. de la Mare, a counsellor - of the British 
Embassy in Washington and talked about the international support 
plan.20 Although Hemmendinger did not mention anything specific 
about the plan, the British could readily expect that the United 
States would ask for their cooperation. The British reaction to 
the American intention was, however, not at all favourable De la 
Mare wrote, ' I naturally did not commit us in any way but I told 
him quite plainly.. . . that we were not anxious to become 
involved...'21
The British Foreign Office actually did not agree even with the 
line of the American Aide-Memoire regarding the status of the
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southern Kuriles. On 13 September, the information regarding the 
Aide-Memoire came to the Foreign Office. Its legal adviser, G.L. 
Simpson, reacted to the part of the memoire referring to the 
status of the southern Kuriles. He doubted whether an 
international arbitration should be applied for the matter of 
Kunashiri and Etorofu and concluded, 1 we cannot go as far as the 
Americans.'22 A.L. Mayall, an assistant of the Far Eastern 
Department expressed disagreement with the American position more 
strongly. He wrote, 'we should have great difficulty in accepting 
the American contention.'23
The Japanese must have known that the British were not very 
helpful on the territorial issues. In July and October 1955, the 
British government had answered the Japanese questionnaires 
regarding the validity of their territorial claims against the 
Russians unfavourably. The Japanese must have known that it was 
almost impossible to obtain British support on this issue. As 
indicated in the Oral Paints, the Americans were reluctant to 
canvas for international support without a request from the 
Japanese government. In a situation where the Japanese 
themselves had to deny the feasibility of the international 
support plan, there was no possibility that the plan could be 
achieved. It was unlikely that Hatoyama would ask the U.S. for 
good officies for the international support. For he had already 
decided to adopt the Adenauer formula and such international 
support would be inconsistent with his decision to shelve the 
territorial question in Moscow. Moreover, the U.S. government had
CHAPTER 8
to give up using Shigemitsu as a leverage in the Japanese 
government for that purpose. Ambassador Allison was clearly aware 
that Shigemitsu had already lost influence in the decision-making 
process in his government. Dulles was faced with a dead-end. In 
consequence, the International support plan was cancelled.
SECQSD MOSCOW TALKS AMD COMCLUSIOM OF JOIMT DECLARATION
As mentioned above, Hatoyama and his supporters in the 
government and the party had only brought about his visit to 
Moscow by ignoring strong opposition from anti-normalization 
quarters in the party. Considering the necessity of obtaining 
their support for the ratification of normalization in the Diet, 
however, Hatoyama had to take into consideration the influence of 
those opposition forces, when the negotiating policy was drawn up. 
Hence, the government line for the second Moscow talks became in 
the nature of a compromise between his Adenauer formula and his 
opponents' hard line policy which had been presented by the new 
party policy issued on 20 September. The most significant point 
on which Hatoyama and his supporters were urged to make a 
concession was in respect of the treatment of the Habomais and 
Shikotan. The result most feared by the hard-liners was that the 
Soviet Union would postpone the settlement of the Habomais and 
Shikotan questions under the Adenauer formula. They insisted that 
the government should demand immediate reversion of those islands.
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Moreover, there was another demand in hard liners that the
Japanese should endeavour to obtain also Kunashiri and Etorofu.
As to this question, Hatoyama must have felt some pressure from 
the United States as presented in her Aide-Memoire of 7 September.
According to Matsumoto, the Hatoyama cabinet drew up its 
negotiating policy based on the compromise described above, before 
the departure of the prime minister which was scheduled for 12 
October. The policy for the second Moscow talks consisted of
three stages. First, it instructed that the delegation should 
at the first stage attempt to conclude a peace treaty. The peace 
treaty should be based on the settlement of the territorial issues 
as follows:
(1) The Soviet Union should agree,
1. To return immediately the Habomais and Shikotan,
2. To hand over Kunashiri and Etorofu to Japan after 
the restitution of Okinawa.
(2) Japan should renounce southern Sakhalin and the Kuriies 
northward of the abovementioned islands in paragraph (I).*®
It is clear that the Japanese government now clearly decided to 
renounce the Kuriies excluding the southern Kuriies and southern 
Sakhalin. But it did not go as far as to recognize Soviet
sovereignty over them. Regarding the southern Kuriies, the 
government included a condition for their reversion. There is no 
evidence to clarify why it referred to the reversion of Okinawa 
as the condition for that of Kunashiri and Etorofu. But it can be 
argued that the government attempted to show its willingness to 
make a concession over the southern Kuriies. At the same time, the
J7y
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Japanese government may have tried to make a use of Soviet 
criticism of American occupation of Okinawa.
In fact, during the second London talks, Soviet Plenipotentiary 
Malik had once stated that 'The United States were still 
controlling Japanese territory without any justification.*26 He 
had intended to use this fact of American occupation of Okinawa in 
order to point out the contradiction between Japanese claims to 
the southern Kuriies and Japanese approval of American occupation 
of Okinawa. Perhaps, this connexion between the southern Kuriies 
question and Okinawa problem may have been perceived in the 
Japanese government. It must be remembered that Kono had stated 
on 20 July that the Japanese government had formulated a proposal 
for restoring 'residual sovereignty' of the southern Kuriies from 
the Soviet Union. Probably the government had at that period 
considered that it would be able to take advantage of this 
connexion between Okinawa and the southern Kuriies. It can be 
argued that the Hatoyama cabinet also tried to use it in Moscow. 
Considering that the 'residual sovereignty' proposal seems to have 
been put aside because of Shigemitsu's firm opposition, the policy 
which Hatoyama would bring to Moscow indicated that influence of 
Shigemitsu in the cabinet had drastically decreased after his 
failure in Moscow.
The government also intended to ask the Soviets for the 
immediate return of the Habomais and Shikotan. Originally, 
Hatoyama had hoped to get back the Habomais and Shikotan even if
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lie had intended to adopt basically the Adenauer formula. He 
expressed in June that he had in mind a mixture of the reversion 
of the Habomais and Shikotan and the shelving of the settlement of 
the other territories.3:7 The prime minister retreated, however, 
from this position which had been expressed in his letter to 
Bulganin. These territorial claims apparently reflected a 
compromise between the proponents of Hatoyama and his opponents.
The second stage of the government's negotiating policy was to 
attempt to conclude a basic convention in case of Soviet refusal 
of the Japanese territorial claims described above. It was 
suggested that the basic conventions should include the following 
clauses:
1. The termination of the state of war and the resumption of
diplomatic relations.
2. The observation of the U.N. Charter.
3. Non-intervention in domestic affairs.
4. Commercial clause.
5. Fishery clause.
6. Ratification.23
It was also recommended to attach a joint communique providing 
for the repatriation of the Japanese detainees, Soviet support of 
Japan's entry into the U.N., and a schedule for the future 
conclusion of a peace treaty including the territorial issue.
At the third stage, in case of Soviet refusal of the second 
proposal, it was suggested that Japan should work out an exchange 
of notes and a joint communique. The exchange of notes was
<3?6'
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intended to include the following items: the termination of the 
state of war; the resumption of diplomatic relations; basic 
principles for relations between the two countries, namely non­
intervention in domestic affairs, and peaceful resolution of 
international conflicts; an article stipulating schedule for the 
conclusion of a peace treaty including the territorial question; 
and ratification. A joint communiqu6 was designed to stipulate 
an understanding on repatriation of the detainees and Soviet 
suppoort for Japan's entry to the U. If. 33Looking at the policy for 
the third stage, we can recognize that Hatoyama was so 
determined, as to intend to normalize Soviet-Japanese relations 
even in the form of an exchange of notes, which did not have to be 
ratified by the Diet to come into effect.
Hatoyama, Kono and other members of the delegation arrived at 
Moscow on 13 October. Kono immediately started preliminary 
discussions with Ishkov, the Soviet minister for fishery. As 
Matsumoto recalled, the most important point was how to cope with 
the reversion of the Habomais and Shikotan.30 At this first 
meeting, Kono asked Ishkov to communicate to Bulganin that
the Japanese strongly desired immediate restoration of the 
Habomais and Shikotan.31
.— ■>
The first plenary session was convened at noon on 15 October.
The session started with addresses by the Soviet premier. After 
having emphasized the importance of normalization of Soviet- 
Japanese relations, Bulganin enunciated that the Soviet government
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accepted the Japanese request for continuation of the negotiations 
for the conclusion of a peace treaty including the territorial 
question.32 In reply, Hatoyama made a speech and explained that 
the Soviet government had accepted the five conditions submitted 
in his letter to Bulganin and that it had also agreed to resume 
the normalization talks on condition that both countries would 
continue the negotiations for the conclusion of a peace treaty 
including the territorial issue.33 Both sides made it clear that 
they desired a fruitful outcome from the negotiations and that the 
negotiations would be run on the basis of a mutual understanding 
that the two countries would continue their efforts to conclude a 
peace treaty by settling the territorial issue in the future.
After the addresses, the Soviets submitted the drafts of a joint 
declaration and a commercial and navigation protocol as a basis 
of the negotiations. Then, both parties agreed to set up an 
expert committee to work out drafts acceptable to both parties. 
Matsumoto was appointed as the Japanese representative on the 
committee and Gromyko as the Soviet representative.
In the afternoon, Kono held an informal meeting with Ishkov 
again. During the luncheon hosted by the Soviets after the first 
plenary session Kono managed to acquire Khrushchev's promise to 
have an informal conversation with him. 34 The meeting with
Ishkov was a preliminary meeting for the coming conversation 
with Khrushchev. At the meeting with Ishkov, Kono took up the
j ' n
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Soviet draft declaration as an adenda. The draft stipulated the 
following points:
1. Termination of the state of war.
2. Resumption of diplomatic and consular relations.
3. Observation of the U.JT. Charter
4. Soviet support for Japan's entry to the United Nations.
5. Repatriation of the Japanese detainees.
6. Waiver of war claims.
7. Start of commercial negotiations.
8. Implementation of the fishery agreement and the sea
rescue agreement concluded in May 1956.
Added to these, the Soviet draft contained a clause on banning the 
production, experimentation, and use of nuclear weapons as Article
9. Article 10, which was the final clause, stipulated that both 
parties should agree to continue the negotiations for the 
conclusion of a peace treaty including the territorial issue after 
the resumption of normal diplomatic relations between the two 
countries. 3S
The problem for the Japanese delegation was that the Soviet 
draft did not contain any clause stipulating the immediate return
of the Habomais and Shikotan, Kono picked up this point and
argued that the Japanese government could not accept it. He 
explained that the delegation was bound to follow the new party 
platform formulated shortly before their departure which provided 
that the Habomais and Shikotan should be immediately returned to 
Japan. Then, he proposed to provide in the joint declaration that 
those islands should be immediately returned to Japan and asked 
the Russians to examine the idea that the Soviet Union would
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return Kunashiri and Etorofu when the United States retroceded 
Okinawa in the future. But Kono added that it was sufficient for 
the declaration to stipulate that the territorial problems except 
the Habomais and Shikotan should be negotiated some time later or 
when Okinawa was retroceded. Ishkov promised to convey the 
proposals to Bulganin and Khrushchev.3S
On 16 October ', Khrushchev invited Kono to the Kremlin. During 
his meeting, Kono requested Khrushchev to return the Habomais and 
Shikotan immediately when diplomatic relations between the two 
countries were restored. But the first secretary asserted that,*^ 
because the Japanese had suggested that the territorial problem 
would not have to be discussed at this time, the Soviet government 
had accepted the five conditions and agreed to resume the 
normalization talks. The questions over the Habomais and Shikotan 
were, he continued, none other than the territorial issue. 
Khrushchev argued that the territorial problem had to be dealt 
with in future negotiations for a peace treaty and that, if Japan 
desired to conclude one, the Soviets would agree to include a 
clause providing the transference of those islands.37 Khrushchev 
clearly refused to return the Habomais and Shikotan immediately.
Then, Khrushchev proceeded to critisize Japan's attitudes 
towards the territorial question. He said, 'Although the Japanese 
repeatedly request us to return the northern four islands (=the 
Habomais, Shikotan, Kunashiri, and Etorofu), the United States has 
not yet returned Okinawa. Ve shall return the Habomais and
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Shikotan after the conclusion of a peace treaty between Japan and 
the Soviet Union when the Americans return Okinawa.'30 In reply, 
Kono asked if the Soviet Union agreed to return Kunashiri and 
Etorofu when the Americans returned Okinawa. Khrushchev retorted 
that the Soviet position would never change.33
On 17 October, Kono met Khrushchev again and repeated his 
request fof the immediate reversion of the Habomais and 
Shikotan.In response, Khrushchev started to show a sign of minor 
compromise. Although he still suggested that the joint declaration 
should stipulate that the Habomais and Shikotan would be returned 
at the time of the conclusion of a peace treaty and of the 
American reversion of Okinawa, he implied that Russia could 
accept a modus vivendi providing that those islands would be 
returned to Japan after the conclusion of the peace treaty 
regardless of when the U.S. retroceded Okinawa.*40 It seen© that 
Kono did not make any comment on this. Instead, he submitted a 
Japanese draft of the joint declaration over the question of the 
Habomais and Shikotan.
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in response to the 
desire of Japan and in consideration of her interests, 
agrees to transfer the Habomai Islands and the island of 
Shikotan to Japan.
Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, agree 
to continue their negotiations for the conclusion of a peace 
treaty including the treatment of territorial question and 
for the comprehensive settlement of the problems resulted 
from the existence of the state of war between the two 
countries, even after normal diplomatic relations have been 
re-established between the two countries.*41
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T M s  proposal was intended to imply that the Habomais and Shikotan 
would be returned immediately when normalization was achieved. 
Khrushchev did not, however, not accept it, and repeated the idea 
of modus vlvendi.
In the evening, Fedorenko, the deputy foreign minister, brought 
the draft embodying Khrushchev's ideas indicated at his meeting 
with Kono.
Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agree to 
continue their negotiations for the conclusion of a peace 
treaty after normal diplomatic relations have been re- s  
established between the two countries.
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in response to 
the desire of Japan and in consideration of her interests, 
agrees to transfer the Habomai Islands and the island of 
Shikotan, provided, however, that the actual transfer of 
these islands shall come into effect after the peace treaty 
between Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is 
concluded and after the island of Okinawa and other Japanese 
islands under the control of the United States of America 
are retroceded to Japan.A3
Fedorenko also handed a draft of the modus vlvendi, which read:
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to transfer 
the Habomai Islands and the Island of Shikotan after the 
peace treaty between Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Repbulics is concluded and even before the island of Okinawa 
and other Japanese islands under the control of the United 
States of America are liberated.
On 18 October, the third meeting was held between Kono and 
Khrushchev. Kono brought with him a proposal which contained a 
crucial concession on the Japanese part.
CHAPTER 8
Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agree to 
continue their negotiations for the conclusion of the peace 
treaty between the two countries including the territorial 
question, after normal diplomatic relations have been re­
established between the two countries.
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in response to 
the desire of Japan and in consideration of her interests, 
agrees to transfer the Habomai Islands and the island of 
Shikotan, provided, however, the actual transfer of the 
islands shall be effected after the peace treaty between 
Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has been 
concluded.' ASCMy italics]
The Japanese now accepted in this draft the reversion of the 
Habomais and Shikotan after the conclusion of the peace treaty. 
They requested Russia, however, to delete from the Soviet draft 
the part referring to the reversion of Okinawa.
Khrushchev agreed with the draft except on one point. He 
requested Japan to remove the phrase 1 including the territorial 
question'. The Japanese were astonished, because the Soviets had 
already agreed in the Bulganin letter to Hatoyama and the Gromyko- 
Matsumoto letters to continue the negotiations on the territorial 
issue after normalization. In other words, from the Japan's 
viewpoint, the phrase 'including the territorial question', had 
been an essential condition for the resumption of the 
negotiations.Khrushchev explained that with this phrase, the 
declaration would clearly mean that the disposal of Kunashiri and 
Etorofu would be discussed later and he firmly insisted on 
deletion of the p h r a s e . I t  became obvious to the Japanese that 
Khrushchev desired to avoid any expression in the declaration
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which was not consistent with the Soviet contention that the
territorial question had already been settled.
Faced with this adamant refusal by Khrushchev, the Japanese 
decided to accept his amendment of the Japanese draft on condition 
that the Soviets should agree to publish the Gromyko-Matsumoto 
letters. These letters clearly mentioned that the Soviet Union 
and Japan had agreed to resume the normalization talks on the 
basis of a mutual understanding that the territorial questions 
would be dealt with in future negotiations for the conclusion of 
a peace treaty. According to Hatsumoto, Kono and he feared that 
the Soviets would raise the issue of Okinawa again if the Japanese 
refused to accept their assertion, and that it would complicate 
the negotiations further."17 They wanted to avoid any 
prolongation caused by this kind of complication. They were 
confident in convincing the Japanese public and the party leaders 
that even without the phrase, 'including the territorial issue', 
the Joint declaration could be interpreted as providing that the 
Soviet Union and Japan had agreed to continue their negotiations 
over the territorial questions. Hatoyama wrote in his memoirs,
.... The delegation examined and discussed this question.
As a result, we reached the following conclusion. Even if
we delete the phrase, 'including the territorial questions', 
'continue their negotiations for the conclusion of the 
peace treaty' can be understood to imply that the two 
countries would negotiate the territorial issues in the 
future, because no other issues than the territorial issues 
over Kunashiri and Etorofu remained unsettled.**
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The Japanese delegation informed the Kremlin that they agreed with 
the Soviet amendment to the Japanese draft provision.
Another important issue during the negotiations was Soviet 
support for Japan's entry to the United Nations. The Soviet 
government did not show any objection to Japan's request for its 
support. On this issue, however, there were strong suspicions 
within the Japanese and United States governments over the 
credibility of the Soviet guarantee to support Japan's entry to 
the United Nations. For example, Secretary Dulles more than once 
warned the Japanese that the Soviet Union had a record of treaty 
breaking. In order to confirm the Soviet promise, Hatoyama 
proposed to exchange letters with Bulganin on this matter together 
with several other issues. Bulganin agreed and the letters were 
exchanged on 18 and 19 October. In the letters, Hatoyama and 
Bulganin confirmed their understanding that the Soviet Union would 
unconditionally support Japan's entry to the United Nations. As 
a minor issue, the Soviets proposed to insert a clause expressing 
a mutual undertanding that both countries would make efforts to 
ban the production, experimentation, and use of nuclear weapons. 
From the Japanese viewpoint, it was unacceptable in the light of 
her relations with the United States. Hatoyama requested Russia 
to remove this clause from the joint declaration. The Soviets 
accepted this claim.
Both the Soviets and the Japanese had reached final agreement 
on the contents of the joint declaration. At 5:45 pm on 19 October,
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the ceremony of signing was held in the presense of all members of 
the Japanese delegation, Bulganin, Shepilov, Gromyko, and other 
leaders of the Soviet government. Khrushchev could not attend the 
ceremony because he had flown to Warsaw to cope with the unstable 
situation in Poland. The plenipotentiaries of Japan, Hatoyama, 
Kono and Matsumoto, for the Japanese part and Bulganin, and 
Shepilov for the Soviet part signed the Soviet-Japanese Joint 
Declaration and the protocol concerning the development of trade 
and mutual granting of most-favoured-nation status.
The Japanese delegation returned to Tokyo on 1 November, after 
visiting London and Hew York. In London, Hatoyama called at 10 
Downing Street to see Prime Minister Anthony Eden. They do not 
seem to have talked about the Soviet-Japanese normalization talks. 
In particular, Eden had been recommended by the Foreign Office not 
to 'enter into any detailed discussion of them beyond perhaps 
saying that he welcomes the normalization of diplomatic relations 
between the two countries as a contribution to lessening tension 
in the Far East.'*® The British government kept its non-committal 
attitude. In the United States, Hatoyama could only see Assistant 
Secretary of State Valter Robertson because he arrived in the 
middle of the Presidential election campaign. Hence, Eisenhower 
was unable to see Hatoyama, nor could Dulles because of the 
uprisings in Hungary and Poland. But we cannot deny the 
possibility that the Americans were showing their displeasure 
about the result of the second Moscow talks. In fact, during the 
conversation with Robertson, Kono asked the American government to
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issue a statement to the effect that the United States supported 
the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration. Robertson did not,
however, give any assurance about this.eo
In Tokyo, domestic reaction to the Joint Declaration was rather 
cool. The Yoshida faction and anti-normalization groups within 
the L.D.P. furiously opposed the outcome of the Moscow talks. 
But the general trend in Japanese political circles and in public 
opinion was to support the Joint Declaration. Although the 
Socialist Party accused the Hatoyama government of delaying the 
normalization, it indicated its support for the result of the 
Moscow talks. On 27 November, the Joint Declaration was 
unanimously ratified by the House of Representatives. But over 70 
dietmen of the L.D.P. abstained from voting. At the House of 
Councillors, it was ratified on 5 December. On 9 December, Radio 
Moscow announced that the Soviet government had ratified the Joint 
Declaration. The instuments of ratification were exchanged on 12 
December, and the Joint Declaration came into effect.
On the same day as the coming into effect of the Joint 
Declaration, the U.R Security Council passed the Peruvian 
resolution recommending the General Assembly to accept Japan's 
entry to the United Rations. The Soviet Union did not veto it. 
On 18 December, the General Assembly unanimously recognized the 
entry of Japan into the United Rations as its fifty-second member. 
Foreign Minister Shigemitsu made an address at the Assembly to 
express his gratitude at accepting membership of the U.R. and
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indicated M s  hope that 'Japan will become a bridge between the 
East and the Vest.' The repatriation of the Japanese detainees 
was also carried out immediately after the coming into effect of 
the Joint Declaration. 1,025 detainees arrived at Maizuru on 26 
December.
Hatoyama resigned from the prime ministership, as he had 
promised, on 20 December. His successor as leader of the Liberal 
Democratic Party, Ishibashi Tanzan, had already been elected on 14 
December and was duly appointed as prime minister.
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003ST0LTJS I OTvTiS
The Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration put an end to the state of 
war between the Soviet Union and Japan. As a result of this, 
diplomatic channels between the two countries were restored. The 
two countries succeeded in settling various specific problems 
during the negotiations for the normalization. In fact, each of 
the two countries obtained significant gains from the 
negotiations. The Japanese finally could have the Japanese
detainees repatriated from Siberia. Moreover, the Soviet Union 
implemented her promise to support Japan's entry into the United 
Nations unconditionally. In addition, the Japanese succeeded in 
concluding a fishery agreement with the Soviet Union which 
guaranteed safe and stable catches in northern waters.
It appears to have been the Soviet Union which made concessions 
on almost all issues. In effect, the Russians satisfied the 
Japanese requests over the abovementioned issues. Moreover, they 
offered to return the Habomais and Shikotan on condition that 
Japan would recognize Soviet sovereignty over the Kuriies and 
southern Sakhalin. Russia finally dropped both the article 
prohibiting the Japanese from entering in any military alliance 
and that limiting the navigation of the three important straits 
connecting the Japan Sea and the Pacific. But she achieved her 
most crucial goal: to re-establish diplomatic relations with
Japan. As an integral part of global detente policy adopted by
the Soviet Union in the middle of the 1950s, reducing tension 
between Japan and herself must have been regarded as important by 
the Russians. The fact that the Soviets promised to return the 
Habomais and Shikotan inidcated how crucial normalization with 
Japan was. In this sense, they also gained a significant
benefit from normalization.
With regard to the territorial issue, the Soviet Union 
skilfully retained even the Habomais and Shikotan at the very 
last stage of the Soviet-Japanese negotiations. She promised to 
return the Habomais and Shikotan at the time of the conclusion of 
a peace treaty with Japan. But this means that the Soviets could 
retain those islands until the time of the future peace 
settlement between the two countries and that until then they
could use those islands as useful political instruments to exert 
a significant influence on the Japanese. In fact, the Soviet 
government put pressure on Japan by unilaterally altering the 
conditions for the reversion of those islands when Japan revised 
the U.S.-Japanese Security Pact in 1960. The new condition was 
that the Soviet Union would only return the Habomais and 
Shikotan to Japan when a peace treaty was concluded between the
U.S.S.R. and Japan and when all of the foreign troops stationed
in Japan evacuated. In this sense, the Japanese were placed on a
weaker position because they failed to achieve the immediate 
reversion of the Habomais and Shikotan.
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TERRITORIAL QUESTIOW
When considering the results of normalization of Soviet-Japanese 
relations afterwards, one may conclude that the normalization 
talks in 1955-6 had a negative effect on relations between the 
two countries. That was on account of the unsettled territorial 
question. The Joint Declaration stipulated that the Habomais and 
Shikotan would be ceded to Japan when a peace treaty between the 
two countries was concluded. But it did not at all provide that 
negotiations for the peace treaty should deal with the rest of 
the territories of which the Japanese had been requesting the 
Russians to return. The Japanese held that the Joint 
Declaration implied that the territorial issue would be discussed 
at the peace treaty negotiations. But this interpretation was 
only a device to persuade Japanese domestic opposition to the 
Joint Declaration to take a favourable view.
The Joint Declaration itself in fact did not stipulate that the 
territorial question with regard to the disposal of the southern 
Kuriies, the Kuriies, and southern Sakhalin would be dealt with 
in the future. But the domestic political situation, in Japan ^  
forced the Japanese negotiators to make a distorted 
interpretation. Once the public opinion and the domestic 
opposition accepted the interpretation, such an interpretation 
became a basis for Japan's foreign policy towards the Soviet 
Union. On the other hand, the Soviets rather interpreted the 
Joint Declaration did not guarantee that the territorial question
s?y
would be discussed at the peace negotiations. After
normalization, the Japanese were to continue to demand the 
southern Kuriies on the ground that the Joint Declaration
guaranteed the continuation of negotiating on the territorial 
question But the Soviet Union was to Keep rejecting this 
Japanese demand by contending that the territorial questions had 
been settled. This divergence impeded to a great degree the
improvement of Soviet-Japanese relations after normalization.
Thus, the failure to reach a definite settlement on the
territorial question was the most crucial defect of the Soviet- 
Japanese normalization talks in 1955-6. Why did the two
countries fail to settle the problem?
In order to answer this question tentatively, it is helpful to 
sum up policy of each country of the two. Russian policy on the 
territorial issue was rather simple. The Soviet Union was 
prepared to concede the Habomais and Shikotan on condition that 
Japan should recognize Soviet sovereignty over the Kuriies 
including Kunashiri and Etorofu and southern Sakhalin. The 
concession of the Habomais and Shikotan was linked with Japan's 
concession over the rest of the territories in question. In 
other words, the Soviet government had no intention to return 
Kunashiri and Etorofu to Japan. The Russians could not give them 
away for military-strategic reasons. Hence, they never showed 
any sign to accept the Japanese claims to Kunashiri and Etorofu. "
Compared with the Soviet position, the Japanese policy was more 
complicated. The complication may have been caused by confusion 
within the decision-making process of the Japanese government. 
It can, however, be argued that the most basic policy formula was 
embodied in Instruction No. 16 prepared shortly before the start 
of the normalization talks in London in the summer of 1955. 
Combined with other evidence, the Japanese territorial policy can 
be characterized as a three-stage-negotiating-strategy. Briefly 
speaking, according to this strategy, Japan should submit to the 
Russians the following three sets of territorial demands:
Cl] The First Stage:
(1) The reversion of the whole of the Kuriies and southern
Sakhalin.
(2) The reversion of the Habomais and Shikotan.
[23 The Second Stage:
(1> The reversion of the southern Kuriies 
<2> The reversion of the Habomais and Shikotan.
C33 The Third Stage:
(1) The reversion of the Habomais and Shikotan.
This strategy contained the following characteristics. First of 
all, the Japanese government intended to retreat from the first 
stage to the second and to the third, depending on how the 
negotiations progressed and the domestic political situation
developted in Japan. Secondly, Japan's minimum territorial 
condition for normalization was the reversion of the Habomais
and Shikotan. In this connexion, thirdly, the request for the
reversion of the whole of the Kuriies and southern Sakhalin at 
the first stage, and that for the reversion of the southern 
Kuriies at the second stage, were both devised as bargaining 
cards. At least, the Japanese leaders involved with the making 
of this strategy were ready to concede the Kuriies, southern 
Sakhalin and the southern Kuriies.
The Japanese negotiators seem to have proceeded with the 
normalization talks along the lines of the three-stage strategy 
until the second Moscow talks conducted by Foreign Minister 
Shigemitsu. When the Soviets indicated their preparedness to 
return the Habomais and Shikotan in August 1955, the Japanese 
plenipotentiary, Matsumoto Shunichi, seemed to consider that this 
was a chance to settle the territorial question. Because the 
Japanese government's minimum condition was the reversion of the 
Habomais and Shikotan, it was natural for Matsumoto to expect 
that the government would take a positive steps for settlement 
of the territorial question. But the foreign minister adapted an 
extremely cautious policy. He instructed the Japanese 
plenipotentiary in London to make a new request for the reversion 
of Kunashiri and Etorofu, in addition to the Habomais and 
Shikotan.
Behind this decision, there was a mixture of international and 
domestic considerations. Though the minimum condition for the 
normalization was the reversion of the Habomais and Shikotan, 
Shigemitsu had to work out the treatment of the other 
territories, the Kuriies, and southern Sakhalin. The United 
States was clearly against any Japanese attempts to deviate from 
the S.F.P.T. and Shigemitsu must have remembered that the U.S. 
Congress had declared at the time of the ratification of the
S.F.P.T. that the Soviet Union should not derive any benefit from 
the treaty over the Kuriies and southern Sakhalin. Moreover, 
the Liberal Party, which was headed by Ogata Taketora but was 
still under a strong influence of Yoshida, firmly apposed the 
normalization itself and took a tough policy over the territorial 
question. While the conservative merger between the Liberal 
Party and the Democratic Party was the central political issue 
in Japan, the foreign policy of the Democratic government could 
not ignore the possible effect of making territorial concessions 
to the Soviet Union on the attitude of the Liberal Party. On the 
other hand, the Soviet territorial concession over the Habomais 
and Shikotan was made on condition that the Japanese should 
recognize Soviet sovereignty over the Kuriies and southern 
Sakhalin. Considering the possible U.S. reactions and negative 
effects on the conservative merger, Shigemitsu could not accept 
the Soviet terms. He then seemed to offer a minor concession 
in his instructions at the end of August, namely, that Japan 
could be satisfied with an international conference over the 
disposal of the Kuriies and southern Sakhalin and would not demand
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outright reversion of those islands. But, in order to make 
Russia drop her request for Japan's recognition of her 
sovereignty over the Kuriles and Sakhalin, he also intended to 
show a firm attitude of by requesting Kunashiri and Etorofu.
Thus, the first chance to settle the territorial question 
between the U.S.S.R. and Japan was not successfully handled. What was worse 
was the fact that, as a result of the conservative merger in 
November 1955, the reversion of Kunashiri and Etorofu was adopted 
as the fixed policy of the newly emerged L.D.P. This policy was 
undoubtedly formed under great pressure from the Liberals. Mow 
the restoration of the southern Kuriles which had originally been 
put on the negotiating table as a bargaining card had became a 
fixed national policy. One must admit that this was an
unfortunate factor in Soviet-Japanese relations. Furthermore, 
this hard line territorial policy was strongly supported by the 
sense of nationalism which had been enhanced since Japan had 
achieved independence thanks to the S.F.P.T. Even the
opposition party, the J.S.P., took the hardest position on the 
territorial issue: they called for the restoration of the
Kuriles and Sakhalin, as well as the Habomais and Shikotan.
Under these circumstances, Japan's foreign policy lost its 
flexibility.
At his first Moscow talks, Shigemitsu also suffered from 
intereference from domestic politics. The Moscow talks were the 
last negotiations in which the Japanese tried to settle the
territorial question through a peace treaty. Though Shigemitsu 
asserted the previous Japanese position at an early stage of the 
Moscow talks, he finally started to retreat from the hard-line 
position. At the last stage of the negotiations, Shigemitsu 
decided to accept the Soviet terms which had never been altered 
since August 1955. But Tokyo refused to approve his decision 
which was out of line with the party policy on the territorial 
issue. This would have caused serious trouble for the Hatoyama 
administration. Moreover, public opinion also had become tough 
and nationalist sentiment had been further provoked by 
Shigemitsu's firm negotiations at the earliest stage of the 
second Moscow talks. Taking into account these conditions, the 
Hatoyama cabinet decided to put aside Shigemitsu's suggestion.
The Japanese should have concluded a peace treaty on Soviet 
terms, as Shigemitsu suggested. The Japanese tried to restore 
the southern Kuriles but they seemed not to have any right to 
demand them. First of all, their rationale for their demand was 
that the southern Kuriles were not part of the Kuriles. But this 
contention has effectively been refuted by Professor Vada Haruki. 
According to Professor Vada, the Kuriles-Sakhalin Exchange Treaty 
in 1875, on which the Japanese government based its claims to the 
southern Kuriles, indicated unequivocally that Kunashiri and 
Etorofu were part of the Kuriles. The Japanese claims to them 
was, Vada argues, a product of Japanese misinterpretation of the 
authorized Russian and French text of the treaty. Moreover, the 
Japanese government had already declared at the Rational Diet in
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1951 that it defined the southern Kuriles as part of the Kuriles. 
It also should not be overlooked that the Japanese demand far the 
reversion of the southern Kuriles was originally devised as a 
bargaining card. It must be said that it is unreasonable for the 
Japanese to have mortgaged the future improvement of Soviet- 
Japanese relations in order to get back the territories which 
had only been regarded as a mere a bargaining card had been 
attached. In this sense, domestic political situations in Japan 
seemes to have dominated the reasonable process of diplomacy.
Thus, the last chance during the normalization talks to settle 
the territorial dispute between the two countries was mainly 
spoiled by the Japanese domestic political confusion. But the 
Soviet Union could not escape its responsibility. At least, the 
Soviets failed to calm down anti-Soviet nationalism and 
suspicion in Japan. To be sure, anti-Soviet nationalism had been 
intensified through psychological manoeuvres by the United States 
and the conservative leaders of Japan, such as Yoshida, since the 
end of V.V.II. But the harsh treatment of the Japanese detainees 
in Siberia by the Soviet Union and her intention to use those 
detainees as hostages or diplomatic instruments to extract 
Japanese concessions during the negotiations reduced the 
possibility that she could secure general public support for an 
early normalization at the expense of the southern Kuriles.
SOVIBT-JAPAMESE NORMALIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IN  THE 
MIDDLE OF THE 1950S: The Cold War, D etente , and N o rm iliza tio n
Specific reasons for the failure in settling the territorial
issue can be described as above. But the meaning of the Soviet-
failure
Japanese normalization and of theirA in reaching a territorial 
settlement can also be understood in the broad context of 
international politics.
In the middle of the 1950s, the general trend of international 
politics seemed to be transformed. The basic structure of the
cold war still remained unresolved. Rather, the East-West arms
race had been intensified and the world had entered into the era 
of thermo-nuclear weapons. The western bloc almost completed its 
establishinent of a network of alliances in the far east, south­
east Asia, and the middle east. On the other hand, many examples 
of international attempts to reduce East-West tensions could be 
seen at this period, which made a sharp contrast to the early 
1950s. The Soviet Union softened her foreign policy and the 
policy of 'peaceful coexistence' was carried out in various 
regions of the world. In 1953, the Korean War reached the 
ceasefire. In 1954, the Indochina War was brought to an end 
through co-operation between Britain and the Soviet Union. The 
Austrian problem was solved through the conclusion of the 
Austrian State Treaty in 1955. The Soviet Union also established 
diplomatic relations with West Germany in the same year. In this 
sense, there was an emerging trend of detente in the
international politics in this period. To sum up, the general 
international situation could broadly be characterized as the 
inter-section of two trends: the trend of the continuing the cold 
war, and the trends of "the detente.
The Soviet-Japanese normalization can be located in this broad 
spectrum of international politics. In other words, the Soviet- 
Japanese normalization in one of its aspects was an example of 
mixture between the reduction of tensions and the continuation 
of the cold war. Moreover, this attempt at normalization was 
closely connected with diversity in Japan which in a way 
reflected the new international situation.
Both before and after the conclusion of the S.F.P.T., Yoshida 
Shigeru had been in charge of foreign policy. Yoshida's foreign 
policy seemed to be strictly based on the principle that Japan 
should be loyal to the United States as a member of the free 
world in the context of the cold war. A series of Soviet peace 
overtures had been rejected by the Yoshida government. Peace 
with the Soviet Union was from Yoshida's point of view a 
deviation from the international relationship which had been 
established by the S.F.P.T. and the U.S.-Japanese Security Pact. 
His rigid cold war foreign policy at last became unpopular to 
Japanese public opinion in the international atmosphere of 
detente in 1953-4 intensified by the cease-fires in Korea and 
later in Indochina. Thus, in 1954, domestic and international 
conditions became now favourable to Hatoyama who had been
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asserting the significance and urgency of Soviet-Japanese 
normalization.
The mixed character of world politics seemed to make it very 
difficult for the leaders to build up national consensus with 
regard to the world trend and therefore to Soviet intentions. 
Broadly speaking, there were two groups fighting with each other 
over the normalization issue. One was the group which could be 
called the cold war oriented group represented by Yoshida and 
Ashida. This group asserted that Japan should be loyal to the 
United States and, therefore, that the normalization itself and 
making territorial concessions to the Soviet Union were 
undesirable in terms of U. S.-Japanese relations. In this sense, 
this group emphasized the significance of the aspect of the cold 
war in the international relations in the middle of the 1950s. 
In fact, the people who could categorized in this group held a 
strong suspicion about credibility of Soviet softening 
international attitudes which had taken place since the death of 
Stalin. The other group may be characterized as the detente 
oriented group, which was represented by Hatoyama and his foreign 
policy advisers. Hatoyama had been asserting that Japan should 
restore normal relations with neighbouring communist countries 
since 1952. The group tended to emphasize significance of the 
new trend of international political situations emerging in the 
middle of 1950s: the trend towards reduction of international
tensions. They also held the view that Japan should contribute 
to the reduction of international tensions or at least
participate in the trend. The territorial question seemed to be 
considered less significance than the necessity of normalization 
with the Soviet Union. This group played the most important role 
to realize the normalization.
These two groups were struggling against each other. Faced 
with the growing strength of the J.S.P. and the urgency of the 
conservative merger against the Socialists, however, the two 
groups also had to compromise in the field of normalization 
policy. Normalization policy of the Japanese government was 
formed through compromises between the two conflicting policies 
held by each group. As a result of the compromise, 
normalization with the Soviet Union was sought. As for the 
territorial question, however, the view of the cold war oriented 
group was embodied in government policy. The persistent claims 
of the Japanese to the southern Kuriles reflected this view of 
the cold war group.
Soviet policy towards Japan also had a character of duality. 
The Soviet offer to return the Habomais and Shikotan reflected 
their determination to reduce tensions between Japan and their 
country even at the expense of those islands which they had been 
asserting were their own territories. But they could not give 
away the southern Kuriles. Those islands were vital to Soviet 
anti-American military strategy. Thus, Soviet persistent refusal 
to return the southern Kuriles reflected constraints imposed by 
cold war considerations.
After Shigemitsu's failure in Moscow, the detente oriented 
group managed to grasp the initiative in approaching 
normalization by shelving the territorial question. Shigemitsu 
did not actually belong to the cold war oriented group. He was 
rather a practical mediator between the two groups. He 
formulated normalization policy, based on a delicate balance of 
various factors, internal and external. Hence, Shigemitsu played 
a role to project the view of the cold war oriented group into 
the government's foreign policy. But, after the first Moscow 
talks, Shigemitsu's influence in the cabinet drastically 
declined. Hatoyama's policy ideas became more significant than 
ever: the territorial problem was seen as less significant than
the achievement of the normalization. Though Hatoyama had to 
request an immediate reversion of the Habomais and Shikotan 
during his visit to Moscow because of strong pressure from the 
cold war oriented group, he finally managed to restore 
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union by making substantial 
concessions on the territorial issue: the Japanese agreed to the 
postponement of the return of the Habomais and Shikotan until the 
time of the conclusion of the peace treaty and to the deletion 
from the Joint Declaration of a phrase which indicated that the 
territorial question would be dealt with in future peace 
negotiations between the two countries.
Thus, the duality of world politics, in other words the 
interaction of the cold war and the detente, affected Soviet 
policy towards Japan and the domestic divergences in Japan.
Soviet-Japanese normalization was a product of the detente in 
Soviet-Japanese relations in the middle of the 1950s. In 
addtian, it can be argued that the failure to settle the
territorial question had an aspect of being a product of the 
clash between the cold war phase of Soviet policy and the 
influence of the cold war group in Japan.
Did Soviet-Japanese normalization transform world politics? 
Or more specifically, did it alter international relations in the 
far east? Since the conclusion of the S.F.P.T., far eastern 
international relations surrounding Japan had basically been 
characterised by the following factors. Firstly, the
confrontation of two military alliances: the U.S.-Japanese
Security- pact and the Sino-Soviet pact of Friendship, Alliance,and 
Mutual Assistance. Secondly, the lack of normal relations
between Japan and the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and between 
Japan and Communist China, on the other. The lack of
communication channels between those countries meant the lack of 
a basic mechanism for restraining regional conflicts between 
them. Moreover, conflicts between them could easily escalate to 
the stage of the superpower conflicts.
The first factor was not transformed by normalization.
Rather, normalization was realized on the basis of the mutual 
understanding and recognition of the existence of the 
confrontation between those military alliances. During the 
negotiations, the Japanese had made it a pre-condition that the
Soviet Union should not request Japan to do anything 
contradictory to the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Security 
Pact. The Soviets did not seriously try to challenge this. 
Thus, one of the most important components of the cold war, East- 
Vest confrontation of the military alliances, was not at ail 
dissolved by normalization. The second factor was partly 
changed. Heedless to say, diplomatic relations were re­
established between the U.S.S.R. and Japan, and the basic 
machinery for conflict solving, namely embassies, was set up. 
But the failure to settle the territorial question left a 
stumbling block to the further improvement of Soviet-Japanese 
relations. Perhaps, the normalization talks rather
paradoxically provoked irredentist sentiments among the Japanese 
and crystallized mutual suspicion between the two countries. 
Sino-Japanese relations were not directly affected by the 
normalization between the U.S.S.R. and Japan. 3ut it can be 
argued that some of the Japanese political leaders and business 
leaders may have been encouraged by the normalization to promote 
Sino-Japanese relations. In fact, Prime Minister Ishibashi 
Tanzan, the successor to Hatoyama, announced at his inauguration 
that the new government's policy would be to normalize relations 
between Japan and Communist China. But his cabinet collapsed 
shortly and the issue of Sino-Japanese normalization was put 
aside.
Thus, except for the termination of the state of war and the 
re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the
U.S.S.R., the new arrangement did not drastically alter far 
eastern international relations. To be sure, Soviet-Japanese 
normalization contributed to some extent to the reduction of 
international tensions in the far east, and can be regarded as 
one of the examples of detente in the middle of the 1950s. But 
the normalization did not have an effect whereby the 
international situation in the far east could escape from the 
constraints of the cold war.
INTERS A TIONAL REACTIONS: B r i ta in 's  and the United S ta te s '
A ttitu d e s
The Soviet-Japanese normalization involved not only the U.S.S.R. 
and Japan, but also the countries which had been deeply involved 
in the making of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, particularly the 
United States and Britain. The Japanese were well aware of the 
necessity to rely on support from their western allies in order 
to steer the negotiations in their favour. Japan had not been a 
great power for long. Without international support, there 
would not be any good prospect for acquiring gains from the 
Soviets, in particular on the territorial issue. Hence, the 
Japnese government sought support and advice from Britain and the 
United States.
The British government was a host-country of the Soviet- 
Japanese negotiations. It seems that the British government was 
quite willing to serve as a host-country because they expected 
that they could exert some influence on the development of the 
normalization talks. It is also likely that, they considered 
that if the normalization talks succeeded in London, Anglo- 
Japanese relations which were supposed by the British Foreign 
Office to be very bad could be improved because the British would 
be thanked by the Japanese for their assistance as the host- 
country.
More importantly, and more directly connected with the contents 
of the negotiations, Britain was asked by the Japanese for 
assistance in their effort to promote the repatriation of the 
Japanese detainees. The Japanese Foreign Ministry seemed to 
carry out a plan to request a milder treatment of Japanese war 
criminals captured by Britain and plead for their early release 
in order to urge the Soviet Union to return those detainees by 
quoting British favourable treatment. Furthermore, in April 
1956, Japanese Ambassador Nishi also requested the British 
government to refer to its support for Japan's position over the 
repatriation issue at a meeting between Prime Minister Eden and 
Bulganin and Khrushchev during the latter's visit to Britain. 
The British did not give a response favourable to the Japanese 
requests. The question of the Japanese war criminals was still a 
serious issue in Britain. Considering domestic reactions, the 
British government could not treat this issue for the purpose of
the Japanese negotiations with Russia. As for the latter request 
from Japan, the British government explained that because of the 
shortage of time this issue could not be dealt with at the 
Anglo-Soviet summit meeting in London.
The most important issue of the Soviet-Japanese negotiations 
with which the British were closely connected was the territorial 
issue. As one of the main architects of the S.F.P.T., Britain 
could not avoid a certain involvement with this issue. Also 
the Japanese government sought British support and advice. In 
July 1955, the government asked the Foreign Office for its views 
on the territorial issue. The Foreign Office sent a memorandum 
to Tokyo, which must have been disappointing. It seems that the 
British answer contended that the Soviet Union could possess the 
Kuriles and southern Kuriles on the basis of the prescriptive 
principle. The Foreign Office held that southern Sakhalin was 
incontestablly under Soviet sovereignty and that Japan had 
already lost her de jure sovereignty over the islands, while the 
Soviets gained the de facto sovereignty and probably de jure too. 
The British retained the original views they had orginally 
expressed in the process of the peace making with Japan in 1950- 
1. It must be remembered that Britain had even suggested that 
the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin should be transferred to the 
Soviet Union even if she did not participate in the S.F.P.T. The 
British contention in 1955 was still based on ideas 
originally put forward in the Yalta Agreement.
With regard to the definition of 'the Kuriles', there is no 
evidence suggesting that the Foreign Office dealt with the issue 
seriously around 1955, preferring to hold the views constructed 
in 1950-1. In April 1951, the British government had prepared a 
draft peace treaty with Japan, in which it clearly drew a border 
line between the Soviet Union and Japan which clearly indicated 
that Kunashiri and Etorofu were included in the Kuriles and in 
Soviet territory.
Even though the British government had such a clear view on the 
territorial question, it tried to keep itself strictly non­
committal on the issue. The British government could not openly 
support Japanese territorial claims with these views described 
above. In August 1955, the Japanese proposed that the Soviets 
convene an international conference to discuss the disposal of 
the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. It is not surprising that the 
British reaction to this proposal was negative. The reasons for 
the non-committal attitude of Britain can be pointed out as 
follows. Firstly, the Foreign Office feared that, if Britain gat 
involved, the Japanese would put the blame on the British for 
their interference if they failed in normalizing their relations 
with the Soviet Union. The British were well aware of the 
upsurge of Japanese nationalism since her independence and that 
any interference would be received with hostility. They also 
realized that Japan should be kept in the free world in order to 
prevent a Sino-Japanese coalition. The Foreign Office desired, 
therefore, to avoid inducing Japanese nationalistic sentiments to
turn towards anti-western or anti-British feelings. Secondly, 
Britain was faced with a dilemma. British foreign policy in the 
middle of the 1950s tended to aim at the improvement of Anglo- 
Soviet relations. If the British had to support the Japanese 
territorial claims positively, Anglo-Soviet relations could he in 
difficulty. The British government would have to revise its 
basic position that it was still observing the Yalta Agreement. 
The alteration of this position would have had an enormous effect 
on Anglo-Soviet relations.
Although they took such non-committal attitudes, the British
were in favour of Soviet-Japanese normalization. They argued
that, even without Japan's regaining the southern Kuriles, 
normalization would be beneficial to the Japanese. Moreover, it 
seems that the British tended to consider that normalization
would operate as a stabilizing factor in the far east. Dening 
even suggested in his own opinion to Shigemitsu that Japan 
should define the border line with the Soviet Union, even if she 
could not have back Kunashiri and Etorofu. It can be assumed 
that the British government tended to make efforts to stabilize 
regional conflicts in the middle of the 1950s such as the 
Indochina war and the Taiwan crisis and, therefore, never tried 
to do anything which could be interpreted as interference against 
the normalization between Japan and the Soviet Union. In other 
words, it can be argued that the British attitudes towards the 
Soviet-Japanese normalization were based on the general 
orientation of British foreign policy towards detente. Tha-t
being the case, it can be argued that the British attitudes 
were, in general, a fusion between their desire to keep the 
Japanese in the western camp, on the one hand, and their 
recognition that normalization could contribute to far eastern 
detente on the other.
Basically, the U.S. government also tried to remain non­
committal towards the normalization talks between the U.S.S.R. 
and Japan. But its attitudes were those of a worried observer, 
rather than a benevolent observer like the British government. 
The Americans assumed that the normalization would enhance Soviet 
and communist subversive activities in Japan. They also feared 
that a Soviet-Japanese rapprochement would finally lead to a 
Sino-Japanese rapprochement, which the U.S. government was most 
anxious to prevent. Moreover, American security interests were 
closely connected with the disposal of the Kuriles. Hence, from 
the U.S. government's viewpoint, Japan should be discouraged 
from making any territorial concessions and recognising Soviet 
territorial claims. But Washington was also aware of the strong 
anti-American sentiment among the Japanese people. It was most 
important for the Americans not to irritate Japanese nationalist 
feelings and not to provoke further anti-Americanism by giving 
the appearance of exerting influence on Japan's decision­
making. Under these circumstances, the American government only 
expressed its general hope for the Japanese to gain as many 
concessions from the Soviets as possible during the negotiations
and subtlely warned the Japanese against making too many 
concessions to the Soviets.
There was actually a reason why the United States government 
did not wish to intervene in the normalization talks at any cost. 
Foreign Minister Shigemitsu was widely regarded as a pro-American 
diplomat. Even after the start of the Soviet-Japanese 
negotiations, the State Department appreciated Shigemitsu*s 
cautious handling of normalization talks with the Russians. 
Shigemitsu and the Foreign Ministry certainly made the utmost 
efforts to keep the appearance of Japan's loyalty to the United 
States. Even Prime Minister Hatoyama tried to assure the 
Americans that his cabinet had no intention to adopt a neutralist 
foreign policy. In this situation, the U.S. government could 
rely on the sensitivity of the Japanese leaders to its possible 
reactions and its desires with regard to the Soviet-Japanese 
normalization.
In May 1956, the situation started to change. Within the 
Hatoyama administration, particularly in the foreign policy­
making process, the influence of Kono Ichiro became stronger. 
His success in the fisheries talks in Moscow and his promise to 
resume the normalization talks by the end of July marked the 
point where the influence of the Foreign Ministry began to fall. 
Shigemitsu*s failure in Moscow in August seemed to the U.S. 
leaders to imply the loss of their useful leverage in the 
Hatoyama cabinet. Added to that, the lobbyists interested in
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Japan and the far east now started to assert that the U.S. 
government should exert more direct influence on the Soviet- 
Japanese negotiations. The State Department also seemed to start 
being more anxious about the possibility that the achievement of 
the Soviet-Japanese normalization would enhance Japanese desire 
to normalize her relations with Communist China. In September, 
the United States finally decided to end her non-committal stance 
and issued an Aide-Memoire explicitly supporting the Japanese 
claims to the southern Kuriles. Moreover, she even planned to 
offer the Japanese her goad offices to arrange a international 
support for the Japanese territorial claims jointly with Britain.
Perhaps based on the lesson derived from the Anglo-American 
dispute over 'the Yoshida letter', and taking into account a 
friction between the two having taken place in the Geneva 
Conference for the Indochina war in 1954, the U.S. government 
endeavoured to keep in touch with the British in handling the 
Soviet-Japanese negotiations. Until the U.S. had issued her 
Aide-Memoire, the British seemed to warn the Americans subtlely 
against committing themselves too much to the Soviet-Japanese 
negotiations. Faced with the Aide-Memoire, moreover, the 
British immediately issued a statement that they did not approve 
the contents of the Aide-Memoire. Here, we can see again the 
pattern that Britain tried to restrain American open 
intervention in Asian affairs.
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Regarding the Soviet-Japanese territorial dispute, American 
views also changed in September 1956, Since the making of the 
S.F.P.T. in 1949-1951, the State Department had taken the view 
that the southern Kuriles were part of 'the Kuriles' and that 
only the Habomais and Shikotan were under Japanese sovereignty. 
Even after the start of normalization talks, the U.S. continued 
to hold this view. Unlike the British, the Americans had 
already in 1946 taken the position that the Yalta Agreement would 
be invalid unless it was confirmed by a peace treaty between 
Japan and the Allied Powers. But, until September 1956, they 
gave no clear sign of strong endorsment for Japan's claims to the 
southern Kuriles, not to mention her claims to the Kuriles and 
southern Sakhalin.
The U.S. decision to give up being non-committal in the middle 
of 1956 also affected her position on the territorial issue. The 
U. S. government had been adopting since 1949 the view that the 
southern Kuriles were part of the Kuriles. Dulles did not, 
therefore, show any clear support, for the Japanese claims to 
Kunashiri and Etorofu, though he supported their claims to the 
Habomais and Shikotan at the San Francisco Peace Conference. 
The U.S. government now clearly stated that it endorsed Japanese 
claims to the southern Kuriles in its Aide-Memoire of September. 
The U.S. statement had the effect of discouraging Japanese 
leaders from signing a peace treaty on Soviet terms. Under the 
circumstances where the Soviets showed their determination not to 
return the southern Kuriles, the issue of the Aide-Memoire
operated as an effective wedge driven between Japan and the 
U.S.S.R. This wedge has been operating to divide Japan and the 
Soviet Union on the territorial question ever since. The U.S. 
Aide-Memoire is still quoted as an evidence of international 
support for Japan's claims to the southern Kuriles. If so, it 
can be now argued that although the United States did not prevent 
the Japanese government from normalizing Soviet-Japanese 
relations in 1956, she set up an effective obstacle to further 
improvement of Soviet-Japanese relations.
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